In The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, William Langewiesche describes how we are entering a “world in which many countries have acquired atomic bombs, and some may use them.”

He quotes an experienced Russian “Cold War hand” who later got involved in selling nuclear power-generation technology to undeveloped countries: “No one thought that proliferation could come from Arab countries.” The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “was aimed at dissuading the developed countries from acquiring nuclear weapons—and it worked because they accepted the U.S. and Soviet nuclear umbrellas.” Smaller countries realized that they didn’t need retaliatory nuclear weapons of their own as deterrents against attack. But “the great powers were stuck with arsenals they could not use, and nuclear weapons became the weapons of the poor” countries, which acquired nuclear power technology thanks to lax export laws in many countries and to companies that had an eye on profit more than on national security.

“The poor,” says Langewiesche, “for a host of reasons, are more likely to use their nuclear weapons than the great powers have been … At the extreme is the possibility, entirely real, that one or two nuclear weapons will pass into the hands of the new stateless guerillas, the jihadists, who offer none of the retaliatory targets that have so far underlain the nuclear peace.”

Langewiesche, however, gives solid reasons why acquiring a nuclear weapon or the means to manufacture one would be very difficult (though not impossible). He describes the technology involved, which he says is not truly secret, just hard to work with and hard to conceal. He describes the security surrounding nuclear weapons and fissionable materials; even in Russia, where physical security is often poor, there are formidable obstacles to penetrating a nuclear city such as Ozersk, stealing bomb materials, and then escaping with them. In the film Last Best Chance, he says, terrorists do exactly that, but the film ends with their escape from the facility, carrying stolen nuclear materials, whereas in reality they would still be hundreds of miles from an open border, with scant chance of reaching it if the theft were discovered. It would not be impossible, just daunting.

The technical obstacles to building, rather than stealing, an atomic bomb are exemplified by the story of Abdul Qadeer Kahn, to which Langewiesche devotes much of the book. Kahn was personally responsible for Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear arsenal and for proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, such as North Korea. Kahn did not steal secrets so much as shortcuts, says the author. Even with shortcuts, it took Pakistan about 10 years to build its first atomic bomb, which it completed around 1986. “By the end of the 1990s the Kahn Research Laboratories were sending salesmen to international arms shows … advertising their conventional and nuclear products.”

The greatest threat to the United States caused by the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an atomic bomb in the hands of jihadists, who, Langewiesche points out, would not hesitate to use it. Poor countries with atomic arms might be more likely to use them against each other. If Pakistan were to use one of its atomic bombs, the target would almost certainly be India, not the USA.

“It seems entirely possible,” concludes Langewiesche, “that terrorist attacks can be thwarted—though this would require nimble governmental action—but no amount of maneuvering will keep determined nations from developing nuclear arsenals.”

His narrative and conclusions seem to be the result of firsthand research. There isn’t a reference note in the book. His sources are named or described anonymously. The presentation is credible and candid. In fact, the tone of the book is conversational, making it very easy to read. The tone, however, is its biggest drawback, too—the author freely injects opinions and comments that are supportable but inflammatory: that the “United States terrorized Japan” in World War II and that “the U.S. Government’s subsequent manipulation of the fear” caused by the September 11 attacks “is deplorable and tragic.” Yet maybe an understanding of this subject requires some inflammation, because the question of nuclear proliferation is seen very differently outside the industrialized nations that are threatened by it.