—Admiral James Loy

Trojan Seahorses?

In the current age of strategic anxiety where unthinkable nihilistic forces threaten to roll back the waves of free trade and globalization with mass-casualty destruction and massive infrastructure disruption, there is a fine line between paranoia and prudence. The spook of the unknown, or what in Rumsfeldspeak has been termed the fear of “unknown unknowns,”³ has been abetted by the agents of global terror. The current insecurity milieu is characterized by higher false-alarm rates emanating from the increased cyber-chatter and the dark machinations of an unseen enemy plotting in the shadows or by frequent disconcerting reports of a faceless adversary discreetly “casing” a potential target in broad daylight. The shock of the 11 September attacks on the United States has translated into an understandable debate over the introduction of increased surveillance regimes, concerns over curbs on civil liberties, other inconveniences, and the effect on extant practices such as trade facilitation. Chronic fears of a repeat of the devastating attacks on the U.S. homeland will not go away anytime soon. The chilling reminder has been well served by al-Qaeda’s deadly reassurance: “We, the fighters of the holy war, in general are hoping to enter the next phase … It will be a war of killings, a war (against) businesses, which will hit the enemy where he does not expect” (emphasis added).⁴

In an age when war is the extension of terrorism by any means, fear has permeated all public sectors and private domains of civilian and commercial public transport and logistics. As a case in point, the arrest by Italian police of a man stowed away in a steel box on a container ship at Genoa in October 2001 triggered renewed fears over transport security around the world. Almost a year later, in another telling, if controversial, “experiment” that exposed the gaping holes in America’s port security, ABC News borrowed 15 pounds of depleted uranium from an environmental group and carried it by train from Austria to Istanbul, Turkey. The contents were clearly marked and packed in a container with wooden horse carts and terra cotta vases before being successfully shipped overseas to New York. Through it all, the depleted uranium in the container went undetected—seven countries, 25 days, and 15 pounds of uranium, without a single question asked.⁵

Besides grave security concerns, there is little doubt that the fear factor has exacted a heavy price on world trade and investor confidence by threatening to significantly slow global economic growth, if it has not done so already. Although the direct effects of 11 September are difficult to measure, experts have cautioned that all the tougher transport security measures being put in place or proposed by the United States and other countries may slow down global transport, creating an overall dampening effect on world trade growth. They estimate that the net result could be an increase of 1% to 3% in the cost of trading internationally.⁶ Others have warned that the aggregate effect of a sudden increase in checks and controls will damage the U.S. economy, as the basic approach may be too blunt and misguided. Already, U.S. public ports have spent nearly US$50 million for security-related enhancements in the wake of 11 September, with most of the money spent on personnel—to hire new officers and for overtime pay. Enhanced security measures bring cumbersome restrictions, which go against the well-established business philosophy of the “just in time” logistical economy.⁷

Notwithstanding the “guns or butter” debates, it is evident that transportation security and economics can no longer be treated as an afterthought or tertiary issue.⁸ Shaken by its vulnerability as demonstrated in the 11 September attacks, America has changed its complacent attitudes.

One example of the vulnerability of U.S. seaports, noted by Commander Michael Dobbs in his article “Homeland Security … From the Sea”: “In 1947, a cargo of ammonium nitrate fertilizer caught fire and exploded in Texas City harbor, causing 600 deaths in a town of only 16,000 people.” It is by no means a stretch of the imagination to worry today that “the employment of a commercial vessel to deliver a weapon of mass destruction to one of America’s major ports would probably result in destruction several orders of magnitude greater than the Texas City disaster.”⁹

Not surprisingly, then, the United States has sought above all to quickly implement, across the board, broad-ranging, radical security measures to protect its homeland. To be sure, one cannot be too careful these days, and many countries now share in the profound sense of vulnerability. In prosecuting its war against terrorism worldwide, the United States can be said to be in a state of low-intensity conflict where the focus on homeland security is now indivisibly linked with international insecurity. The struggle will be protracted and, at times, shadowy. The United States therefore has compelling reason to impose cumbersome checks, unprecedented surveillance protocols, and enhanced security procedures that invariably restrict and slow down the free flow of people, information, and trade. Such measures are meant to err on the side of caution in protecting lives, vital infrastructure, and national interests from catastrophic terrorist attacks.

In the current age of unrestrained terrorism, shipping containers have become another bugbear for security managers as modern-day Trojan (sea)horses potentially capable of mass destruction. Shipping containers have even been likened to slow-moving cruise missiles that load up at the port of origin, meander their way through the littorals, and proceed across the pelagic commons toward their target destination at some distant port, often changing platforms at transshipment hubs en route. It is at the ports of origin and transshipment hubs that the CSI hopes to come into play by initiating a new global maritime trade and security regime that seeks to preserve cargo integrity, at least for containers heading for the U.S. homeland. In another deadly reminder, the careful screening of sea cargo heading into Bali by Indonesian authorities post facto¹⁰—in the wake of the devastating bomb attacks on 12 October 2002—is a reactive posture no country can afford these days.

CSI—A Big, Hairy, Audacious Goal¹¹

The idea for CSI was publicly mooted by Robert Bonner, Commissioner of U.S. Customs, in early January 2002. In contemporary management parlance, one could say that CSI represents the U.S. Customs Service’s bold attempt to define and develop its own big, hairy, audacious goals to thwart terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The concept of CSI is in theory deceptively simple. The United States wants to implement a system of layered security that virtually extends its borders and gateways as far from continental America as possible. It aims to stop terrorists from shipping weapons of mass destruction and other suspect cargo into the United States. The thinking is that the sea, like the air and land, represents a vast blue yonder from which the established sea transport routes of the world’s commerce shipping can be exploited to do grave damage to the U.S. homeland It follows that these potential maritime container threat vectors should as far as possible be prescreened and preempted en route before they call at U.S. ports.

A catastrophic terrorist attack through the container cargo traffic would not only disrupt American lives and livelihoods, it would also severely disrupt the entire world’s commerce trade system on which the national engines of the global economy depend. As eminent maritime strategist Geoffrey Till noted: “Sea transportation costs have been drastically reduced over the past decade or so, but at the price of a tight ‘just-in-time’ philosophy that makes it disproportionately vulnerable to local shocks.”¹²

Given the vulnerability of maritime trade, the pugnacious al-Qaeda statement quoted earlier, and the severe disruption of the airline industry worldwide by the 11 September attacks, it is clear that terrorists now target not just lives and minds but also prevailing ways of going about one’s everyday life and doing business. After half a century of intense capitalist globalization, which helped reduce trade barriers worldwide, visions of a borderless world are in for some serious remake. The stepped-up policing of national borders and raising of the bar on all physical entry barriers (for human and cargo traffic) have become urgent concerns, particularly of American national security. As Commissioner Bonner baldly put it:

We can no longer afford to think of “the border” merely as a physical line separating one nation from another. We must also now think of it in terms of the actions we can undertake with private industry and with our foreign partners to pre-screen people and goods before they reach the U.S. The ultimate aims of “pushing the border outward” are to allow U.S. Customs more time to react to potential threats—to stop threats before they reach us—and to expedite the flow of low-risk commerce across our borders.¹³

On top of reciprocal deployments of customs officers, some 54 high-tech X-ray machines have been deployed at U.S. and Canadian ports to scan containers. Beyond the ports, the United States has also dispatched a battery of new radiological detection equipment to U.S. borders and even countries afar to prevent terrorists from smuggling a “dirty bomb” that could spread radioactive waste over a large swathe of U.S. population areas.¹⁴

It should be noted, however, that the U.S.-Canadian CSI arrangement may not be an entirely appropriate or accurate model for the other CSI ports worldwide, because between the United States and Canada there is significant cross-border trade that is reciprocal in nature and volume, whereas much of the earmarked CSI ports’ transshipment cargo headed for the United States is weighted unidirectionally toward the United States, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, CSI transshipment ports are unlike North American ports that principally transport more cargo point to point (origin to destination, with less transshipment cargo). With the U.S. land border of 7,500 miles and the coastline of 90,000 miles, border crossings of 500 million per annum, truck crossings of 11 million per annum, and shipping port calls of 51,000 per annum involving millions of containers, it is easy to see why CSI is an urgent flagship item on a tall action order for U.S. Customs.

The CSI as spelt out by Bonner has four pillars:

1. To establish international security criteria for identifying high-risk cargo that may contain terrorists or terrorist weapons.
2. To prescreen high-risk containers at the port of shipment, before they are shipped to the United States.
3. To maximize the use of detection technology, such as X-rays and radiation and chemical detection sensors, to prescreen high-risk containers.
4. To develop and deploy smart and secure boxes with electronic seals and sensors to ensure cargo integrity, especially after prescreening.

Conceptually, CSI appears to be straightforward and evolving steadily as more countries make tentative and in-principle steps to come on board. In praxis, CSI remains polemical and the subject of considerable concern among the world’s shipping community. It raises difficult issues that remain to be clarified and bridged: increased costs and burden-sharing, port efficiency, discriminatory trade regimes, fears over encroachment of sovereignty, and the real effectiveness of such an extensive and potentially expensive initiative. But having just suffered a monumental strike on its aviation Achilles’ heel, the United States may, again understandably, be in little mood for a purely cost-benefit calculus. This is especially so when the prevailing thinking and domestic pressure are such that doing something (or being seen as seriously doing something) is better than doing nothing. At least there is a fighting chance of preempting some catastrophic attacks and possibly preventing a repeat of the 11 September attacks. Nevertheless, the Americans will have some more tough selling to do with CSI. To avoid the risk of the initiative’s being stillborn, it is clear that unilateral knee-jerk implementation is not tenable, and careful collaborative consultations with prospective global partners will be necessary in taking CSI forward.

Steaming Ahead or Losing Steam?

For a start, the top 20 megaports, which make up about 80% of the inbound container traffic to the United States, have been targeted by CSI. Besides Canada, others were invited to lead the way: the Netherlands (Rotterdam), Singapore, France (Le Havre), Belgium (Antwerp), and Hong Kong. The first four have acceded, with in-principle pilot or “proof of concept” caveats as first movers on board. In fact, Singapore, as the first port in Asia to adopt the new counterterrorism procedures as part of CSI, has called for a tender of two advanced X-ray machines for use at its ports by January 2003. Overall, the competitive pressure to get on board CSI appears to have generated a momentum of its own, with swift follow-up announcements by German ports (Bremerhaven and Hamburg) that they have also agreed to be part of CSI.¹⁶

The list looks set to grow in the months ahead if the United States sells it right, and as ports around the world, mega or minor, feel it compelling in their commercial and national interest not to be left out of CSI. An indication of the speed at which CSI is steaming ahead is that a team of U.S. Customs inspectors has already been deployed to Rotterdam to help screen shipping containers bound for the United States for potential terrorist threats. CSI was scheduled to be fully operational in Rotterdam by 2 September and in Le Havre, Antwerp, Bremerhaven, and Hamburg in the months following. The move to post U.S. Customs inspectors abroad marked the first time in the 213-year history of the Customs Service that inspectors have been assigned outside North America to prescreen cargo.¹⁷ With each implementation success, Customs would increasingly find good reason to be optimistic about the high degree of receptivity to CSI.

Despite the gathering momentum, it is likely that many countries—even if they have agreed in principle with the CSI pilots—would prefer to adopt an incrementalist wait-and-watch approach in actual implementation, and they would remain cautious about granting the Americans carte blanche with CSI. Worries linger, especially among Asian ports, that CSI could become a back door for unbridled external interference in domestic jurisdiction and enforcement regimes over port operations.

Even European Union regulators have reacted strongly to U.S. plans to screen sea cargo before it leaves for the United States, but for slightly different reasons: unprepared for the speed of U.S. action and the willingness of individual member states to sign up for CSI, the European Union has had to play catch-up, if not effect damage control. It lobbied hard in early August 2002 (and has since presented its case to key U.S. congressional advisors) for a single U.S. maritime security agreement with the European Union, which would be preferable to bilateral deals with individual member states.¹⁸ In particular, the European Union has also raised serious concerns that the stationing of U.S. customs officers in Rotterdam, Le Havre, and Antwerp could break international trade rules by blacklisting containers sent from other ports.¹⁹ The fear is that CSI could distort competition between European Union ports by unduly penalizing smaller facilities that do not have the resources and capacity to compete with CSI box hubs. Rather than work unilaterally or bilaterally to impose new security regimes on the shipping container trade, the European Commission has urged the United States to work within international institutions, including the Group of Eight industrialized nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Customs Organization, and the International Maritime Organization.

The CSI issue potentially piles on another item to the growing list of trade spats between the world’s trading partners, and a stalemate on the issue would not augur well for the increasingly palpable strategic rift²⁰ in cross-Atlantic relations. Farther down the road, it may not be implausible for the European Union to come up with similar or novel maritime trade-security regimes or demands of its own to maintain economic competitiveness and for security. The latter concern remains germane for the European Union countries, given that the new transnational threats can, just as surely, gravely impact the European heartland.

Hong Kong was similarly hesitant in signing up for CSI. As the top foreign port for cargo bound for the United States, it had been slow to agree to join, signing up only on 23 September 2002, with the express hope that the policy change would give Hong Kong a competitive edge over the mainland Chinese ports.²¹ But concerns remain, and the timetable for Hong Kong’s CSI implementation remains up in the air. In particular, the proposal to have U.S. Customs agents screen for terrorist cargoes had been met with a cool response initially. Industry insiders had cautioned that Hong Kong’s port efficiency should not be sacrificed at the expense of excessive or overly detailed inspections by U.S. Customs. About 2.2 million twenty-foot equivalent units, or nearly 20% of Hong Kong’s containerized exports, are shipped from Hong Kong to U.S. ports. Of these, some 80% originate with mainland businesses and manufacturers.

In fact, Hong Kong had earlier sent a delegation to visit ports in the United States in June 2002 to evaluate how CSI might affect longstanding shipping practices, with an eye to balancing potential security benefits against the impact on trade and port competitiveness. Henry Tang Ying-Yen, Hong Kong’s newly appointed Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology, had emphasized that if Hong Kong were to implement CSI, U.S. Customs officers stationed in Hong Kong would not have any inspection or enforcement powers. He also made the assessment that CSI would likely have an adverse impact on Hong Kong and other CSI ports. He identified two key problems that could hobble the CSI: First, shippers, freight forwarders, and shipping lines may have to upgrade their computer systems, because of the need to submit advance information. This means redesigning the information system to allow U.S. Customs officials to access shipment details. Such efforts would incur significant extra costs. Second, CSI would “affect the longstanding mode of operation of the shippers, freight forwarders and shipping lines.”²²

It is clear that more than mindset changes will be necessary for CSI to gain wider acceptance. Joint capacity-building and forging consensus on the shaping of evolving norms—which address the realities of local concerns and regional and global conditions—will be important turnkeys for project success. There is perhaps a third problem that may hamstring the CSI downstream: Even if countries agree to abide by the letter and spirit of CSI by declaring their support in signing up to come on board early, there is still the very real possibility that CSI may turn out to be a white elephant. This is, to be sure, the inherent danger of all big, hairy, audacious goals. In the final analysis, CSI may turn out to be little more than an expensive public relations exercise in effete mutually comforting assurance for all involved. Like many new security ideas, it may not do much to stop terrorism. CSI’s risk-profiling and prescreening measures ultimately represent merely a drop in the ocean in the long and broader fight against global terrorism. Although a politically important symbolic gesture that signals U.S. resolve and cooperative partnership by participating countries on the matter, effectively screening the enemy beyond America’s gates will, assuredly, need to go well beyond CSI if it is not to end up an exorbitant exercise in futility.

On another beachhead beyond Hong Kong, it has been reported that U.S. Customs officials had planned to formally ask China to agree to a proposal to station U.S. Customs agents in Chinese mainland ports.²³ It would indeed be an unprecedented act of cooperation should China agree to the proposal. Casting such an elaborate and extensive CSI net would likely take some convincing, and it is not yet certain that cooperation and enforcement measures taken can be harmonized for all CSI ports, given the differing standards in cargo-handling capacity and the nature of the container business. For example, much of the cargo that flows through Chinese ports to the United States consists of products made by the domestic Chinese manufacturing and industrial economy. In a transshipment hub like Singapore, cargo comes from all over the region and the world before being offloaded from one ship and reloaded onboard another for shipment across the Pacific to the United States.

Besides, China may be concerned that the CSI may become an instrument of U.S. protectionism. Unfounded or otherwise, the concern that the growing Chinese container trade heading to the United States may be slowed down by overly stringent CSI checks as a result of future bilateral trade friction may need to be assuaged. This is of considerable importance, given the fact that China’s southern port, Shenzhen, with its strong export growth, is already well on its way to replacing Shanghai as the mainland’s largest port.²⁴ Shanghai is currently the fifth-largest port in the world.

The United States has also sent a delegation of officials to call on the South Korean government to intensify security checks on containers bound for the United States and for stationing Customs officials at Korean ports as part of the effort to rope Busan and Gwangyang into the CSI loop. Reactions have been cautious. As a South Korean government spokesman disclosed: “We have passed on our position in principle to study the proposal. But it is too early whether we will comply because the decision requires discussion with related ministries.”²⁵

At the other end of the spectrum, countries such as Thailand and Malaysia have expressed keen interest in coming on board CSI, especially when Singapore had already gotten on board and the promise of competitive benefits such as faster “green lanes” appears too attractive an incentive to miss out on. Already, the competition to get on board CSI might have turned up the heat on the rivalry somewhat, judging by some reports.²⁶ Though ranked number 25 in the world’s container ports for 2001, Malaysia’s fledgling port of Tanjung Pelepas has been pressing the Malaysian federal government to fast-track its participation in CSI. In fact, it has already filed an application to join the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the U.S. Customs Service’s government-business program designed to tighten international supply-chain security. Malaysia’s other port, Port Klang, which ranks number 12, has also been working with the U.S. Customs Service for full implementation of CSI requirements by the end of 2002.²⁷ The Malaysian interest is noteworthy, given that both Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas are not on the solicited list of top 20 megaports with the highest percentage of containers headed for the United States annually (Table I).

Despite the strong interest shown, nagging questions remain as to the eventual shape and nature of CSI and its ultimate impact on port efficiency. As Malaysian Transport Minister Ling Liong Sik stated: “The U.S. Customs Service approached us recently and we were fully supportive … on condition that it will not lead to delays or congestion at the ports” (emphasis added).²⁸ Malaysia’s Royal Customs Department Director-General, Datuk Abdul Halil, has also reportedly said that all inspections would be carried out by Malaysian Customs officials, while U.S. officials could only look at and choose the containers they intend to inspect.²⁹ All in all, the Malaysians have indicated that besides Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, the Johor port and Butterworth Port in Penang are being considered for CSI.

Amid the litany of understandable concerns and mounting interest, the United States has sought to reassure the targeted megaports—with mixed success so far—that the United States will “work in partnership with governments in the countries where these megaports are located to build a new international security standard for sea containers.”³⁰ “To build a new international security standard for sea containers” will require the support of the wider multinational shipping community and world maritime agencies and forums.

To be sure, the nature of that emergent partnership is now under international scrutiny as the rest of the megaports and smaller ports monitor how the Singapore, Rotterdam, Le Havre, and Antwerp pilot CSI ports shape up. The challenge will be in navigating the shoals of sovereignty, security, and cost when testing and implementing the CSI pilot port projects to prove that the concept works in ultimately safeguarding global maritime trade across the pelagic commons.

Addressing Partnership Concerns

To overcome the many concerns, the United States will need to do more serious soft-selling of CSI with some political delicacy and with greater coherence and clarity. This can be done by adopting a consultative posture for close collaboration on the implementation of CSI. It will have to tread sensitively in areas that may encroach on the sovereignty of CSI partner states. One should appreciate that containers are intermodal (transportable by sea, road, and rail). The intermodal modus operandi of the container logistic system makes it “difficult to regulate as it crosses jurisdictional boundaries.”³¹ This geopolitical fact underpins the practical challenge of normative CSI enforceability and should not be forgotten or treated desultorily.

Balancing Realistic Ends With Reasonable Means

All parties involved, especially the Americans, will need to be realistic about the ultimate value of CSI. At best, the measure seeks to give some form of limited public assurance through cargo supply-chain visibility and early risk-profiling measures, allowing more reaction time for threat cargo interdiction. Free trade is a worldwide net with many big holes, and there need to be some realism and realization that it is well nigh impossible to plug all the (loop)holes definitively or unilaterally (assuming it were possible). It is not in the interest of those advocating greater global free trade to do so after spending much of the post–Cold War era trying to batter down national walls to enter new markets. Even an increase of a few percentage points in the inspection rate of the cargo headed to the United States would put a severe brake on the smooth transshipment system and would be intolerable for many far-flung CSI ports, not to even talk about wishful 100% cargo inspection.

In any case, even if it were hypothetically possible to significantly prescreen a larger percent of the container cargo at CSI ports, the danger would not be neutralized, because if even one piece of infiltrated cargo arrives at a U.S. port, it may be too late, especially given the wide array of weapons of mass destruction potentially on the loose out there. Asking for early documentation to help in risk-profiling would also be a huge challenge. “Digitized or not, the maritime industry’s present documentation is unreliable,” wrote Dave Eberhart, who noted that “in one instance, U.S. Customs audited 181 ships and found 96 had more or fewer containers on board than identified. What’s more, bills of lading describing the containers’ contents also were incomplete or falsified.”³² Even with the right targeting information and risk-management protocols in place, it would still be a physically impossible task to verify all declarations by comparing them against every actual item being shipped. When one contemplates seriously the actual information-processing capabilities from shipper to shipper and country to country, the challenge would be compounded by the wide disparity in secure container cargo-handling capacity and capability between the more advanced and less developed ports.

In addition, the “volume of paper work would be mountainous,” Eberhart noted,³³ and the paper trail messy, especially when a typical container cargo transaction involves many parties and agencies, ranging from exporters, importers (shippers), shipping lines, insurers, and time-charters to financiers and governments. In the final analysis, checks are never foolproof, and it would be a tall order to expect all cargo to be screened. Grand calls for supply-chain dominant awareness must be tempered by realistic expectations in a world of asymmetric means (capacity and capability) and political will in the wide gulf, which the global logistics trade traverses, between the rich north and the poor south. It stands to reason then that the United States should not impose excessively cumbersome, unrealistic, and unreasonable measures for risk profiling and screening of containers on its CSI partners. A certain amount of accommodation and alignment of customs and legislative mechanisms may be necessary on the part of the CSI partners if CSI is to satisfy U.S. objectives while preserving the partnering states’ national interests.

Sovereignty Sensitivities and Customs Officers

The posting of U.S. customs officers in CSI ports to scrutinize containerized shipments bound for the United States and to assist in searches will also be a sensitive issue.³⁴ Agreements and codes of conduct can spell out clearly the out-of-bounds markers. But customs officers on the ground will have to face the day-to-day challenge³⁵ of ensuring that competing interests are minimized and common ones converged so that any differences in enforcement regimes and disputes are resolved amicably in a timely manner through mutual arbitration and agreement.

A repeat of the historical problems associated with the stationing of overbearing trade officials at Asian ports would be something the Americans would do well to avoid when implementing CSI. After all, sovereignty remains a highly sensitive issue. The adverse impact of uninvited foreign spheres of influence (such as the contentious U.S. Open Door policy from 1900 until World War II) continue to haunt Chinese memories. The historical chapter in China’s external relations is a constant reminder of the humiliating concessions it had to give to the Western imperialist powers, and therefore the need to guard its sovereignty and commercial interests jealously. The historical precedent is especially pertinent when the net result of CSI may not, in the final analysis, do real justice to any excessively stringent prescreening measures put in place that may unnecessarily strain trade relations. Securing the confidence and trust and maintaining the goodwill of partner CSI states would be an imperative for sustained cooperative engagement by ground enforcement agencies on all sides. At the signing of the Declaration of Principles on CSI in Singapore on 20 September 2002, U.S. Customs Commissioner Bonner asserted in his speech that “U.S. Customs officers will not be enforcing U.S. laws in Singapore and they will not be enforcing Singapore’s laws.” The assurance of close bilateral customs partnership with the pooling of joint resources and expertise was a timely tack that should go down well with the rest of the CSI partners who will have to host U.S. Customs officers.

Trade Facilitation and Rule-Making

CSI should not hamstring the free flow of commerce the globalized world has enjoyed and thrives on. Ultimately, there must be a balance between security and trade efficiency. This can be done by jointly ballasting the relevant issues and managing expectations on all sides. U.S. Republican Don Young, Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, told a January 2002 conference on maritime security, “Let’s not get to a point where we’re so over-secure we can’t move freight too … If you do that, you lose your profit margins and you’re not competitive with other countries.” This remains an important pragmatic reminder when implementing CSI, eschewing the risk of going overboard with unrealistic risk-profiling and overkill screening measures. In other words, any new countermeasures—logistic protocols or security regimes—should not be counterproductive to trade facilitation. The two facets of protection and trade facilitation, as U.S. Customs Commissioner Bonner rightly emphasized, “are not mutually exclusive.”³⁶

In implementing CSI, the views of the international shipping community will also need to be actively sought and included where possible. Take, for example, the issue of rule-making. In September 2002, the World Shipping Council published a robust 24-page commentary on the U.S. Customs Service’s proposal to introduce radical changes to the extant Cargo Manifest Filing system practiced by shippers worldwide.³⁷ Representing 90% of the shipping capacity serving the world’s largest economy, the council had asked U.S. Customs for more time to deliberate and prepare for any eventual tightening of container security rules. In considerable detail, the World Shipping Council commentary critically catalogs the laundry list of practical difficulties and polemical issues that attend the U.S. Customs proposal to renovate the extant manifest system as part of CSI developments. In particular, it takes critical aim at the U.S. Customs proposal to change the Cargo Manifest Filing system from one that records cargo information after the cargo is loaded on board a ship to one that instead requires the carrier to create and file a manifest for what it expects will be loaded. In fact, many countries would no doubt question the feasibility for the shipping industry to provide cargo information before containers depart ports, issues of timeliness and fidelity notwithstanding. The U.S. Customs rule-making proposal for advance cargo manifests potentially creates additional burdens to the vessel carriers. It has the very real potential to result in operational delays and increased costs for the vessel carrier. The World Shipping Council commentary stresses both the need to recognize the limited scope of the cargo manifest and its operational implications. In sum, the World Shipping Council warns against the adverse repercussions on carriers, port operators, and shippers if U.S. Customs implements the new rulings without close consultation and greater clarification on the range of practical and policy issues. Despite the shipping community’s concerns, U.S. Customs has made determined unilateral moves to forge ahead with its own rule-making. A rule announced on 30 October 2002 to be enforced in early 2003 makes it mandatory for sea carriers to provide details of their container contents destined for the United States 24 hours before the cargo is loaded onto ships at foreign ports. Companies that fail to provide accurate manifest information 24 hours before loading would be subject to fines—although the regulation would not apply to ships carrying bulk cargo such as oil and grain.³⁸ All said, the practical reality of such unilateral moves might well be that CSI cannot go it alone at the government-to-government level without the important inputs and effective cooperation of the international shipping community. To be sure, the U.S. Customs Service will need to continuously engage the wider international shipping community in parallel with efforts to deal with the major ports and domestic U.S. trade constituents on CSI. For all practical purposes and intents, the partnership model should be extended to the private shipping sector, as the latter will be most affected by any new CSI measures and will help CSI to ultimately take off as planned. Furthermore, megaports can ill afford to ignore the concerns of the shipping community if they want to keep their businesses afloat and moving. In the end, the shipping community represents a critical segment of the world business community involved in the global supply-chain movement. To some extent, this concern is being addressed by C-TPAT, which runs parallel to CSI.

Cost Burden-Sharing, Smart Technology Collaboration and Capacity Building

There are concerns by prospective CSI ports that they may be left in a situation where they take over all the burdens of U.S. controls in situ at their ports. Gatekeepers often have a thankless task in holding the can; therefore their concerns and cooperation should never be taken for granted. While shipping lines are naturally concerned about how new CSI measures may adversely affect their businesses, CSI ports have to grapple with the hefty capital investments needed up front for the development and introduction of smart technologies for screening containers. To be sure, screening out the range of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats requires a special suite of full-spectrum detection capability sensors to be deployed at all gateway ports. Furthermore, additional security measures such as the potential use of electronic seals to preserve in-transit cargo integrity, new X-ray machines for prescreening containers, and advance data on cargo manifests come at some cost and no small inconvenience for any CSI partner. For example, new machines that employ patented backscatter X-ray technology make it easier to detect low-density objects such as “dirty bombs” that might escape normal X-rays, but these machines entail high initial outlays and considerable recurrent costs. Avenues should be explored for some cost burden-sharing mechanism to be built into the CSI in the true spirit of genuine partnership. After all, first movers on board CSI—pilot ports such as Singapore—had signaled their strong support by agreeing to cooperate on such an expensive and cumbersome initiative despite the fact that many practical difficulties of implementation remain to be jointly ironed out. The potentially strong demonstrative or positive domino effect of such an early vote of confidence by a megaport such as Singapore for a nascent, and somewhat nebulous, initiative that has yet to find its feet should not be lost on the U.S. Customs Service and transport authorities. Singapore has already pumped in S$8.8 million to purchase new equipment such as portable bomb detectors and gamma-ray scanners to boost border security.³⁹ Under the Strategic Goods (Control) Bill that Parliament passed on 25 November 2002, it has also acquired more legal muscle to track 600 items of strategic goods moving through its ports, as part of the worldwide effort to keep out of terrorist hands any goods that they might find useful.⁴⁰

Besides the issue of cost burden sharing, technology collaboration through test-bedding some of the new prescreening technologies could be jointly carried out to increase synergy and standardize any new normative security protocols and business processes that may be adopted. This could include the joint trawling of the security technology market for rapid technology insertion of suitable systems. For example, it has been suggested that “a few places—Hong Kong and Singapore—have smart systems that the US should study as possible models.”⁴¹ Singapore PSA’s information technology unit, Portnet.com, recently clinched an S$8 million deal to implement a nationwide e-commerce port and community system for the National Ports Authority of South Africa.⁴² The e-commerce system is designed to speed up cargo handling, handle electronic container data, and facilitate track-and-trace services, potentially improving risk profiling and enhancing overall logistical visibility and security. PSA’s smart e-commerce system may well develop into a global portnet system with established nodes in different continents linking up. In another signal development, the world’s top three terminal operators—Hutchison Whampoa, PSA, and P&O Ports—have agreed to collaborate to demonstrate and deploy automated tracking detection and security technology for containers entering U.S. ports. They have reportedly agreed to fund and spearhead the dockside implementation of CSI. The initiative known as Smart and Secure Tradelanes would initially employ U.S. Defense Department technology known as the Total Asset Visibility network to track the movement and integrity of containers.⁴³

Cost burden sharing and technology collaboration will enhance capacity building. In time, other ports around the world outside the megaport league may also want to join CSI to reap the benefits of capacity building in the area of secure container handling. At the moment, it is unclear whether the developing ports see CSI as an opportunity or a threat to their fledgling and sometimes faltering businesses. Rightly or wrongly, some may yet view CSI as another obstacle put up by the United States to curb their exports. CSI will therefore need, at some stage, to engage the minor ports of developing countries to cast a wider maritime security network and manage expectations and suspicions.

Secure Supply-Chain Management and Green-Lane Benefits

Notwithstanding concerns about CSI, quite a few major global shipping lines have already expressed their intentions to sign on to C-TPAT, a parallel U.S. joint business-government antiterrorism initiative whereby businesses are required to establish policies to enhance their security practices and those of their business partners along the supply chain. The practices include vetting importers and assessing the risk of service providers with the implementation of stringent security processes along and across all levels of the logistic business units. For carriers, it encompasses certifying that their port operations, vessels, and computer systems are secure and that background security vetting has been conducted for key employees. The implementation vision is for firms on board the C-TPAT program to be given expedited processing at U.S. ports of entry.⁴⁴ Implicit in C-TPAT is the recognition that shippers are ultimately responsible for a large part of the supply chain, and it is vital that they be made committed security stakeholders.

In tandem with expedited processing for shippers under C-TPAT, the United States has promoted Green Lane (or fast-lane access) as an advantage for CSI ports. But the United States will need to articulate more clearly what this entails from the technology implementation, ground-level enforcement, and policy implication angles and how CSI Green Lane benefits translate into tangible gains in a positive way (rather than a punitive and negative way⁴⁵) such that they accord partner CSI ports (and C-TPAT shippers) a distinct competitive advantage over ports and shippers that are not compliant with CSI or C-TPAT. For example, through smart “reverse profiling,” CSI-compliant containers that are low risk should be precleared and given automatic green-lane status. Only non-CSI cargo of suspect origin and with limited or unknown information should then be “red-laned” for more stringent checks at U.S. entry ports. In addition, CSI should not erode the “free port” status and efficiency now enjoyed by megaports such as Singapore. The fast turnaround time of transshipment containers should not be disrupted. In the end, clear Green Lane incentives and specific benefits, such as special preferred port status, that are up front, consistent, and transparent will go a long way in encouraging more parties to come on board the CSI and C-TPAT programs. This would help allay anxieties and minimize reticence for ports to be among the first movers. Another important aspect the United States could highlight to drive its security initiative forward is to advertise another potential benefit of a dual-layered CSI and C-TPAT system: CSI would secure the physical containers at the ports while C-TPAT screened the range of disparate service providers or players in the supply-chain business. From a crisis-recovery point of view, even if the United States were to shut down the entire sea-logistics system in the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack via the maritime container trajectory, it could do more to reassure its CSI partners of another first-mover advantage. In particular, it could reasonably be expected—and it should assure—that CSI ports and C-TPAT shippers would be accorded trusted preferential status and be among the first to resume cargo operations with the United States.

On Common Turf and Dovetailing Disparate Initiatives

On the issue of leadership and responsibility, there is a need to clarify and dovetail some of the one-stop executive functions among the many U.S. agencies and federal departments involved in improving sea cargo, port, and border security. This will minimize confusion and enhance the overall synergy of effort while minimizing some of the turf wars among the many U.S. agencies involved in securing maritime trade security with foreign partners. The U.S. Congress appears divided. Through the Port and Maritime Security Act passed in December 2001, the Senate had given the responsibility of securing the cargo coming into U.S. seaports to the U.S. Customs Service. Similarly, the House Ways and Means Committee had introduced a bill that gave the U.S. Customs Service the responsibility. However, the House Transportation Committee has assigned the Department of Transportation’s new Transportation Security Administration the responsibility for directing maritime and international cargo security.

Another case in point is that while CSI and C-TPAT may be U.S. Customs Service initiatives, there may be a need to deconflict or better synergize with other similar federal initiatives. For instance, there have been parallel efforts by the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and the U.S. Coast Guard to enhance sea transport security. Some of these appear to overlap. For example, the Smart and Secure Tradelanes initiative with private shippers is driven by the Department of Transportation. Furthermore, distinct excise and revenue-collection functions and maritime security functions traditionally handled by the Customs Service and the Coast Guard respectively have somewhat blurred. There are unclear institutional responsibilities and overlapping mandates between the two agencies. This is, in part, because the Customs Service has taken on a more assertive and expanded role in enhancing U.S. border security. For example, on 4 June 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Act, which accords to the U.S. Coast Guard an active role in assessing the security systems in certain foreign ports and in denying entry to vessels from ports that do not maintain effective security. In addition, it calls for domestic and foreign port assessments, antiterrorism teams, and development of an antiterrorism cargo identification system by mid-2003. The bill also contains a provision requiring the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security to develop a system of container cargo information to analyze shipping container information for antiterrorism purposes and to develop performance standards for shipping container security.⁴⁶ How the Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Act will interface with CSI in implementation remains to be seen.

Despite some confusion and controversy, the homogenizing and harmonizing function envisaged in the incipient Department of Homeland Security⁴⁷ may yet turn out to be a positive development. It may well go some way in dovetailing the disparate initiatives when it is established. A clear central authority driving the overall maritime and border security effort mooted by the United States may yet help prospective partners to build bridges and identify the correct agencies to deal with, particularly when sharing sensitive data and proprietary information for targeting high-risk containers.

There is also the issue of jurisdiction and oversight of the U.S. Customs Service’s commercial operations and trade facilitation initiatives. The U.S. Joint Industry Group, in its testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, called for establishment of an Under Secretary for Commercial Operations, who would report to the Deputy Secretary within the Department of Homeland Security. The Under Secretary would ostensibly guarantee that U.S. Customs’ obligation to facilitate trade would not be subsumed within an agency that has as its first priority the security of U.S. borders. The U.S. trade community has reasonable grounds to be concerned that insufficient attention would be given to U.S. Customs’ traditional remit on commercial operations and trade-related functions once it is absorbed under the Homeland Security Department. In their own words, they “fear that trade facilitation will be almost entirely neglected in a department devoted entirely to security and enforcement.”⁴⁸ They are also concerned that money earmarked for Customs’ commercial operations and trade facilitation activities might be diverted to fund enforcement activities. While supporting the Department of Homeland Security initiative, the Joint Industry Group believes that U.S. Customs must remain subject to Congressional oversight by the appropriate committees with the right authority.

Apart from such bureaucratic tangles that need to be worked out, there may also be a need at some point to incorporate, harmonize, and address the linkages, if any, between CSI and C-TPAT and other longstanding U.S. efforts like those related to Free Trade Agreements and implementation of export control regimes for materiel that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. Also in need of better definition are linkages to new efforts such as the proposal, crafted by the United States, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Mexico on 28 October 2002 to overhaul the Pacific Rim’s tradeways⁴⁹ by tightening security on millions of shipping containers, fortifying cockpit doors in airplanes, and strengthening customs cooperation.

Ultimately, who is to be in charge and who is to foot the bill for enhanced security measures will be questions that will need to be answered clearly and jointly by all partners on board CSI and related initiatives. The debate about whether homeland security can indeed be outsourced⁵⁰ appears to be already passé, if not academic, insofar as American resolve on extending CSI is concerned. The determination to outsource a significant proportion of container security through CSI is clear. This is manifestly the case even if the outsourcing is, strictly speaking, partial—that is, the posting of U.S. Customs officers at CSI ports to help with advance container targeting and screening—and the fact that U.S. ports can still be expected to actively screen suspect containers. But an even more important practical point about outsourcing security is that the rest of the CSI countries should be given some pecuniary support for cost burden sharing and capacity building to fulfill the Herculean operational demands required in effectively implementing CSI. Even as willing partners, few countries can afford to underwrite security for free, for long. Outsourcing implies a contractual relationship. CSI would be true to the spirit and letter of (limited) outsourcing only if the United States complements CSI with some amount of financial cache for joint capacity building and management of recurrent costs that go beyond simply Green Lanes and goodwill.

Some Compass Bearings in Making Way Ahead

History will, in the end, provide a critical assessment of whether CSI will prove to be a useful exercise in the fight against terrorism through its deterrence utility or whether it is one in futility. Perhaps, more than anything else, its true value lies in its political symbolism in reassuring the American and global public. This remains to be seen as the final shape and substance of CSI if it makes headway toward anchoring its presence around the world.

The following principal considerations could be useful for the CSI in fixing its bearings while making way ahead:

• An iterative and phased approach for pilot implementation and regular joint reviews of impact on port efficiency for fine-tuning security control measures. Increased demands on data collection and screening checks should not adversely impact trade facilitation. Adaptive solutions and flexible protocols would make any bitter pill of CSI easier for partners to swallow.
• Close consultation and consensus among agencies in intelligence and information sharing to work out the required body of information for risk management and targeting. Besides enhancing coordination, there are issues of sovereignty and sensitive commercial information involved in allowing unfettered access to databases that will have to be managed. A streamlined or one-stop data-processing center could help to collate and disseminate the required body of information for validation, verification, and effective risk management.
• Strict rules of conduct and terms of reference for Customs officers deployed at CSI ports. Not all ports will be comfortable with letting U.S. Customs officials dictate targeting and screening measures. The United States must work closely with partner states on an agreed modus operandi that is effective and reasonable.
• Joint capacity building, information exchange, cost burden sharing, and smart risk-profiling regimes will be integral to showcasing CSI as an effective and evolving global trade norm. Joint public-private ventures, taking into account government-industry concerns and ideas, would help to forge a mutually reinforcing partnership to set new security benchmarks and industry norms.
• U.S. Customs’ CSI and C-TPAT initiatives would also have to see how the measures they seek to implement can be aligned and harmonized with other multilateral supply-chain security initiatives, like those mooted by the World Customs Organization.⁵¹ For example, expensive and extensive ideas like the use of electronic seals (e-seals) will require comprehensive international cooperation, and all local and global players throughout the supply chain must be willing and able to implement any new procedures for greater success in the longer term.

Conclusion: Lashing Down Together for Choppy Seas

The forces of terror must not be allowed to paralyze or derail the juggernaut of globalization. But in a world where threat perceptions, port capabilities, and political priorities differ, it would be presumptuous and well nigh impracticable to implement a “one size fits all” approach when implementing CSI. Harmonization of CSI with extant and evolving maritime regimes will be the vision; getting there together will entail much negotiation, consensus on the nature of the problem, and concerted action. Already, in the wake of the Bali blasts and the September attack on the French supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, Southeast Asian port authorities reportedly plan to create a comprehensive shipping and security database to be shared among regional members. Such a plan, if put into action, potentially represents a useful bid to raise the information-gathering capabilities of the ports in the region that could complement CSI.⁵² Whatever elaborate solutions—global or regional—may be thrown up to try to deal with the new global security problems, it is important to realize that there can be no silver bullet when it comes to dealing with the many trajectories of Trojan sea(horses). Ultimately, CSI is about risk management. Even with CSI, every prescreened or green-laned container will carry inherent risks. No checks can ever be completely foolproof, and successful interdiction of threat cargo will hinge largely on the effectiveness of early-warning intelligence and risk-profiling measures for screening. There is therefore a real need to temper expectations with reason. There is no perfect, watertight system, except in a vacuum. The global village is no vacuum but quite the opposite: an inhabited space characterized by messy networks of people, information, and goods that are decidedly filled with unpluggable holes of slippages and spin-offs. A fully foolproof container-screening system remains the holy grail. More surmountable will be the challenge for the United States to work through a web of bilateral and multilateral regimes to reduce vulnerabilities by increasing visibility and tightening up security in the supply chain of the global container logistics system. Successful CSI (and C-TPAT) implementation will ultimately rest on defining and delivering tangible advantages for the participation of ports and shippers. It will require a balanced approach on a broad front that matches the needs of enhanced protective security with the realities of commercial efficiency. It is perhaps ironic that Alfred Mahan’s call for America to dominate the sea trade of the oceanic commons in order to secure its national power and economic interests will require more than the hard hyperpower of naval supremacy or gunboat diplomacy.⁵³ In the postmodern globalization era of transnational threats to the international trading system and state security confronting many nations, it will also require the soft power of consultative leadership and patient persuasion. Such soft power, backed up by strong partnership, will help forge a practical multilateral network of mutually reinforcing maritime cooperative regimes that will accord clear tangible benefits and greater assurance to all players involved. In the end, consensus building and joint capacity building through close interstate coordination and interagency collaboration, not compulsion, must be the order of the day for CSI success. Such a pragmatic winning partnership approach will be pivotal as more countries and captains of the shipping industry, watching carefully in the wake, decide to get onboard with the Yanks on U.S.S. CSI to help make a historic sea change that seeks to better safeguard the global maritime trading system.

References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1. Stephen E. Flynn, “Beyond Border Control” in Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 2000). See also his prophetic pre–11 September 2001 warning that “most of the physical plant, information, communications, power, and cargo handling sectors of the marine, surface, and aviation transportation systems are unprotected or are equipped with security sufficient to deter only amateur vandals, thieves, or hackers.… America’s transportation infrastructure may become the national Achilles’ heel, risking lives and prosperity” in his “Transportation Security: Agenda for the 21st Century,” TR News, No. 211 (Transport Research Board, Nov.-Dec. 2000), p. 4; http://gulliver.trb.org/publications/security/sflynn.pdf. See also his chapter “Transforming Border Management in the Post–September 11 World” in Governance & Public Security. (Syracuse, NY: Campbell Public Affairs Institute, 2002); http://webdev.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/Governance_Symposium/flynn.pdf.

2. U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy, cited in “When Trade and Security Clash,” The Economist, 4 Apr. 2002, p. 61; http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3040_1297.pdf.

3. As U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it when defending Washington’s view that the United States and its allies could not wait for “absolute proof” before taking action against groups and states suspected of acquiring weapons of mass destruction: “The message is that there are no ‘knowns.’ There are thing we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know.… There’s another way to phrase that and that is that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”—Donald Rumsfeld, press conference at NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 6 June 2002; www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06062002_t0606sd.html.

4. Abu Laith, claiming to be a spokesman for al-Qaeda, quoted in a Reuters report in the Chandigarh, India, Tribune, 11 July 2002; www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020711/world.htm.

5. “How Safe Are Our Borders?” ABC News, 11 Sep. 2002; http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/sept11_uranium020911.html.

6. World trade was up 12% in 2000, flat in 2001, and expected to rise only 2% or so in 2002; see Rana Foroohar with Karen MacGregor, “A Blow to Global Trade,” Newsweek, 9 Sep. 2002, p. 46.

7. Ironically, the drawn-out labor dispute and strike at the 29 major U.S. West Coast ports that began on 27 Sep. 2002 provided a poignant case study of a serious disruption to the just-in-time sea trade. It was estimated to have cost the U.S. economy as much as US$1 billion in Asian exports each day the ports were closed. See Linda Collins, “Port Row Halts Work at Plants,” Singapore Straits Times, 5 Oct. 2002, p. 6. See also Fareed Zakaria, “Time to Save Just in Time,” Newsweek, 12 Nov. 2001, p. 13, and Janet Plume, “Customs Folding Ocean Moves Into C-TPAT,” Gulf Shipper, 1 Apr. 2002; www.gulfshipper.com/archive_gs/featureoftheweek/featureoftheweek-4-1.shtml.

8. Sean Kilcarr, “Transportation Security,” FleetOwner, 12 Sep. 2002; http://fleetowner.com/ar/fleet_transportation_security/. See also J. R. Richard Ernsberger et al., “Fortress America,” Newsweek, 12 Nov. 2001, pp. 52–58.

9. Commander Michael Dobbs, “Homeland Security … From the Sea,” Journal of Homeland Security, November 2002; www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/displayarticle.asp?article=77.

10. Yeoh En-Lai, “Cargo at Port Undergoes Careful Checks,” Singapore Straits Times, 18 Oct. 2002.

11. Exceptional organizations set challenging and often risky goals. “Big, hairy, audacious goals” is a concept advocated by James Collins and Jerry Porras in Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (New York: HarperBusiness, 1997). The concept has also been adopted by the Vice President and Senior Scientist of Sandia Labs, Gerry Yonas, in Sandia’s advanced technology research and development work; see also Sandia LabNews, Vol. 53, No. 8, 19 Apr. 2002.

12. Geoffrey Till, “Seapower: The Indian Ocean and the 21st Century,” in his unpublished “Discussion Notes for IMF, USI and IDSA,” Feb. 2002.

13. Robert C. Bonner, statement to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Charleston, SC, 19 Feb. 2002; http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/021902bonner.pdf.

14. 24 X-ray trucks have been deployed at national borders and the ports of Boston; Long Beach, CA; and West Palm Beach, FL. Another 24 were at ports in Egypt, Britain, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. See “X-Ray Trucks Scan Cargo for ‘Dirty Bombs,’” Singapore Straits Times, 25 July 2002.

15. See “Automated Commercial Environment (ACE): The Primer” (25 Apr. 2001); http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/modernization/ace/sld001.htm. See also “Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping: Container Security—U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative (CSI),” International Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee, 75th session, agenda item 17 (12 Apr. 2002); www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/imosec/75-17-33.pdf.

16. The ports of Bremerhaven and Hamburg are among the top 20 megaports of the world. In 2001, approximately 257,000 sea cargo containers entered the United States from Bremerhaven and 103,000 from Hamburg. See “Germany Signs Declaration to Join U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative, Strengthening Anti-Terror Coalition” (U.S. Customs Service press release, 1 Aug. 2002); www.customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2002/0801-00.htm.

17. U.S. Mission to the European Union, “U.S. Customs Inspectors Deployed to Rotterdam to Screen Containers,” 26 Aug. 2002; www.useu.be/Categories/Justice%20and%20Home%20Affairs/Aug2602CustomsRotterdamContainerSecurity.html.

18. “Brussels to Lobby US on CSI,” Lloyd’s List, 1 Aug. 2002.

19. Trade relations between the 15-nation European Union and the United States had been strained by disputes ranging from farm aid to hormone-treated beef to steel tariffs and export tax breaks. See “EU Slams US’ Plan to Screen 3 European Ports,” Business Times, 15 July 2002.

20. For a good account of the growing clash in strategic cultures between the United States and Europe over a range of economic and political issues, as well as the argument that it presents a threat to the transatlantic alliance more serious than any in the past 50 years, see Philip Stephens, “An Insecure Alliance,” in WorldLink, July 2002; www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/storyReader$1154. See also Roy Denman, “How to Make the Americans Listen,” International Herald Tribune, reprinted in Singapore Straits Times, 17 July 2002.

21. Mary Kwang, “New Security Pact: US Customs Officials to Inspect Cargo at HK Port,” Singapore Straits Times, 24 Sep. 2002. See also Wong Joon San, “Hong Kong CSI Talks End Without Much Success,” Marine Digest and Cargo Business News, August 2002; www.marinedigest.com/august2002SR2.html.

22. “Currently carriers are allowed to submit cargo manifests to Hong Kong Customs within seven days after the cargoes have been exported … Shipping lines usually only request freight forwarders or shippers provide cargo information for the preparation of the manifest after the vessel has departed.” This is the industry norm. See Keith Wallis, “Hong Kong Admits Adverse Effects of US Box Measures,” Lloyd’s List, 24 July 2002.

23. ChinaBiz Daily, 19 July 2002.

24. “Shenzhen on a Roll With Container Traffic Surging 51%,” Singapore Straits Times, 17 Aug. 2002.

25. P. T. Bangsberg, “U.S. Presses S. Korea on Box Security,” Journal of Commerce, 2 Aug. 2002.

26. “Singapore Accused of Disrupting Port of Tanjung Pelepas’ Position After Signing CSI”; www.nanyang.com, 19 Sep. 2002. The report claims that U.S. Customs had ordered that all cargo in Malaysia headed for the United States be sent to Singapore for checks before resending it to the United States and that Singapore’s decision to join CSI was forcing the main shipping companies in the port of Pelepas to send their cargo through Singapore’s CSI pre-clearance before sending it to the United States. However speculative, the report, in casting aspersions, highlights the increasingly intense and acerbic nature of port competition between the neighboring states.

27. “Malaysia Port Seeks Closer U.S. Box Ties,” Journal of Commerce, 5 Sep. 2002. See also Kang Siew Li, “Malaysia Starts Vetting US-Bound Containers, Business Times, 8 Aug. 2002; www.informare.it/news/review/2002/businesstimes0067.asp.

28. P. T. Bangsberg, “Malaysia Joins U.S. Box Initiative,” Journal of Commerce, 8 Aug. 2002.

29. V. Shankar Ganesh, “US Customs May Pre-Screen Cargo Here,” New Straits Times, 24 Sep. 2002.

30. “EU Slams US’ Plan to Screen 3 European Ports,” Business Times, 15 July 2002.

31. “When Trade and Security Clash,” The Economist, 6 Apr. 2002, p. 60.

32. Dave Eberhart, “Container Ships—The Next Terrorist Weapon?” Newsmax, 15 Apr. 2002; www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/4/14/151335.shtml.

33. Ibid.

34. The New York City Police Department has similar plans to deploy officers in at least five foreign countries in an ambitious effort to give the city’s police force a global reach in its antiterrorist operations (“New York to Post Police Officers Abroad,” Singapore Straits Times, 16 July 2002).

35. For example, in Hong Kong, the eight Kwai Chung container terminals handle about 60% of Hong Kong’s total throughput while the rest is handled by the river trade terminal and midstream operators in public working areas. Keith Wallis quoted an unnamed source in “Port Delay Fear From Checks” in Hong Kong iMail: “Are US customs agents going to be stationed at each of the public working areas? How are the triads, who are long-suspected of controlling these operations, going to react to that?”; www.informare.it/news/review/2002/hongkongimail0028.asp.

36. Remarks to the American Chamber of Commerce at a lunch talk in Singapore on 20 Sep. 2002, following his signing of the Declaration of Principles on CSI with his Singapore counterpart.

37. “Comments of the World Shipping Council Before the United States Customs Service in the Matter of Advance Cargo Manifest Filing Proposed Rulemaking for Vessels Loading Cargo at Foreign Ports for Transport to the United States,” 9 Sep. 2002; www.worldshipping.org/customs_manifest_comments.pdf. See also “Delay to Security Pact,” Today, 12 Sep. 2002, p. 16.

38. “US Wants Details of Sea Cargo Before Loading,” Singapore Straits Times, 1 Oct. 2002. See also “Customs Finalizes 24-Hour Advance Manifest Rule,” Maritime Press, 1 Nov. 2001; www.maritimepress.com/english/asp/mis/search/view.asp?num=37561.55032407410&code=see4.

39. Karen Ho, “High-Tech Detectors to Sniff Out Bombs,” Singapore Straits Times, 29 Nov. 2002.

40. Such goods range from certain chemicals and viruses to flak jackets and parachutes, and cover anything—including computer software—that can be used to make weapons for nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare. The new act lists about 600 controlled items, including munitions, and materials with civilian and military uses. It makes Singapore the first Southeast Asian country to put into law rules that control the movement of all types of strategic goods. Before, rules covered the export and trans-shipment of specific categories of goods such as firearms but did not cover such things as viruses. Under the Strategic Goods (Control) Bill that the Singapore Parliament passed, all such items will require special permits for export or trans-shipment. Its passage through Parliament came with a government pledge that the new requirements would not delay shipments unnecessarily. See Goh Chin Lian, “Terror Controls on 600 Items,” Singapore Straits Times, 26 Nov. 2002.

41. Zakaria, op cit.

42. “PSA’s IT Unit Wins $8m South African Port Deal,” Singapore Straits Times, 10 Sep. 2002; www.psa.com.sg/wos/020910_ST_PSA_IT_unit_wins_8m_South_African_port_deal.htm.

43. “China Will Consider Having US Customs Officers at Its Ports,” Business Times (Shipping Times), 19 July 2002.

44. According to U.S. Customs, over 270 companies have signed on board C-TPAT since its launch in April 2002. Maersk Sealand, Evergreen America Corp., China Ocean Shipping Co., and NOL’s APL division have expressed their intention to sign up. See “Major Ocean Carriers Join US Fight Against Terrorism,” Shipping Times, 30 July 2002; www.ifcba.org/ctpat3.htm. U.S. Customs has also developed new regulatory audit methodologies such as the Importer Self-Assessment program, which allows interested importers to assess their own compliance with U.S. Customs laws and regulations. The program is primarily based on the development and use of established business practices and good internal controls designed specifically for a company’s customs operations. See Cynthia A. Covell, “U.S. Customs Service, Office of Strategic Trade, Regulatory Audit Division: Message From the Director”; www.customs.ustreas.gov/imp-exp1/comply/isacover.htm.

45. In dangling the CSI Green Lane carrot, the United States has warned that cargo arriving from ports that are not CSI compliant could face greater scrutiny and delays, the positive implication being that CSI ports could gain volume as prescreened shipments are waved through into the United States for expediency. However, even with CSI endorsement it is unlikely that U.S. Customs will guarantee that all prescreened or CSI containers will not be subject to additional screening at U.S. ports, especially if the prevailing threat conditions are dire.

46. “Maritime Transportation Anti-Terrorism Act Approved,” Shipping News, 6 June 2002; www.cmc-ccm.com/shipping.php?choice=352. See also Rep. Frank LoBiondo’s statement on port security, 4 June 2002; www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/lobiondo-ports-floor-statement.html.

47. The U.S. House of Representatives approved the Homeland Security bill in July 2002, facilitating the creation of a massive Department of Homeland Security to tackle emerging terrorist threats. Before it becomes law, the House version of the bill would have to be reconciled with the Senate’s version. The Department of Homeland Security would be tasked with guarding the nation’s borders, protecting potential targets such as transportation systems, and overseeing recovery from future attacks. The department would be anchored by agencies that include the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security Administration, and the law enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Department of Homeland Security would receive intelligence information from the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies and would analyze it to issue warnings about terrorist attacks and to recommend beefing up security at potential targets.

48. See James B. Clawson, testimony on behalf of the Joint Industry Group before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 6 July 2002; http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/071602jctest.pdf.

49. “APEC Takes ‘Concrete Steps’ to Fight Terrorism,” Singapore Straits Times, 29 Oct. 2002.

50. Chua Lee Hoong, “Homeland Security Cannot Be Outsourced,” Singapore Straits Times, 25 Sep. 2002.

51. The World Customs Organization, representing 161 countries or 97% of world trade, adopted a supply-chain security strategy in Doha, United Arab Emirates, in July 2002. Known as the Trade Data Harmonization initiative, the plan is to standardize information needed to identify high-risk shipments by June 2003 (see Shipping Times, 30 July 2002).

52. “Regional Ports to Share Security Data,” Singapore Straits Times, 23 Oct. 2002.

53. In fact, the Bush administration aims to widen its hunt for terrorists and to cut off their weapon routes at sea by negotiating agreements with dozens of nations for new powers to police the world’s waters. The plan builds on ship interdiction operations that were started largely to capture al-Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan across international waters. It envisions giving U.S. forces rights to hot pursuit and to board vessels not only in international waters but also in a nation’s sovereign waters under some circumstances. This is, to be sure, a highly controversial proposal that will not likely go down well with many countries that guard their waters and sovereignty jealously. See “US Wants New Powers to Police Oceans,” Singapore Straits Times, 11 Aug. 2002; www.infoshop.org/pipermail/infoshop-news/2002-August/001518.html. Mahan wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890), still used as a textbook.