Introduction

Large public gatherings, such as sports events, that celebrate American popular culture are considered terrorist targets.¹ In a post-9/11 world, sports managers must be adequately trained and knowledgeable of available security measures in order to prepare for, prevent, detect, and deter potential threats to their sports venue. The goal is to increase capabilities to better respond to and recover from disasters, acts of terrorism, weather-related crises, or crowd management issues. There is no room for complacency in this new world, and the attitude that “it will never happen to us” is dangerous, especially the further we get from the atrocities of 9/11.

Collegiate sport programs must take the lead and realize the risk that exists today. Their athletic facilities may be considered soft targets, since they are not as nationally recognized as professional sport stadiums. A series of attacks on college sports venues on a Saturday afternoon would devastate the college and surrounding community and inevitably have a catastrophic effect on the U.S. sports industry and national economy. Therefore, those responsible for security operations at intercollegiate athletic events need to be aware of potential threats, have the ability to identify security weaknesses, and possess or recruit the necessary resources to address weaknesses by implementing more stringent security practices.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has issued “planning options” as guidelines for intercollegiate athletic programs, but there are no sport event security standards in place for institutions to adhere to or be held accountable for. Therefore, there is a lack of consistency in security management practices at university sports events throughout the United States. This research project was conducted to identify weaknesses in the security management of university sports venues and provide recommendations for the improvement of security systems.

Review of Literature

Potential Terrorist Threats

Sport facility managers face two types of terror: organized terror and spontaneous terror.² Organized acts of terror are planned over a long period and are usually rehearsed, in contrast to spontaneous or unpredictable acts of terror, such as fans attacking officials and players. Besides terrorism, other potential threats include drug and alcohol use, patron injuries, weather concerns, power failure, and sabotage.³

The sporting world first experienced an act of terrorism in 1972 at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, when a group known as Black September killed two Israeli athletes and took nine more hostage.⁴ Terrorism struck the Olympics again in 1996, this time at the Atlanta games, when domestic terrorist Eric Rudolph bombed Centennial Olympic Park, killing one person and injuring over a hundred.⁵

Since terrorists seek mass casualties and the exposure received when they humiliate the authorities, major sporting events provide an attractive stage for them to gain instant global recognition. In March 2005, the Department of Homeland Security identified a dozen possible strikes it considered most devastating, “including detonation of a nuclear device in a major city, release of sarin nerve agent in office buildings and a truck bombing of a sports arena.”⁶

According to Ed Worthington, then Director of the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security, “Sporting events are perfect targets because of the number of people amassed in a relatively small space, and in any nation where sports are held in such high regard, an attack on any scale would likely grab national or even international attention.”⁷

Collegiate sport stadiums in particular provide a perfect target for mass casualties and catastrophic economic impact. Approximately 46 million spectators attended Division I football games during the 2003 season.⁸

In October 2005, an Oklahoma University student killed himself by prematurely detonating a bomb strapped to his body outside a stadium packed with 84,000 people.⁹ There have been reports that this individual tried to enter the stadium but fled the scene once he realized that his backpack containing the bomb would be inspected.

Crowd Management

Crowd control is also a major issue in sports today. “The frequency and intensity of spectator violence is increasing.”¹⁰ Sport venue managers must plan for the unpredictable or unexpected acts of fan violence. Fan violence and unruly behavior have been a problem for both professional and collegiate sports associations in recent years. The 1993 stabbing of tennis star Monica Seles in Hamburg, Germany; soccer riots in England and Italy; and post-game victory riots after Super Bowls are examples of violent fan behavior. In September 2005, Louisiana State University Tiger fans threw beer bottles at a University of Tennessee bus after the Tennessee Volunteers came from behind to defeat the Tigers 30-27 in overtime.¹¹ In 2004, “a street reveler was killed at a Boston Red Sox celebration when she was hit in the eye by a projectile filled with pepper spray.”¹² In September 2002, a father and son attacked Kansas City Royals first base coach Tom Gamboa at Comiskey Park in Chicago.¹³ Mayhem broke out at an Indiana-Pacers game in November 2004, when fans and players exchanged punches in the stands. This incident has been referred to as the worst brawl in National Basketball Association history. However, the association witnessed another scary scene on December 15, 2006, as ten players were ejected following a Knicks-Nuggets brawl.¹⁴ Player-on-player violence has increased too; a recent incident in college sports occurred during the Florida International and Miami football game in October 2006. Two dozen police were needed to control the situation, which resulted in 31 player suspensions.¹⁵

Fans’ rushing the court or field is another safety concern for sport venue managers. Injuries occurring from these events could pose problems for the stadium or arena operator. Getting trampled upon is not an inherent risk for spectators at a sporting event; therefore liability becomes an issue. The facility owner or operator must have taken the necessary steps to protect against foreseeable incidents. Since this has happened quite frequently, security measures must be in place—for example, barriers to stop fans from crossing the perimeter and regulations prohibiting this kind of behavior. In December 2004, the Southeastern (college athletic) Conference implemented a system of fines for such violations. The first offense incurs a $5,000 fine; the second, $25,000; and subsequent violations, $50,000.¹⁶

Natural Disasters

Natural disasters have posed a real concern for sports organizations in recent years. Hurricane Katrina caused the displacement of many professional and collegiate sports teams in the fall of 2005. Games were rescheduled and relocated; some events were cancelled for the season. Tulane University, the University of New Orleans, Louisiana State University, and the New Orleans Saints all experienced the catastrophic results of Katrina. The Saints did not return to the Superdome until September 2006, after the stadium had received $180 million in renovations. Louisiana State University is still dealing with the financial impact of the hurricane: the athletic department lost or paid other schools approximately $3.5 million and suffered $400,000 in facility damage.¹⁷ College business operations were interrupted for an entire semester, an incident that is unanticipated and rarely planned for. Intercollegiate athletic programs have found it hard to recover from such an incident and now realize the need to have disaster recovery and contingency plans in place.

Recognizing these threats and enhancing security efforts to address sports event emergencies prepares the sports organization to react to any type of unexpected disaster. It also ensures that personnel are trained and equipped to deal with all possible situations. Recognizing the need for effective security management of collegiate sport venues and consistency in security policies and practices at sport venues, the University of Southern Mississippi applied to the Department of Homeland Security for funding to conduct risk assessments at collegiate sport venues in Mississippi.

Research Grant

The University of Southern Mississippi has been a national leader in the quest to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents at collegiate sporting venues. In May 2005, the School of Human Performance and Recreation was awarded a $568,000 grant by the Department of Homeland Security and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency to develop a research-based model for effective security management of university sports events. Research objectives included these:

• Reviewing current risk assessment methods
• Customizing and field testing methods and materials for sport venues
• Conducting vulnerability assessments and game-day audits at seven state-supported institutions in Mississippi
• Gathering and disseminating best practices

The grant also contributed to developing the Center for Spectator Sports Security Management at the University of Southern Mississippi; it focuses on research and educational efforts in the area of sport event security. The research emphasizes organizational, technical, and educational tools to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents at sports events. The center offers a unique interdisciplinary environment that provides a mechanism for building security awareness, improving sport security policies and procedures, and enhancing emergency response, evacuation, and recovery operations.

The Risk Assessment Process

Current risk assessment methodologies were reviewed and customized for the assessment of sport venues. The Department of Homeland Security risk assessment criterion was essentially modified to create the Sport Event Security Assessment Model, developed through the collaboration of academic and security professionals. Security Management Solutions, an Alabama security firm with expert credentials, supported the development and field testing of the model. The partnership assured quality sports stadium assessments in compliance with Homeland Security Department regulations. The model was piloted at seven public universities in Mississippi to identify security weaknesses and in turn harden their sport facilities.

The risk assessment process is a way to determine risk and threat levels and identify vulnerabilities. “A good risk management approach includes three primary elements: a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment,” Raymond J. Decker testified before Congress in 2001.¹⁸ These assessments provide vital information for the protection of critical assets against terrorist attacks and other possible threats. Sports venue managers are able to identify vulnerabilities and in turn harden the facility and improve physical protection systems. The risk assessment process used in this project included the following steps:

1. Identifying a sport event security action team
2. Characterizing critical assets
3. Conducting threat assessments
4. Conducting vulnerability assessments
5. Assessing consequence evaluation
6. Analyzing the risk level
7. Providing consequence reduction proposals

Identifying a sport event security action team ensured multi-discipline cooperation and the ability to receive information from different perspectives. This team was responsible for providing information about the sport facility and campus area.

Site surveys were very effective in identifying campus and community critical assets. Campus critical assets may include the fans, stadium, athletic building, dorms, science buildings, vendors or contractors, the campus police department, the game day command post, medical services, and electric, water, and gas supplies. Community critical assets may include the municipal police department, the fire department, local hospitals, public works, and ambulance operations. The assessment group also discovered whether emergency evacuation plans were in place and exercised, and whether emergency medical services were adequate and equipped to deal with a catastrophe.

The threat assessment focused on potential threat elements, including the existence of a group or individual operating close to the venue, a history or past activity of the group or individual, intentions to act, capability to act, and targeting of the sport venue.

The vulnerability assessment was a critical component of the risk assessment and provided information regarding security weaknesses to be addressed by management to harden the sport facility. An unannounced game day audit was conducted at each site to ensure that security measures said to be in place actually were in place. This procedure provided a unique insight into the security operations on game day. The vulnerability assessment component involved analysis of several key factors about the venue itself:

1. Level of visibility: assess the awareness of existence and visibility of the sport venue to the general public.
2. Criticality of the sport venue to the jurisdiction: assess the usefulness of the sport venue to the local population, economy, or government.
3. Potential sport venue population capacity: assess the maximum number of people at the site at any given time.
4. Potential for collateral mass casualties: assess potential mass casualties within one mile of the sport venue.
5. Impact outside of the venue: assess the loss outside of the sport venue.
6. Existence of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive elements within one mile of the stadium: Are these materials secured and protected according to protocols?
7. Potential threat element access to the sport venue: assess the availability of the sport venue for ingress and egress by a potential threat element.

The consequence evaluation assessed the potential number of people requiring transportation or hospitalization, the potential loss of life and infrastructure, the economic and environmental impact, and finally the level of social trauma.

After the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments were calculated, a risk level was determined on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being lowest and 5 being greatest.

Once these steps were performed, consequence reduction proposals were provided to each institution based on their individual assessments. These proposals are addressed in the results section.

Results

Common Security Shortfalls

Common security shortfalls (gaps) were identified through the seven vulnerability assessments. Security weaknesses identified at some of the institutions during investigation related to emergency preparedness, perimeter control, physical protection systems, access control, credentialing, training, and communication.

Some institutions lacked emergency response and evacuation plans specific to their sport venue. There was also inadequate searching of the venue prior to an event, inadequate lock-down procedures for the venue, and inadequate searches of fans and their belongings. Concession areas were not properly secured, and in some instances there were no intrusion detection systems for the venue. At some venues, there was inadequate signage concerning searches and restricted items. Some universities did not have closed-circuit television coverage of the sport venue or surrounding areas, and dangerous chemicals were stored inside the sports venue. Regarding access control and credentialing, there was no accountability for vendors and their vehicles and no security notification system for fans, players, staff, etc. There was also inadequate training for response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, and there were insufficient communication capabilities between the university and local responders.

Best Practices for Security of Collegiate Sport Venues

Numerous best practices were developed by Security Management Solutions and Robert Rolen, the lead investigator, from the assessment process in the following areas: game day, vendor, access control, physical security, maintenance, emergency response preparedness, and training. The following list provides a brief overview of some best practices considerations identified in each of the security areas noted:

Game Day

1. An onsite security command post is established on game day to allow for easy contact with fans to report potential security problems and to dispatch and manage security-related events.
2. Communication is established and checked with all emergency responders (fire, police, state police, hospitals, and ambulance services) prior to the game.
3. A 100-foot setback is implemented for parking and tailgating activities.
4. Vehicles are restricted from parking under the venue.
5. Signs are placed in the parking areas and at the gates, indicating prohibited items and stating that entry constitutes permission to search.
6. Removable bollards and/or portable barricades are used to restrict access in and around the venue.

Vendor

7. Vendor areas are locked when not in use.
8. Vendors are required to obtain access keys to the vendor areas from the security guard monitoring vendor access and identification.
9. Delivered boxes are accounted for and secured by the appropriate vendors.
10. The stored ice is secured with lock and key.
11. No vendor deliveries are allowed within 90 minutes of the game unless the delivery is inspected and escorted by a security person.

Access Control

12. Electronic scanning of all tickets could be implemented and be capable of capturing season ticket holder information.
13. Game day (color-coded) locks are used for the lockdown process with a strong key control system.
14. Media are issued specific identification cards.
15. No fan reentry to the venue is permitted.
16. Portable metal detectors are at the venue entry gates.
17. Handheld metal detectors enhance searches of potential contraband detected by the walk-through detectors.

Physical Security

18. A closed-circuit television provides coverage of vendor areas, access roads, venue gates, seating areas, and the areas beneath the stands.
19. Automatic emergency generator power is available for the public address system, communications, elevators, and emergency lights.
20. Restricted areas, storage areas, and venue equipment rooms have alarms and are secured with high-security locks.
21. Offices, storage rooms, and mechanical rooms in the venue are properly secured when not in use.
22. Utilities within the venue are secured.
23. The science buildings are equipped with an integrated security management system consisting of closed-circuit television, access control, and alarms.

Emergency Response Preparedness

24. An emergency evacuation plan is developed, along with maps indicating evacuation routes and identifying specific duties and responsibilities for security officers.
25. Colored emergency evacuation lights are considered for larger venues.
26. Signage identifying evacuation procedures and designated routes is posted throughout the venue.
27. A venue disaster training exercise is conducted; it includes all local emergency responders.
28. Primary and secondary campus triage locations are designated.
29. Response assistance from state and local emergency responders is formalized through written mutual aid agreements.
30. The athletic department has a written business continuation disaster plan, including event relocation contingencies.

Maintenance

31. All venue utilities are inspected weekly and, if necessary, repaired.
32. Emergency generators are start-tested monthly and before each game.
33. Potentially dangerous chemicals and materials are permanently removed from the venue and brought onsite only as needed.
34. Clear refuse bags are used.

Training

35. A campus hazmat response team is established and trained to hazmat defensive Level 2.
36. Absent a fire department onsite, a campus fire emergency response team is identified, equipped, and trained to handle and assess small fires occurring in the venue.

Consequence Reduction Proposals

After the seven assessments were completed, Security Management Solutions and lead investigator Robert Rolen provided consequence reduction proposals for the security of university sport venues:

1. Identification of a sports event security assessment team
2. Initiation of a responsible vendor program
3. University participation in an information sharing and analysis center
4. Improving access control and physical security measures
5. Developing and exercising emergency and evacuation plans

1. Identification of a sport event security assessment team
A sports event security action team must be identified to assess security operations and provide insight for future actions pertaining to the sports venue. This team should include local emergency responders and should practice and exercise emergency and evacuation plans in cooperation with multi-agency response services.

2. Initiation of a responsible vendor program
Universities should also consider initiating a responsible vendor program, setting the standards for vendors’ and contractors’ access to the campus and the venue. These groups would be required to meet minimum access standards relating to identification, insurance, background investigations, and uniforms. Onsite employees would participate in a security awareness program developed by the university.

3. University participation in an information sharing and analysis center
Universities are encouraged to participate in a stadium security information sharing and analysis center, which would be accessible by university and local jurisdiction security stakeholders as well as the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and the FBI. Shared information would include suspicious behavior, threats, and coming events. This statewide group could serve as a model for an NCAA-wide security information sharing and analysis center. This mechanism will allow for easy access to the latest security information, especially new knowledge in the field through ongoing research efforts.

4. Improving access control and physical security measures
Universities should consider conducting monthly safety and security meetings to address past security shortfalls as well as upcoming events. Venue pass procedures need to be evaluated and concern given to identification, accurate records, authorization areas, specific gate access, pass color coding and numbering, holographic images, and sign-in procedures. Equipping the venue (including the press box and skyboxes) with an integrated security management system consisting of closed-circuit television, access controls, and alarms is critical in the countermeasure process. The system should be digital, capable of being monitored at a central station in the campus police department and on the local area network.

5. Developing and exercising emergency and evacuation plans
A business continuity plan needs to be developed so athletic departments can continue operations in light of an incident. The university and the local county’s emergency management agency team should develop a sports event emergency response plan for the campus. This response plan should specifically address conditions such as heavy traffic and large crowds on campus and in the community during a sporting event. It should specify duties and procedures for all emergency responders as they relate to the campus and the sporting event. This plan should be integrated with the county’s comprehensive emergency management plan. The university and the local jurisdiction responders should conduct a tabletop exercise and give strong consideration to conducting a full-scale exercise.¹⁹

Conclusion

Findings from the risk assessment process and game-day audits indicate many needs in regard to capabilities for the prevention of and effective response to sports emergency incidents. Those responsible for game-day operations lack threat and risk assessment training; some do not have emergency and evacuation plans in place and do not practice and exercise disaster drills. “By conducting threat/vulnerability assessments, by establishing clear guidelines and procedures, by training personnel, and by conducting incident drills, leagues, teams, and venue operators can take significant and effective measures to prevent and prepare for a terrorist incident,”²⁰ natural disaster, or crowd management issue.

References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1. Ronald E. Hurst, Catherine Pratsinakis, and Paul H. Zoubek, “American Sports as a Target of Terrorism: The Duty of Care After September 11th,” Mondaq Business Briefing, January 2003.

2. Benjamin D. Goss, Colby B. Jubenville, and Jon L. MacBeth, “Primary Principles of Post-9/11 Stadium Security in the United States: Transatlantic Implications from British Practices,” International Association of Assembly Managers, Center for Venue Management Studies, 2003.

3. Gil Fried, Managing Sport Facilities (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2005).

4. “Munich 1972: Games of the XX Olympiad,” Official Website of the Olympic Movement.

5. FBI indictment of Eric Rudolph, Oct. 14, 1998.

6. Eric Lipton, “U.S. Report Lists Possibilities for Terrorist Attacks and Likely Toll,” New York Times, March 16, 2005.

7. Bryan Doyle, “Security at Mississippi Stadiums Evaluated,” Daily Mississippian, June 6, 2005.

8. Official 2005 NCAA Football Records Book (Chicago: Triumph Books, 2005).

9. Douglas J. Hagmann, “Black Hole in America’s Heartland,” Northeast Intelligence Network, Oct. 30, 2005.

10. Peter J. Farmer, Aaron L. Mulrooney, and Rob Ammon, Jr., Sport Facility Planning and Management (Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, 1996), p. 137.

11. Associated Press, “LSU Athletic Director Apologizes for Fans,” Fox Sports, Sep. 29, 2005.

12. Gil Fried, p. 294.

13. Associated Press, “‘I Was Stunned’: Royals First Base Coach Assaulted by Father-Son Duo,” Sports Illustrated, Sep. 19, 2002.

14. Associated Press, “Ten Players Ejected After Wild Brawl at End of Knicks-Nuggets Game,” Fox News, Dec. 17, 2006.

15. Associated Press, “13 Ejected in Florida Football Brawl,” Oct. 14, 2006.

16. Malcolm Moran, “On Men’s Hoops: Floor-Rushing Elicits Safety Concern,” USA Today, March 3, 2006.

17. Paul Steinbach, “Storm Teams,” Athletic Business, Sep. 1, 2006.

18. Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. General Accounting Office, “Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (Committee on Government Reform), Oct. 12, 2001.

19. L. Beckman, “A System for Evaluating Emergency Response Capabilities at a University Sporting Venue,” unpublished dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi, 2006.

20. Ronald E. Hurst, Catherine Pratsinakis, and Paul H. Zoubek, p. 4.