United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has issued a call for a global forum on preventing biological terrorism. Bio-terrorism is, according to the Secretary-General, “the most important under-addressed terrorist threat” that “requires new thinking on the part of the international community.” Annan has earlier drawn international attention to bio-terrorism, but his recent comments are far more pointed in how he characterizes the threat and what he requests the world to do. It is imperative that the communities of scientists, government officials, and other experts who are concerned about bio-terrorism take up this call.

A Controversial Assertion: Combating Bio-Terrorism Is Not Arms Control

Implicit in Secretary-General Annan’s statement is a profound assertion about the nature of bio-terrorism—an assertion that has controversial ramifications for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Heretofore, international efforts to address threats associated with the misuse of pathogens have focused on state bio-weapons programs. According to Annan, some “States see biological weapons as a State-sponsored threat.” In this view, biological weapons are, with nuclear and chemical weapons, the third leg of the weapons of mass destruction triumvirate. With respect to nuclear and chemical weapons, a multilateral treaty has designated a huge international organization to verify through onsite inspections of select facilities that weapons-relevant materials and equipment are not wrongfully diverted to produce prohibited weapons.

For at least the past decade, disputes have centered on whether to add verification mechanisms to the Biological Weapons Convention. Annan admits that “the Convention does need strengthening.” But that is as lukewarm an endorsement as can be imagined. His sustained emphasis is on the need for “additional measures to address the problem of non-State actors.” Moreover, he does not make even the slightest suggestion that such measures should be developed through a multilateral negotiation process.

According to Annan, the threat of bio-terrorism is not like the threat of nuclear technology, but should be addressed like threats of cybercrime: “Tens of thousands of laboratories worldwide will be operating in a multi-billion-dollar industry. Even students working in small laboratories will be able to carry out gene manipulation.” Mechanisms to verify State compliance with international norms against weapons of mass destruction are not effective in this context. Most states can be expected to abhor crime and to combat it if they have capacity. The challenge, therefore, is to assist states in developing legal infrastructure and to provide equipment and training, etc., so that they can more effectively pursue mandated responsibilities.

Characterizing the Threat: Dual-Use Biotechnology

Annan does not mention proliferators, nor does he draw attention to terrorists’ statements of interest in bio-terrorism. His focus is exclusively on biotechnology that “has developed exponentially” and “heralds breakthroughs … in our attempts to eliminate infectious diseases that kill upwards of 14 million people every year.” Biotechnology’s advances “can, however, also bring incalculable harm if put to destructive use by those who seek to develop designer diseases and pathogens.”

Significantly, Annan’s focus on “designer diseases” wholly bypasses the well-known pathogen threats (smallpox, anthrax, etc.). In this, he has strode boldly into another simmering dispute. Many scientists have long decried efforts to combat bio-terrorism that focus on leading-edge biotechnology. They assert that anthrax, for example, can be scraped from dead livestock and brewed at home; salmonella and botulism are even easier to mass produce. If bio-terrorism is so simple, it makes no sense to regulate advanced biotechnology.

True enough, killing a few people can certainly be done with only rudimentary science. Prevention of these threats of low-level bio-terrorism must be the responsibility of individual States. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has every reason to focus on the less likely but far more devastating risks associated with biotechnology that, if deliberately misused, could devastate civilized order worldwide. Commission of a truly catastrophic bio-terror attack is technically very challenging. To successfully carry out such a catastrophe, the perpetrators need a combination of people with