New Terrorists, New Attack Means?
Categorizing Terrorist Challenges
For the Early 21st Century

The motivations to use terrorism are inherently diverse, as they reflect the whole spectrum of human striving.
~ Ariel Merari, in The Future of Terrorism

Introduction

A binary (old versus new) examination of terrorists is simplistic, as they cover a broad spectrum; however, it may help in providing analysis to policy makers and decision makers. Prophets of transnational terrorism, international terrorism, super terrorism—and the inevitability of the future use of weapons of mass destruction by these terrorists—believe there are “new” terrorists, with motivations, organizational structures, incentives and disincentives, and potential means of attack distinct from those of their “old” predecessors. Who are these new terrorists? Where are they from? What motivates them as terrorists? When will they strike, and how—conventionally? electronically? with weapons of mass destruction? At the core of these questions is another: Will the new terrorists of the 21st century choose to attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons?

This article seeks to characterize terrorists of both the new and the old schools and then to examine the most likely attack means to be employed by each.

Terrorist Types

How Can the “Old” and “New” Terrorists Be Defined?

The Old Terrorists

Social-revolutionary (leftist) terrorists still exist, although fewer in numbers than in the preceding 30 years—the Japanese Red Army, Sendero Luminoso (the Peruvian “Shining Path”), Peru’s Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the Mexican Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army) are current examples.[3]

Nationalist-separatist terrorists remain active—the Irish Republican Army, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, the Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty separatist terrorists of Spain), and the Abu Nidal Organization or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command.[4]

Simply defined, it is fair to say that their motivations are political; they use violence often as a didactic tool; they are organized, deliberate, and systematic in their attacks; they often attack symbolic targets (of the state); they desire attention, not a large body count; they enjoy revolutionary connotations; they cloak themselves in the terminology of military jargon; and they generally describe themselves as freedom fighters and liberators, ethnic self-defense movements, or executors of righteous vengeance.[5]

As their names indicate, these groups have traditional motivations. Their strategies and tactics, while evolving slowly, remain similar to those observed for centuries. While the conventional wisdom is that overall 21st-century target selection is more varied and less discriminate than before, these groups are generally more likely to show some discreteness and moderation in both their selection of targets (still largely symbolic) and in their attack means. Their organizational structures remain predictable, if still difficult to penetrate using technical or human intelligence. This predictability is almost reflective of the old terrorists’ compliance with decision theory—in which decisions are made by weighting the utility of all possible outcomes by the probability that they will reach the expected utility benchmark and then selecting a course of action that will yield the highest gain at the lowest risk of negative consequences. Funding and cover mechanisms are standard. One of the important elements that clearly separates the old terrorists from the new is the importance of local and international constituencies that understand what the groups are doing and how they are doing it; indifference to constituencies is one of the key defining elements of the new terrorist.

In summary, according to Ronald D. Crelinsten, the old “rational, political actor has specific goals to achieve, and uses terrorism to gain recognition as a player in the political game, to gain legitimacy with a particular constituency, and to extract specific concessions from political authorities.”[6]

The New Terrorists

• An escalatory pattern of violence
• Innovation in weapons and tactics
• Willingness to take risks
• Paranoia and grandiosity
• Small groups of militants
• Isolation, with no outside constituency
• Charismatic leadership
• Defensive aggression
• Apocalyptic ideology

Alex Schmid presents a list of factors that have contributed to the “under-utilization of weapons of mass destruction.”[9] The list includes

• General reluctance to experiment with unfamiliar weapons
• Lack of familiar precedents
• Fear that the weapon would harm the producer or user
• Fear of whether it would work at all, or work too well
• Fear of constituency alienation
• Fear of an unprecedented governmental crackdown or retaliation
• Lack of a perceived need for indiscriminate, high-casualty attacks for furtherance of the group’s goals or objectives
• Lack of money

What makes the new terrorist different is that these obstacles to using weapons of mass destruction or CBRN weapons have largely been overcome. Who are these new terrorists?

As contrasted to the social-revolutionary leftist or nationalist-separatist old terrorists, the new terrorist is likely to be one of the following:

• A religious, extremist terrorist
• A transnational terrorist
• A “new religions” terrorist
• A right-wing terrorist
• An isolated, rogue terrorist from a shared “community of belief”[10]

The new terrorists have a different face, at least when viewed simplistically and heuristically. Their motivations are more likely to be religious than political; in fact, as Bruce Hoffman states, “The religious imperative is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.”[17] Their use of violence is less constrained and less didactic. They may attack targets for purely shock value, not satisfied to strike only at symbolic targets. These terrorists may have smaller constituencies, or their constituencies may be closed. They may be led by charismatic persons who are able to manipulate the actions of the whole. They may act in isolation—either group isolation from society in general or as individuals influenced by religious- and racist-based hate terrorists (such as the American Christian white supremacists).[18]

Terrorist Means

Introduction

Strengths and Weaknesses

Among the strengths of conventional attack means are

• The tools are acceptable, even by the adversary
• The tools are morally acceptable within the spectrum of the tools of war
• The terrorists’ constituency understands and accepts conventional attack means
• The development and use of conventional attack means are technically simple and relatively inexpensive
• There is a fast return on investment, as the attack is immediately noted and reported
• The propaganda effect is real and measurable
• These attacks are largely viewed, even by the targeted adversary, as deliberate and systematic

Among the strengths of CBRN attack means are that they are horrible to imagine and to suffer, making them an ideal instrument of fear. They are guaranteed to garner media attention, given proper attribution of the sponsor of the event. Additionally, a good defense against these threats is extremely difficult and expensive; it will likely remain so.

Among the weaknesses of CBRN attack means are

• The terrorist groups’ constituents find the tools unacceptable
• The tools are morally unacceptable to nation-states and other adversaries within the spectrum of the tools of war
• By and large, the terrorists’ constituencies do not understand and accept CBRN attack means
• The development and use of CBRN attack means are technically difficult and expensive
• There is no fast return on investment, as the attack is not immediately noted and reported and may not be attributed to the terrorists
• These attacks are largely viewed to be indiscriminate and random in their victims

What general initial conclusions can we draw? First, to be most effective, the terrorist act must have a message that is broadly acceptable. According to Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, this “message is directed toward a diverse audience: the government of the state; public opinion within the state; the international community; and the domestic constituency of the group itself.”[21] Conventional attack means are more likely to reach this positive audience goal. Second, the moral distinctions between the use of conventional and CBRN attack means are clear and unambiguous. The use of conventional attack means by terrorists can fall under the “justice of war” paradigm—as the just cause, right authority, right intentions, and proportionality are all conditions largely met when terrorists use conventional means. However, the use of CBRN means is morally (and unacceptably) different, as the intent is radically different and the ends do not justify the means employed—a conflict with “justice in war,” which requires that belligerents use methods proportional to their ends, a principle to which CBRN attack means do not conform.[22]




(click chart for larger image)

Historical Review of Terrorist Attacks

The past indicates the predominance of conventional attack means. This is true as “the most sophisticated [terrorists recognize] the value of symbolic acts of violence and accept that violence itself will reap rewards only if it is carefully moderated,”[23] according to Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole. The U.S. State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000” listed 140 terrorist acts for that year; none were CBRN attacks. Multiple bombings in India, multiple UNITA (Angolan guerrilla terrorists) shootings and kidnappings, multiple Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or National Liberation Army bombings, Spanish Basque Fatherland and Liberty attacks on Spanish interests, attacks on civilians and soldiers in former Yugoslavia, several Southeast Asia kidnappings and shootings, a bombing outside the U.S. Embassy in Manila by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and a Sri Lanka bombing by the Tamil Tigers) lead the list.[24] Likewise, 2001 started and continued with no change in this pattern. Kidnappings and murder of hostages in the Philippines continued through the year. Israeli-Palestinian violence is at a peak, with bombings and other terrorist suicide attacks almost daily. In Sri Lanka, the airport and major hotels were attacked. Of the largest (or most significantly reported) terrorist attacks in the 1990s—the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, multiple car bombings in India in 1993, the Algerian Groupes Islamiques Armés (Armed Muslim Groups) Air France jet hijacking in 1994, the Tokyo subway attack with sarin in 1995, the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995, the Algerian Armed Muslim Groups bombings in 1995, the Hamas suicide bombing spree in Israel in 1996, the attack on civilian tourists in Cairo in 1996, the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, the Gamat at-Islamiya attack on tourists at Luxor in Egypt in 1997, the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the periodic Islamic attacks in Algeria since 1992 with over 75,000 deaths, and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000—only one, the Tokyo subway attack, was a CBRN effort.[25]

Recent use of CBRN started with the 1995 attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. Since 1995, 23 CBRN terrorist incidents have appeared in Gurr and Cole’s list.[26] Only four definitely used CBRN means; the rest are speculative entries.

In comparing and contrasting the expected predominance of conventional attacks with the emergent use of CBRN, what trends appear and what can we conclude? Clearly the threat of CBRN use is growing, but the vast preponderance of attacks continues to be conventional.

Attack Means of the Old and New Terrorists

The old terrorists generally have no perceived need to experiment with new weapons; for them, guns and bombs work quite well. The old terrorists generally are risk averse, so following precedent is a logical choice for them, as risks can be minimized. Technical inexpertise leads the old terrorist not to use or develop a weapon that could backfire. The instant media gratification of conventional means is largely negated if tools other than guns and bombs are selected; again, if the oft-repeated goal of the old terrorists is coverage rather than body count, there is no compelling need for a CBRN attack. The same aversion to risk and the fear of severe clampdown or retaliation also constrain old terrorists to more conservative attack means. While the victims and families of victims can argue that the old terrorists’ means are not discriminate or moderated, old terrorists do tend to focus on symbolic targets, and most other victims represent collateral damage. This is important, as the old terrorist is overwhelmingly concerned about the understanding of the terrorist group’s constituency and about audience approbation. As Bruce Hoffman has observed, “Left-wing violence tends to be highly discriminate, selective, and limited.”[27]

How does the new terrorist differ? The new terrorist is largely unconstrained, by any measure. Self-contained, morally indignant, professing to be religiously superior and racially pure, and full of themselves, their hate, and their charismatic leadership—these individuals or groups are much more likely to use more catastrophic attack means. They regularly access technical information—either on the Internet or through outright buying of scientific personnel. Black and gray markets in CBRN weapons are burgeoning, although probably not as severely as some doomsayers would indicate. Additionally, the lack of a constituency also indicates the denial of responsibility; the old terrorist lived for the world stage and a platform from which to shout injustice; the new terrorist has no constituency and thus no need to claim responsibility for the acts of terror. Escalating violence, which might hasten the apocalypse, is perfectly justifiable to these new terrorists. Compared to many of the old groups, these new terrorists are flush with money with which to execute the escalating attacks they appear to favor.

Not only are the new terrorists more radical than their radical leftist predecessors, they are radically and dangerously different in their motivations, targeting strategies and tactics, constituencies, leadership, organization, and funding. The normal constraints felt by the old are not observed by the new, making the modern religious extremist, transnational, or religious right-wing terrorists much more likely to use CBRN means.

What the Professionals Say About Future Attack Means

Academia is mixed in its point of view on the imminence of CBRN use. On the likely side, Jessica Stern argues that retribution, invocation of dread, retaliation, motivational changes, proliferation and availability, and better understanding of how to develop and employ CBRN weapons will lead shortly to their expanded use; to her, “dread is the terrorist’s instrument for achieving influence,”[29] and for that reason CBRN weapons are attractive for immediate use. Similarly, James Campbell would argue that terrorist CBRN weapon use is much more likely now, arguing that the need for a worldwide audience and a high body count leads in that direction. To him, availability and the weakening of constraints against their use indicates increasing likelihood of use. He stated that an upward spiraling of attack means and methods, spectacular media coverage, dramatic or repressive government responses, public desensitization to conventional attacks, dissemination of technology and production information means that ultramodern, religious-based groups of closed constituencies largely unconcerned about backlash are more likely to use CBRN weapons.[30] David Seigrist of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies would agree with the previous assessments; in a presentation to the Marshall Center in 1999, he was a strong believer in future superterrorism—a concept that at its core states that the use of CBRN weapons is highly likely. On the other hand, Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole said that “the likelihood of an attack is quite small.”[31] Elsewhere in the same volume they described the threat of CBRN attack as a “low-probability, high consequence threat.”[32] Likewise, Ariel Merari described the threat of terrorist CBRN attack as “low probability, high impact.”[33] In the same book, Alex P. Schmid said that this threat has low risk and far-reaching consequences.[34] David Veness saw it the same, calling it “low intensity, high impact.”[35] Ehud Sprinzak was even more blunt, calling the “rhetoric of Washington doomsayers” the result of “sloppy thinking ... vested interests ... and morbid fascination.”[36] David Claridge called for a “far more balanced viewpoint,” asking, “Does the end justify the means? Is the threat real? And is it real enough to justify the $2.8bn that could as easily be spent elsewhere?” Clearly, he did not see the imminence of terrorist use of CBRN.[37]

Public figures, at least in the United States, have been vocal in their assertion that a terrorist CBRN attack is imminent. President Clinton said in a January 1999 article in the New York Times that it is “highly likely” that a terrorist group would use a chemical weapon on American soil in the next few years.[38] Senator Sam Nunn said that “the threat of terrorist attack on American cities using CBRN has reached a point where a bold and vigorous effort is required. This is a clear and present danger to the American people that requires a timely response.[39] FBI Director Louis Freeh said in 1997 that “acquisition, proliferation, threatened or actual use of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group or individuals constitutes one of the gravest threats to the United States.”[40] Presidential candidate Richard Lugar used a series of expensive television spots in 1999 to demonstrate the grave threat posed by nuclear terrorism.[41] These cases are balanced by more reasoned views posited by Russian and Israeli public figures, the former with concerns about the safety of their CBRN stockpiles and the latter being among the most threatened nations in the world.[42]

Terrorists have advertised the coming use of CBRN attacks. In 1998, Nasser Asad Al-Tamimi of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad hinted of his group’s potential use of biological weapons. Usama bin Laden claimed in 1998 that he had been trying to acquire chemical weapons since 1993. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef may have attempted to acquire chemical weapons prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Shoko Asahara’s Aum Shinrikyo group clearly had no problems with using chemical agents, as their sarin attack in Tokyo in 1995 evidenced.[43] In the United States, right-wing groups such as the Minnesota Patriots Council and The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord—which has spawned independent attacks by non-affiliated persons such as that by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City—have demonstrated that terrorist use of CBRN is possible. However, the weight of examples still indicates that conventional tactics and means remain more likely. Sri Lankan terrorists have recently blown up the international airport and hotels frequented by foreigners in that nation’s capital. Philippine terrorists have captured and beheaded foreigners and natives in the past several months. Mass graves on both sides have provided ample examples of terror killings of significant numbers of civilians in former Yugoslavia. Palestinian terror techniques have resulted in significant Israeli military and diplomatic response over the past several months. It is clear that conventional attack remains the principal means chosen by terrorists around the world.

Conclusions

Second, it is dangerous and careless to resort to a binary categorization of future terrorist attack means—“either CBRN or conventional”—and their likelihood of use; it is likely that both types of attack will occur, as they have in the past. We should clearly keep in mind that the use of conventional or CBRN attack means is not an either-or proposition. As Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole noted, “Terrorist groups generally seek specific political, religious or social objectives, and will employ violence to achieve those objectives in a number of complementary and often interlinked strategies and tactics.”[45] However, Brian Michael Jenkins’ caution to “think broadly but at the same time exercise caution [in the analysis of ‘dream threats’]” while avoiding the “subtle shift of verbs from could to may happen” when discussing the potential use of CBRN by terrorists seems sage advice for all predictive analysts attempting to ascertain whether conventional or CBRN attacks are more imminent.[46] By its nature, terrorism is extreme. Describing terrorists and their acts of violence, Jerrold Post asserted that “moderation is the enemy of extremism.”[47] This suggests, on the surface, that terrorist use of CBRN is more likely, as it is an extreme tool for extreme actors. However, the weight of the evidence suggests that terrorists are most likely to continue using conventional weapons.

I believe that there is indeed a new type of terrorist in our world, and that—while the new terrorists are more likely to use CBRN than their predecessors (although the immediacy of use is another matter)—they remain more likely to use conventional attack means but in a much less constrained manner, leading to an ever-increasing escalation of deaths directly attributable to terrorist incidents.

1. Joshua Sinai, “An Indications and Warning Methodology to Forecast Whether Terrorist Groups Will Resort to ‘Conventional’ or CBRN Warfare,” Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict News, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2001, pp. 2-3. In completing the second and third columns in the table I developed for this article, I found Sinai’s “I&W Indicators to Forecast CBRN Terrorism” to be of significant utility in populating the table. (The indicators are adapted from Sinai in the introductory table, with my descriptive elements in the second and third columns.)