Homeland Defense:
Assumptions First, Strategy Second

Col. Randall J. Larsen, USAF (Ret.) and Ruth A. David, Ph.D.
October 2000

Previously published in the Fall 2000 edition of Strategic Review

Each new administration brings with it a set of assumptions on national security issues. These assumptions provide the framework for strategy, policy, and resource allocation. It is not clear today what assumptions a new administration will bring to Washington regarding homeland defense. With the possible exception of national missile defense, neither major party has provided details on what may become the most important national security issue America will face in the coming decade.      What is homeland defense? The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) states, “Homeland defense is the core of military service.”[1] Yet the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not define or even mention the term.[2] Ask foreign military officers what the mission of their nations’ armed forces is and most will say, “To defend our homeland.” That is not the answer one would hear from most American military officers.      Homeland defense is something NORAD has been doing since its inception in 1958. But for most other military units and other federal, state, and local government organizations, homeland defense is a new concept. That is precisely why homeland defense is arguably the most misunderstood term in the national security vernacular. In fact, there is a raging debate among and within federal agencies whether this mission should be called “homeland defense,” “domestic security,” or “civil support.”      The new administration can quickly correct this problem. It should state that homeland defense is neither an isolationist, “fortress America” concept nor a mission primarily focused on managing the consequences of a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil. In the 21st century, the term “homeland defense” is nearly synonymous with how we used the term “national security” in the latter half of the 20th century. There are just two primary differences: Nation-states, large and small, and some non-state actors have the capability to bring a new form of warfare to the American homeland. New types of weapons, primarily cyber- and biological, are immune to our superpower status and traditional defenses.      The homeland defense mission in the 21st century should not be confused with counterterrorism in the 20th century. This is not about someone driving a truck bomb into the parking garage of a large government building. That would be a tragedy, but homeland defense is about serious threats to national security. This new type of threat, unfortunately, will prove to be the most significant change in national security since the invention of the hydrogen bomb.      Since the report of the National Defense Panel in 1997 first mentioned the emerging threat to the American homeland, numerous workshops, conferences, and commissions, plus several General Accounting Office reports, have identified the requirement to develop a strategy for homeland defense.[3] This should be a high priority for the next president. However, America is not ready to develop this strategy, because there is no consensus on the key assumptions that would underpin any such strategy. Wide disagreements exist on the nature of the threat, the probability of attack, the roles and missions of the federal, state, and local governments, and the role of the private sector. This diversity of opinions and assumptions has added value to the discussion.      Homeland defense is a new concept for America, requiring new ideas, new partnerships, and vigorous debate. But the true value of these discussions will not be realized until the new administration moves from the academic phase (“we need another commission”) to the action phase (statement of assumptions, strategy and policy development, and resource allocation). The first step in the action phase should be a presidential white paper on homeland defense. It should contain five key assumptions: The threat of asymmetric attacks on the American homeland, either by nation-states or terrorist organizations, is real and will increase during the next decade. The federal government will play the leading role in deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution, and retaliation. State assets (which include the National Guard) and local governments will play the lead role in first response and consequence management. The private sector will play a critical operational role, particularly in defending against and responding to cyber-attacks and biological attacks. An integrated warning-information-coordination system is required to ensure effective use of resources to mitigate effects during and after large-scale attacks or campaigns.      Whether a new administration agrees with the foregoing assumptions and definitions is far less important than the act of clearly communicating its own assumptions. The homeland defense mission needs a leader, and only one person can provide that leadership. He will take office on January 20, 2001. The Five Assumptions      1. The threat of asymmetric attacks on the American homeland, either by nation-states or terrorist organizations, is real and will increase during the next decade. Some disparagingly use the terms alarmists, doomsayers, and worst-case scenarios to downplay the threat. Yet respected national security leaders such as Secretary of Defense William Cohen, General Colin Powell, and former Senator Sam Nunn tell us otherwise.[4] The fact is that no one can tell us when an event will happen, but a growing field of national security experts and analysts agree that the possibility of occurrence is increasing. Instead of focusing on predictions that we all know are fallacious, a more reliable model is used by Dr. Lani Kass at the National War College: Vulnerabilities x Intentions x Capabilities = Threat.[5]      Like any nation, America is vulnerable to nuclear weapons, but due to our rapidly increasing dependence on information technology, America is even more vulnerable than most countries to cyber-attacks. We all witnessed what two junior college dropouts can do when they launched the ILoveYou virus on the Internet. In April 1998 a few dozen U.S. government employees assumed the role of the enemy in an exercise called “Eligible Receiver.” They quickly demonstrated their ability to shut down America’s power grid and seriously disrupt U.S. military forces in the Pacific.[6] Imagine what damage a 21st-century adversary could inflict with a team of computer engineers trained in America’s best universities.        Biological warfare is another area of increasing concern. Our vulnerability to a large-scale biological event was demonstrated during the winter of 1918–19 when 600,000 Americans died of influenza (naturally occurring) and once again during the recent “Topoff” exercise, in which a simulated attack with pneumonic plague overwhelmed medical facilities in central Colorado.[7] Our friendly neighbors to the north and south, the two oceans that have protected our eastern and western flanks, and our strong military no longer provide protection from threats that modern technologies make possible. America’s vulnerability to asymmetric attacks is real and significant.      While the technology has changed, motivations and intentions have not. More than 2,500 years ago Plato said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.” Unfortunately, these words are just as true today. During the coming decades, nation-states and nongovernmental actors will perceive “justifiable reason” to challenge America’s leadership. Their intentions may be Clausewitzian—attack our center of gravity (the once impregnable homeland) to obtain political goals—or they may seek only to punish us and reveal our Achilles’ heel. Some say no one would dare attack our homeland for fear of massive retaliation. But many threats, especially biological and cyber-attacks, can unfold anonymously.      In this equation, capabilities represent the critical factor that is changing most. The growing cyber-threat is obvious. Less obvious is the growing biological threat. While most agree that the chances of a small terrorist group developing a bioweapon capable of killing millions is remote, the fact remains that certain scenarios do pose a serious threat to the American homeland.        One of the problems with the 1998 Gilmore Commission’s examination of the threat from weapons of mass destruction was that it focused exclusively on current terrorist activities and excluded nation-states as well as future capabilities. Furthermore, it used Aum Shinrikyo as an example of a well-funded terrorist organization that failed to successfully weaponize anthrax, and it concluded that biological warfare was not a serious threat.[8] This was the wrong “lesson learned.” The cult members charged with developing a biological warfare program were physicians and chemists. There were no microbiologists working on Aum Shinrikyo’s biological warfare program. That is why they failed. The fact remains that most nation-states and many well-funded terrorist organizations have the capability to produce sophisticated biological weapons. Future developments, including genetically engineered biological warfare agents, will likely be a reality within the next decade.[9]      Others, such as Jonathan Tucker, a highly respected scholar from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “proved” that biological warfare would not likely be a threat because so many attempts have failed in the past. However, he admits that if a terrorist organization obtained high-quality biological warfare agents from the Soviet Union’s program (which produced such agents by the tons), it would pose a serious threat.[10] Supposedly, these massive stockpiles have been destroyed. But “seed stock” of these agents (plague, smallpox, Marburg, anthrax, and many others) remains. So do the scientists who produced these weapons. Most are unpaid and underemployed, a fact well known by our adversaries.[11]      The question is not whether the vast majority of terrorist groups are capable of launching a large-scale biological warfare attack on the American homeland. They are not. The question is: Is it reasonable to assume that no terrorist organization or hostile nation-state could develop the capability to launch a successful biological warfare attack on the American homeland? (How can one make that assumption, when the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and several other nations built highly sophisticated biological weapons programs with 1960s technology?) The paramount assumption that must come from the new administration is that the current and, more important, the near-term vulnerability x intentions x capability equation produces a serious threat to the American homeland.      2. The federal government will play the leading role in deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution, and retaliation. One of the most hotly debated issues of homeland defense is “Who is in charge?” The answer is both simple and complex. According to the U.S. Constitution,[12] the president is in charge of defending the homeland; however, outside the Oval Office the responsibility, authority, and accountability become obscure and include federal officials, governors, mayors, fire chiefs, and many others. The Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and Bremer Commissions have examined these issues, but none has resolved them. A presidential white paper should assign responsibility based on mission areas. The federal government should have the lead for deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution, and retaliation. Of the five assumptions in this paper, this will be the least controversial, with the possible exception of attribution.        Attribution is a relatively new concept in national security. For the past 200 years, weapons have primarily used blast, heat, and fragmentation. As John Train noted in the Summer 2000 issue of Strategic Review, bullets, bombs, and missiles generally come with return addresses. Cyber-attacks and biological attacks may not. Swift, accurate forensics is critical to proper response (retaliation), and that may play an important role in preventing or deterring further attacks. To ensure swift, accurate forensics, the federal government will need total cooperation from local officials. America cannot afford a repeat of the confusion that occurred following President Kennedy’s assassination about who was in charge of the investigation—the Dallas police, the sheriff’s department, the FBI, or the Secret Service.[13] The factors that caused confusion between these law enforcement agencies have been corrected by Congressional legislation. In the case of homeland defense, we must not wait for another confused and uncoordinated response before correcting the problem. America must avoid what former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre refers to as “the fault lines” between federal, state, and local areas of responsibility.      3. State assets (which include the National Guard) and local governments will play the lead role in first response and consequence management. With the exception of unique skills, such as the Department of Energy’s ability to handle nuclear weapons and the Defense Department’s technical support following a chemical attack, the vast majority of first response assets will come from state and local governments—particularly following the mass disruption and consequences of a major biological or cyber-attack. The federal government can play an important role in providing standards for equipment and training; however, these first responders (firefighters, police officers and hazardous-material teams) will clearly be under the command and control of state and local officials.      These resources serve the nation best when they can be loaned to other jurisdictions as needed. The National Guard, commanded by state governors (except when federalized), is a superb example of how national standards can be of great benefit to state assets. Moreover, National Guard units often respond in states other than their own following natural disasters. Their national standardization greatly facilitates effective integration with units in other states—a capability needed when responding to weapons that self-replicate—such as computer and biological viruses.        4. The private sector will play a critical operational role, particularly in defending against and responding to cyber and biological attacks. The need for a new partnership among the federal, state, and local governments for homeland defense is a new concept that some will have difficulty accepting. Even more difficult, perhaps, will be the necessity to include the private sector in this partnership. But it must be included, because most of this nation’s critical information infrastructure is privately owned.        The most difficult challenge in forming this new partnership will not be to get the public sector to cooperate; rather, the problem will be the private sector. Today, corporations, large and small, are less-than-enthusiastic partners. Many corporations admit privately that they are fearful of reporting computer crimes and attacks because investigations could Disrupt their business (when the FBI confiscates their storage devices to complete its investigation) Provide self-incriminating information to law enforcement officials Compromise highly sensitive proprietary information[14]      A critical element in this new partnership will be to require that cyber-crimes and cyber-attacks be investigated by a new type of organization, or under laws that provide immunity and ironclad security guarantees. The new organization would more closely resemble NASA or a not-for-profit corporation than it would the Department of Justice. Several information-sharing and policy-coordination partnerships exist between the private and public sectors, but the “law enforcement” problems must be resolved.[15] There should be no hesitation to report computer crimes and computer attacks to the appropriate authorities. Rapid reporting—and response—is required to protect America’s critical information infrastructures.      Another important element in the private-public partnership will be the role the private sector plays in responding to a biological emergency, either man-made or naturally occurring. The initial indication of such an attack will likely come from doctors, nurses, and medical technicians. Today there exists a mature partnership between the public and private health communities.[16] What is lacking is a real-time epidemiological reporting system that will allow rapid analysis and coordination on a national level. This shortfall was apparent in the Topoff exercise.      5. An integrated warning-information-coordination system is required to ensure effective use of resources to mitigate effects during and after large-scale attacks or campaigns. When Ray Downey, Chief of the New York City Fire Department’s Special Operations Unit, was asked what system was available to provide information from one municipality to another about the details of an asymmetric campaign on the American homeland, his answer was “None.”[17] In other words, if attacks were under way in cities on the West Coast, no system in existence could pass critical information to first responders in New York or other cities.      Nowhere was this more obvious than during a February 2000 tabletop exercise by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and their senior staffs. This exercise began with the hypothetical explosion of a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon in downtown Cincinnati. The lack of an integrated information and coordination system was obvious throughout the exercise, according to John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense.[18] This failure was also witnessed during the Topoff exercise in May 2000, in which simultaneous chemical, biological, and radiological attacks occurred in three widely separated metropolitan areas.      One of the most important roles the federal government should play in preparing America’s capability to respond to a serious attack on our homeland is to build an integrated warning-information-coordination system. It would provide the means to monitor activities from a national level. Is the massive disruption of power on the West Coast part of a coordinated attack, or is the simultaneous outbreak of West Nile Virus on the East Coast just a coincidence? How about an oil pipeline break just outside of Houston coupled with air traffic control disruptions in Chicago? Today, the capability for rapid, integrated analysis of such events does not exist.        This system would also provide first responders across the country with “controlled or classified” information during crises, and it would be a great management and coordination tool for governors and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to use, especially in responding to crises that involve bordering states.        The $40 million federal coordination center built for Y2K has, unfortunately, been dismantled. It would have served as an excellent prototype for a nationwide homeland defense warning-information-coordination system. It should be located in the nation’s capital, but also have regional centers for redundancy (backup) and to provide more liaison with state emergency management centers.   Recommendations        During its first 100 days in office, the newly elected administration should issue a white paper on homeland defense. It should include the aforementioned assumptions and perhaps a few others. One important issue not mentioned above is the problem with reliable warning from the Intelligence Community. Counting Soviet missile silos, ships, and armored divisions was a much easier challenge than it will be to discover biological weapons laboratories and cyber-warfare capabilities. The prospect of an attack out of the blue will increase in the 21st century, both against our deployed military forces and on our homeland.        It is therefore not prudent to assume the threat away just because it has not happened yet. The Vulnerabilities x Intentions x Capabilities = Threat equation provides the requirement for action by the new president. America will face new threats in the 21st century. They may not be imminent, but they are real, and the threat of attack on the American homeland will increase with time. The time to prepare is now, not the day after. The president is the only individual with the clout needed to lead the federal effort and to coordinate and cajole support from state, local, and private organizations. He is the only leader capable of bringing about the structural and organizational changes required. The preparation does not require new big-ticket items, but it does require new thinking, new concepts, and strong leadership.        As a young nation we defended our homeland with coastal batteries. During the Cold War we defended our homeland from aerial attack with NORAD. Which frontier and what means will protect the American homeland in the 21st century? America expects the next president to provide the answers. Click on an endote number to return to the article. [1] The home page for NORAD is www.peterson.af.mil/norad/. [2] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, June 10, 1998 (as amended through June 14, 2000). [3] The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (aka the National Security Study Group or the Hart-Rudman Commission); the National Commission on Terrorism (aka the Bremer Commission); the Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka the Gilmore Commission); and two Government Accounting Office Reports: “Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency” (NSIAD-99-3) and “Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy” (NSIAD-97-254). [4] See Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s op-ed piece in the Washington Post, November 26, 1997; Testimony of Gen. Colin Powell, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act FY 1994—H.R. 2401, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., H201-33 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 112: “Nothing scares me more than biological weapons, not even tactical nuclear weapons”; Senator Sam Nunn, “If you look to any one American city and you said what are the odds of this happening in city X, you could perhaps say the odds are pretty strongly against it. If you looked at all American cities and say what are the odds of a biological attack in one or more of these cities in the next two to five years? I’d think the odds are pretty strong that it will happen”; “Bioterrorism—Can It Happen Here?" a videotape produced by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command. [5] For instance, the United Kingdom has an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and America has significant vulnerability to a nuclear attack. But the United Kingdom’s intentions for such an action are zero. Therefore, the threat is zero. On the other hand, if a well-funded terrorist, such as Usama bin Laden, acquires several hundred kilograms of high-quality powdered anthrax, then the capability factor in this equation increases dramatically. According to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 100 kilograms of high-quality powdered anthrax (delivered under ideal conditions) could be as lethal as a one-megaton thermonuclear weapon (50 Hiroshima bombs). With a significant increase in capability, and already high numbers for intent and vulnerability, the threat from Usama bin Laden with high-quality bioweapons would be substantial. [6] “Computer Hackers Could Disable Military; System Compromised in Secret Exercise,” Bill Gertz, Washington Times, April 16, 1998. [7] Jeff Nesmith, “Mock Bioterror Attack Spooks Some in Denver,” Atlanta Constitution, May 22, 2000. Associated Press report by Katherine Vogt, “Lessons Learned From Simulated Terrorist Attack,” May 25, 2000. [8] “Nevertheless … despite Aum’s considerable resources and the superior technical expertise and state-of-the-art equipment and facilities at its disposal, the group could not effect a truly successful chemical or biological attack. The lesson of Aum is that any non-state entity faces organizational and significant technological difficulties and other hurdles in attempting to weaponize and deliver chemical and biological weapons, arguably providing a refutation of the suggestion voiced with increasing frequency about the ease with which such weapons can be made and used.” The Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, “First Annual Report to the President and Congress—Part I, Assessing the Threat,” Dec. 15, 1999, p. ix. [9] Conversation on Aug. 22, 2000, with Dr. Tara O’Toole, M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Director of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies. [10] Jonathan B. Tucker, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 46–52. [11] For an in-depth examination of the Soviet Union’s offensive biological warfare program and the problems that remain regarding biological warfare capabilities in Russia today, see Biohazard by Dr. Ken Alibeck (New York: Random House, 1999). [12] U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, “The executive power shall be vested in a President....” Section 2, “The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several states, when called into actual service of the United States.” [13] Warren Report, Chapter VIII, Section: Recommendations, Subsection: Assassination a Federal Crime, “At present, Federal agencies participate only upon the sufferance of the local authorities. While the police work of the Dallas authorities in the early identification and apprehension of Oswald was both efficient and prompt, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who strongly supports such legislation, testified that the absence of clear Federal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy led to embarrassment and confusion in the subsequent investigation by Federal and local authorities.” (“Embarrassment and confusion” is a bit of an understatement.) Following congressional action, the FBI now has complete authority involving investigations of assassinations and assassination attempts on the president. [14] Many corporations expressed concern to the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection about the possibility of self-incrimination and sensitive proprietary information being released through the Freedom of Information Act. [15] See the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (www.ciao.gov/partnership/faq.htm). [16] The Centers for Disease Control’s Epidemic Intelligence Service, the Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Program, and the National Disaster Medical System are examples of current cooperation between the public and private sectors, but they do not provide real-time information. [17] Conversation with Ray Downey, Chief of the New York City Fire Department’s Special Operations Unit, March 22, 2000. [18] John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, remarks at the Army War College 11th Annual Strategy Conference, April 12, 2000.