Military Support of Civil Authorities—
A New Focus for a New Millennium

Major General Bruce M. Lawlor
Commander
Joint Task Force–Civil Support
October 2000 (Updated September 2001)

Concern about the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on U.S. soil has been building within the national security establishment. On September 15, 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century issued a report that predicted, “States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.” On October 1, 1999, Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, created a new organization, Joint Task Force–Civil Support (JTF-CS), to provide military support to civil authorities during the aftermath of a WMD incident.

JTF-CS is a standing military headquarters without assigned forces. It is located at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. Its mission is to provide military support within the United States, its possessions, and its territories. It plans and integrates Department of Defense (DoD) support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for WMD events in the 48 contiguous states. This support will involve capabilities drawn from throughout DoD, including detection, decontamination, and medical and logistical assets. In addition, once the Secretary of Defense has ordered military forces to provide assistance to civil authorities, JTF-CS will deploy to the incident site and serve as the command and control headquarters for responding DoD units. At the site of a WMD incident, JTF-CS will work to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support.

The Existing Mission—Improved Capability

The JTF’s mission—providing military support to civil authorities—is not new. For years, DoD officials, under a variety of existing federal statutes and regulations, have employed federal military forces to help state and local civil officials cope with emergencies.

In 1992, more than 22,000 federal troops deployed to South Florida to help civilian officials deal with the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. In 1995, nearly 800 federal troops provided assistance to civil authorities near Los Angeles following the Northridge earthquake. Almost 400 federal troops helped local and state officials following the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The list continues. In each instance, federal military forces deployed under the overall direction of a lead civilian federal agency to help state and local leaders care for civilian populations distressed by natural or manmade disasters.

The procedures governing the use of military forces for domestic missions are well established. Central to their employment is an understanding that military personnel serve in a supporting role and carry out relief missions as designated by the civilian federal agency responsible for leading the federal assistance effort—the lead federal agency. Normally, this is FEMA. It uses the Federal Response Plan to coordinate federal assistance to state and local civil officials. The Federal Response Plan divides the federal response effort into 12 Emergency Support Functions. Each function is headed by a primary agency designated on the basis of its expertise, authorities, resources, and capabilities. Other federal agencies have been designated as support agencies for one or more of the functions. Together they deliver needed federal assistance to state and local authorities under FEMA’s overall direction. DoD is not in charge of the relief effort. Rather, it serves as a support agency and will respond to state and local requests for assistance once they have been validated by the lead federal agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense through his on-scene representative. In the case of the Federal Response Plan, FEMA serves as the lead federal agency. The joint task force is not designed nor does it have authority to move federal military forces domestically in the absence of a lead federal agency request and appropriate orders to do so.

The use of federal military forces to help state and local officials is not a new mission. State and local officials have often requested federal assistance in times of crisis, and that assistance has frequently been provided by the military. What is new are the circumstances under which such assistance will be given and the military mechanisms used to deliver it. Like it or not, the United States is no longer immune from the threat of domestic terrorism. That message has been made clear by the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings and by a growing number of lesser incidents and foiled attempts—the most recent being efforts by Islamic radicals to smuggle military-grade explosives into the United States in advance of the millennium celebrations.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, issued a report on September 15, 1999, in which it predicted:

States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.

The White House appears to support the Hart-Rudman Commission assessment. In its latest national security policy guidance, entitled “A National Security Strategy for A New Century,” the administration states that weapons of mass destruction have emerged as the “greatest potential threat to global stability and security.” “Defending the Homeland” against them is listed as a major administration goal.

The U.S. military has developed considerable expertise over the years in protecting its members against WMD and in operating on nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological contaminated battlefields. These skills were developed in anticipation of their use in foreign conflicts. The threat, however, is no longer confined to U.S. forces on foreign soil. It has reached into the domestic arena, and so has the requirement to defend against it. If a WMD event were to occur on U.S. soil, it would be unconscionable for DoD to withhold from domestic civil authorities the experience and expertise it makes available to U.S. forces deployed overseas. That understanding was at least partly responsible for the formation of JTF-CS.

From Part-Time to Full-Time

A full-time joint task force is a natural step in the progression in DoD’s method for handling requests for large-scale civil support. In the past, whenever a command and control headquarters was needed, DoD formed an ad hoc joint task force and designated an available officer—without regard to prior experience—to lead the response effort. This solution was less than optimal. Frequently the designated joint task force commander and staff had little or no experience in providing military support to civil authorities and were unfamiliar with the procedures and processes for doing so. The result was at times frustrating for both civilian leaders, who resented the military “I'm in charge” mindset, and military officers, who just wanted the civilians to get out of the way and let the military get on with it.

A change in this approach first emerged during planning for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. The level of military support that would be needed in the event of a WMD incident led the First United States Army to form a Response Task Force headquarters designed specifically to work with federal, state, and local civilian officials supporting the event. Staff officers and enlisted personnel were temporarily reassigned from other duties to work for the Response Task Force. Once the games were over, the task force members returned to their former positions. The Response Task Force’s standup in advance of the actual event enabled its personnel to train in civilian response methods and DoD military support procedures. The value added by such an approach was quickly recognized, and Fifth Army soon followed First Army’s lead in forming a second Response Task Force to cover WMD response requirements west of the Mississippi. The Response Task Forces represent a substantial improvement over the previous method of using ad hoc joint task forces to oversee military support. Their part-time nature and single-service flavor, however, present them with unique planning and execution challenges. A standing joint task force represents the next logical step in moving from ad hoc to part-time to full-time focus on issues of military support to civil authorities. The result of this concentration of focus is an improved capability to bring federal military support quickly and efficiently to civil authorities in their time of need.

Four Core Principles

JTF-CS’s standup has not been without its critics. On the one hand, civil libertarians have expressed fear that a large domestic military deployment will have negative consequences for constitutionally protected individual liberties. On the other, organizations opposed to the federal government are concerned about federal usurpation of state and local authority. Such concerns are something we must recognize and respect. Indeed, it is important that these perspectives be raised because we must both understand and be sensitive to them.

The Secretary of Defense has promulgated four core principles that will govern the joint task forces’ employment. The principles should allay many of the critics’ concerns.

• JTF-CS chain of command and civilian oversight within DoD will be clear. The JTF-CS commander reports directly to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, who in turn reports to the National Command Authority. Within DoD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, who is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on domestic consequence-management activities for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives incidents, provides oversight of JTF-CS.

• JTF-CS will always work in support of a lead federal agency. In the case of WMD, that agency will most likely be FEMA, and, under FEMA’s direction, JTF-CS will work to support the civilian federal primary agencies responsible for each Emergency Support Function.

• The mission of the U.S. military is first and foremost to fight and win the nation’s wars. The military’s primary mission does not include domestic law enforcement or civil administration, nor does it encompass long-term recovery or restoration operations. These functions are civilian responsibilities, and they will remain so. DoD consequence-management support shall emphasize DoD roles, skills and structures, such as the ability to mass mobilize and provide logistical support.

• JTF-CS will work to promote and take advantage of the unique skills of the National Guard and the Reserves to accomplish this mission. To that end, we are working to integrate Guard and Reserve forces in everything we do.

These four core principles form the operational framework upon which the joint task force’s relations with federal, state, and local civil officials are being built.

Operational Focus

JTF-CS’s specified tasks are to save lives, prevent injury, and establish temporary critical life support. Its implied tasks run the gamut from command and control to a wide variety of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, medical, and transportation and other logistics requirements. Within this general construct, three factors help define JTF-CS’s operational focus.

• The first is the definition of a WMD event. Definitions are important to set limits as well as to define duties. The federal interagency process has yet to reach consensus on a common definition. However, within the context of what JTF-CS has been tasked to do, a WMD incident is defined as “a deliberate or unintentional event involving a nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological weapon or device, or large conventional explosive, that produces catastrophic loss of life or property.” It is important to note that this definition permits JTF-CS to respond to accidental as well as intentional WMD detonations and/or releases. Equally important is its incorporation of high-yield conventional explosives, allowing response to such incidents as the Oklahoma City bombing.
  
  
• Second are JTF-CS’s specified tasks. These allow JTF-CS to help restore local water and power systems, provide emergency medical care, and create temporary transportation fixes such as short-term bridging that will aid in the efficient distribution of lifesaving supplies and services. Just as important, these tasks limit the kinds of assistance JTF-CS can provide. For example, law enforcement functions, civil administration, and long-term reconstruction or rehabilitation work are outside the scope of the unit’s charter.
  
  
• The final factor influencing the JTF-CS operational focus is DoD’s core competencies. These are grouped into two general categories: First, DoD possesses unique knowledge and experience concerning nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. The ability to survive such weapons and operate on a contaminated battlefield is a training requirement for all uniformed services. Exploiting DoD’s expertise and experience to provide assistance to civil authorities when requested and as necessary in times of need is part of JTF-CS’s purpose. Second, DoD is very good at responding quickly and at organizing and moving large numbers of people, equipment, and supplies. This capability will be critical to an early and effective response in the event of a WMD incident.

When these three factors are combined, JTF-CS’s operational focus begins to emerge. If requested and ordered by the Secretary of Defense to do so, JTF-CS will respond to an accidental or deliberate release or detonation of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or conventional high-yield explosive device. It will bring DoD’s WMD expertise and logistics capabilities in support of a lead federal agency to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary life support.

The Full Operational Spectrum

JTF-CS will serve across the entire spectrum of response. During routine operations, as with most military headquarters, the unit’s main effort will focus on training, exercises, and planning for future operations. At present, the JTF-CS is using the deliberate planning process to conduct “what if” drills to develop five scenarios based on a nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, or large conventional explosive release or detonation. The objective is to understand the requirements unique to each scenario and to begin building a template that will shorten the response time needed to support a real-world event.

Besides routine planning exercises, JTF-CS expects to be involved in planning and operational execution for National Security Special Events. Under Presidential Decision Directive 62, the National Security Council, upon the joint recommendation of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the Olympics or the president’s inauguration, as National Security Special Events. Once so designated, such an event becomes the focal point for contingency planning by the designated lead federal agency—usually the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the U.S. Secret Service. As part of that planning, certain types of actual and contingent DoD support may be needed to assist the federal, state, or local organizers of the event in case of a WMD incident. In such cases, JTF-CS will perform the initial mission planning and, if necessary, deploy to provide command and control of any DoD assets that may be prepositioned near the event site.

If a significant WMD threat is identified, a lead federal agency—usually the FBI—will conduct crisis-management operations aimed at interdicting or otherwise preventing the threat from becoming fact. During crisis management, if requested by the lead federal agency and when directed by the Secretary of Defense, JTF-CS will deploy in support of the lead federal agency to conduct detailed planning for consequence management. The main tasks will be predictive analysis, preparing to deploy WMD consequence-management assets, and determining logistics requirements for an effective and timely response should crisis-management efforts fail.

Finally, in the event of a no-notice WMD incident anywhere in the United States, its territories, or its possessions, and upon a request from civil authorities and after appropriate federal approvals, JTF-CS will deploy to the site, conduct mission planning, and provide command and control of assigned DoD forces in support of the lead federal agency.

The Federal System—Sharing Authority

It is important to remember that JTF-CS will not be the only agency present at the site of a catastrophe. The United States conducts its public business within a federal system where power and responsibilities are shared both within the federal government and with state and local governments.

In the event of a WMD incident, local responders will be the first people on the scene. Local directors of emergency management will work to bring the assets of their community to bear and to integrate the assets of nearby communities through mutual-aid compacts. Using the incident command system as a command and control mechanism, local emergency managers will quickly concentrate all nearby response capabilities at the site. While this is happening, local authorities will also coordinate with state officials to provide information and to alert them that additional assistance may be needed.

If the size of the event is such that additional help is needed, the state is responsible for contributing the next level of support. States will bring a broad array of services and significant amounts of manpower to the response effort. Under our federal system, the states exercise much of the authority for transportation, police, and health and welfare matters. A myriad of state agencies that perform these functions can be expected to provide additional help to local officials as they manage the disaster.

In addition to the capabilities resident in state civil agencies, the governor will likely alert the National Guard and send it to the scene. In 21 states, the state adjutant general, a two-star general officer, acts not only as commander of the Army and Air National Guard units within the state but also as director of state emergency management. If an incident occurs within such a state, the National Guard—at least to the extent of its state headquarters—will be heavily involved in the incident from its outset. The National Guard will likely support the response with transportation (air and ground), medical, mess, security, supply and services, communications, administrative, and other units, all of which would be trained to varying levels of proficiency in nuclear, chemical, and biological operations.

While the state is bringing its internal assets to bear, its emergency managers are in contact with their counterparts in neighboring states. Many states have joined with others to form interstate compacts that provide for sharing resources in response to catastrophic events. The largest of these compacts is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, in which 30 states and one territory participate. Under the compact’s provisions, state emergency managers facing a crisis that taxes their state’s ability to respond reinforce their own emergency responders with assets from other jurisdictions. This ability to share among the states substantially increases the response capabilities that any single state emergency manager can marshal to address the crisis.

The state’s emergency manager, besides calling on other states for support, notifies FEMA in case federal help is needed. If so, the procedure begins with a request by the governor to the president for federal assistance. If the president agrees with the governor’s assessment, he issues a presidential disaster declaration. This activates FEMA and energizes the Federal Response Plan. Under the plan, an approved request for assistance that cannot be met by the function’s primary agency may be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, who will assess it against six criteria:

1. Is the requested support legal for DoD to provide?
2. Does it involve the use of lethal force?
3. What is the risk of injury to U.S. service members?
4. What is the cost and who is paying?
5. Is it appropriate for DoD to be providing the kind of support requested?
6. What impact will providing this support have on military readiness?

Assuming that all these questions are answered satisfactorily, the Secretary will issue an execute order instructing the appropriate warfighting commander-in-chief to provide the requested support. If the crisis involves a WMD and the size of DoD’s participation in the response is significant, JTF-CS will deploy to provide command and control of DoD forces.

Operations at the Scene

JTF-CS deploys in stages. Upon notification, and after appropriate authorization, JTF-CS immediately dispatches an advance party to the site. This element acts as JTF-CS’s forward eyes and ears. The advance party contains five to seven staff officers and is configured to fit a particular incident. Generically, it will contain representatives from current operations, plans, and communications sections. Its purpose is to link up with the lead federal agency’s advance party, obtain that agency’s assessment of the situation, determine what might be forthcoming by way of requests for assistance, and establish communications with JTF-CS headquarters. The advance party passes this information back to the JTF and through it to the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operations Center.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operations Center plays a critical role throughout the operation. Upon receipt of a deployment order, the Joint Operations Center arranges for JTF-CS’s transportation needs and works to gain situational awareness at the site. This effort frees the JTF to focus its attention on preparations for immediate deployment of the main body. The Joint Operations Center serves as JTF-CS’s lifeline. It will source all requests for assistance, and it will plan for and monitor the movement of DoD forces responding to the incident.

Following deployment of the advance party, other activities will take place—not necessarily in sequence. JTF-CS’s main body will arrive and set up its operations center at a site best suited to conduct liaison with the lead federal agency and provide command and control for subordinate military forces. It will also immediately establish communications as directed with the federal, state, and local organizations it is being requested to support to further refine its situational awareness.

A Base Support Installation, usually a nearby military installation, will be designated to support deploying forces and to store and distribute the large quantities of material and supplies that will flow into the area. In addition to the Base Support Installation, one or more Joint Personnel Reception Centers will be established for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of follow-on military forces into the response effort. As units arrive, they will become a part of the overall DoD response effort and will be tasked to execute approved requests for assistance in support of various civil agencies.

When deployed, JTF-CS is functionally organized according to the situation. Likely subordinate elements may include medical, air, or ground transportation; supply and services; evacuation; decontamination; and an information center. In accordance with the Federal Response Plan, the Defense Coordinating Officer will be supplanted by the JTF Commander as the senior DoD official on the scene. However, both the Defense Coordinating Officer and the Defense Coordinating Element will continue to act as a liaison between the lead federal agency and the JTF and to perform mission assignment coordination and validation as delegated. Requests for assistance in a WMD incident will be processed in the same manner as requests for assistance in natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, and fires. However, because of the expected size of DoD’s response to a WMD incident, decisions regarding the commitment of large numbers of military forces will likely be made at higher levels.

To facilitate smooth, rapid, efficient military support to state and local officials, JTF-CS will organize its Joint Operations Area, the area of its responsibility, to mirror the existing civil administrative boundaries. For example, if the local jurisdiction is organized into precincts and that is how responders are organizing their support, JTF-CS will organize along the same precinct lines. If it is by cities, fire districts, or other civil jurisdictional boundaries, JTF-CS will comply and copy these administrative boundaries. The intent is to overlay JTF-CS’s geographic organization on the existing civilian framework for managing the crisis.

JTF-CS will form a subordinate element called Task Force Liaison to serve both as part of a support distribution system and as a mechanism to assist end users. Task Force Liaison will organize itself into contact teams, equipped with organic transportation and communications and capable of 24-hour sustained operations. Each end user will be assigned a contact team to provide the user with a single DoD point of contact for all DoD support. Contact teams will perform functions similar to those of support platoons in maneuver units. They will ensure that once a request for assistance has been approved, the appropriate DoD resources are collected and escorted to the work site. They will also facilitate the integration of military and civilian organizations, help resolve minor disagreements, provide a support distribution system, and monitor mission accomplishment. It is important to note that contact teams will not be authorized to accept requests for assistance directly from the users they support. All requests will have to be processed through regular channels and receive prior approval from the state coordinating officer and FEMA.

One of the earliest tasks to be accomplished by JTF-CS is to establish disengagement criteria. It’s important to remember that JTF-CS’s mission is temporary and not one of sustainment or reconstitution. Long-term rehabilitation efforts belong exclusively to civil authorities. At a mission’s outset, JTF-CS will develop measures of mission effectiveness and establish criteria, which will set the stage for its disengagement from the response effort. In general terms, JTF-CS will begin to disengage when the operational environment is stabilized and conditions are set for long-term recovery. At that point, all JTF-CS operations will be transferred to the lead federal, state, or local agency or to a follow-on headquarters.

Warfighters—A Helping Hand if Asked

Military support to civil authorities has become a complex operation. The possibility of a WMD event within our borders has raised considerable planning and support requirements. JTF-CS is DoD’s response to the challenge of providing that support while maintaining important constitutional safeguards. As members of DoD, we are the nation’s warfighters, but we are willing to lend a hand here at home—if necessary and if asked.