Introduction

For as long as men (and women) have fought, their teachers and leaders have told them, “There are no dangerous weapons, only dangerous men.” The original intent was to create a mindset wherein the warriors would accept the fact that they were the true weapon and that hardware (knives, guns, bombs) was a tool for them to use in achieving their end. Today, however, that concept has been taken even further, and perverted, in its application to suicide attacks, such as those we have witnessed in Israel and the even deadlier attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States.

On the basis of continued suicide attacks in Israel, attacks in Iraq, location of mass-produced, high-quality suicide vests in Baghdad, and many other indicators, there is strong reason to believe that suicide attacks may become de rigeur for terrorism in the future, especially in the United States. There is a low level of knowledge, preparedness, and understanding of suicide attacks among the many agencies that may be affected by them in the United States and other parts of the world. It is therefore necessary to discuss this issue and lay the groundwork for future developments for dealing with it.

Some of the issues must be considered in analyzing and, we hope, mitigating and ultimately preventing the effects of suicide attacks on U.S. and other societies. Key to this topic is the recognition that we, as a society and culture, are dealing with the first truly new form of attack in over one thousand years.

The concept of suicide in warfare is as old as man, and dying for one’s cause goes at least as far back as we have had causes. Historical examples include the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicari) in Roman-occupied Judea, the Islamic Order of Assassins (hashashin) during the early Christian Crusades, and the anarchists of 19th-century Russia.¹ However, most people alive now learned of these ideas for the first time with the kamikaze fighters of Japan in World War II.

Another aspect of suicide bombing is the evolution of technology. In the evolution of weapons, first there were the humans themselves (the closed fist), followed by handheld tools (rocks, clubs), then human-powered weapons (thrown rocks), which evolved into purpose-made weapons (spears), then more complex devices (bows and arrows), and on, through to the integrated combined-arms battlefields of today. A somewhat similar evolution occurred in the more specific area of bombs or so-called “smart weapons.” We began with simple fuzes, which provided a modicum of remote control based on how long they were cut, then progressed to more sophisticated timers (clocks, but nonetheless not coupled to the environment) and finally to remote controls, where for the first time the weapon initiation was coupled to the environment; a plan could be altered once it had begun. The ultimate in the progression, however, is now the suicide bomber, who is actually part of the weapon, not merely controlling it from the outside.

Today’s society, especially that of Western cultures, however, has difficulty accepting and is not prepared for dealing with the concept of a suicide bomber. Even during World War II, kamikaze attacks were limited to military targets. While different in motivation, they were not terribly different either technically or in the response they provoked from the bombs of the day. While the philosophy behind them was hard to understand, countering them was almost identical to countering any of the other conventional attacks that were dealt with at the time; it was more of an evolutionary than a revolutionary change, and one that did not occasion a complete phase change in either our military operations or our society.

Not so with suicide bombers and attackers.

Illness Versus Ideology

The will to commit suicide has been viewed in Western society as an illness. Even those who give their lives for a cause (for example, the hundreds of firefighters, police personnel, and first responders on 11 September, or the many people who have lost their lives in battle in what were considered hopeless situations) are not considered to have committed suicide; they died in the line of duty but did not plan to do so. Their deaths were an unintended consequence of their actions, but were not desired.

In today’s society we treat those who attempt suicide and try to cure them of this drive toward self-destruction. We assume that, like victims of the common cold or cancer, people with suicidal ideation would wish to be cured if they were sane. Further, we assume that, in general, a suicide attempt is a call for help from someone and is a symptom of some underlying disease. Finally, many people who attempt suicide and fail state that at the last minute (passing the first story of the building on the way down, the gun misfiring, throwing up the sleeping pills) they wish they had not attempted suicide and were glad they failed.

Another issue to consider in radical Islamic terrorism is that suicide is actually forbidden by the Koran. Through a rather complex series of logical gymnastics, however, it has been possible to convince radical Islamic suicide terrorists that what they are doing is not, in fact, suicide, but rather a form of martyrdom that should be considered different from suicide. While on the face of it this seems to be, at best, a specious argument, it has undoubtedly been effective. The fact that we have radical Islamic suicide terrorists is proof of that.

However, in terms of thwarting potential suicide bombers, formal suicide psychology does not apply. Those who engage in suicide bombing missions do not inherently possess suicidal tendencies. In fact, as noted above, many suicide terrorists do not even consider their actions to be suicide. The principal motivation for suicide attacks is, generally, the attack itself—to create havoc, generate an atmosphere of fear, and gain attention through media publicity. The loss of the attacker’s own life is a detail of the operation, not an underlying goal. In a series of interviews with Arab terrorists, American psychologist Jerrold Post found that they do not think of themselves as committing suicide; instead, they believe that they are holy fighters sacrificing themselves in the name of Allah. One terrorist stated, “I am not a murderer, a murderer has a psychological problem.”² These attitudes and beliefs must be carefully considered when evaluating and deciding how best to develop and execute measures to reduce the threat of suicide bombings.

There are many societies, and obviously individuals, who do not view the desire to commit a suicide attack as an illness but instead as something to be admired, worshiped, idealized, supported, and envied. Evidence shows that those suicide bombers who failed to die during their mission did not regret trying, but regretted failing to complete their mission. When they fail, they seldom still attempt to kill themselves, because their goal was not suicide but to kill people, create chaos, and wreak havoc on society. While there is no overriding trend and the cases all tend to vary, oftentimes once the attackers are no longer able to carry out their mission, their apparent motivation for self-destruction rapidly wanes and is often replaced with simple depression over their failure.

In considering dealing with suicide bombers, however, it must be recognized that they are not trying to commit suicide, at least not in the conventional sense usually experienced in Western culture. As a result, their responses and attitude may be vastly different from those normally associated with suicide in Western culture and must be carefully considered when evaluating and deciding how best to develop and execute measures to reduce the threat of suicide bombings.

Deterrence as the Cornerstone of Society

The security of most of today’s Western society is built around the concept of deterrence. Western society does not depend on preventing actions or crimes, but instead focuses its efforts on attribution and punishment, which are aimed at acting as a deterrent to members of society who wish to avoid punishment. While obviously this is imperfect (as we still have crime rates), it has nonetheless been effective for much of modern history. As an example, consider that speeding in an automobile is not actually prevented, but only deterred by the speeder’s fear that he will be caught and fined for his misdeed. A bank robber is not actually prevented from committing an armed robbery, but may be deterred from doing so by the likelihood that he will be caught and punished.

This concept of deterrence pervades society at all levels, from the grand strategic visions of the Cold War (mutual assured destruction, or MAD) to the cop on the beat, who will readily tell you that he cannot be every place at once to stop crime—his job is to apprehend suspected criminals for the justice system to judge and punish, and by his very presence deter crime, not prevent it. U.S. society is based on the basic tenets that people will follow rules and that people will be deterred by the threat of punishment.

One need look no further than the concept of a restraining order in today’s judicial system to gain a clear and unambiguous view of how society depends on rules and deterrence. Restraining orders, however, sometimes fail because they are an attempt to apply rules to people who have demonstrated their inability to function effectively in society—that is, to follow the rules.

When Traditional Deterrence Fails

Western society is now dealing with a new problem, one it has never dealt with before: the fundamental breakdown of what has always been thought an almost inviolable concept, the instinct for self-preservation. There are a number of obvious (and not so obvious) sequelae to this issue, and entirely new rules, concepts, and paradigms must be developed and applied to effectively address this problem.

First is the immediate need to “do something,” which seems to take hold every time a crisis threatens the community. The obvious steps (for example, increasing law enforcement, expanding intelligence collection and gathering, and increasing investment in technologies ranging from sensors to nonlethal weaponry) are already well under way and, predictably, are having questionable impact, but are nonetheless creating the perception of doing something. As of yet there is no effective, widely understood and accepted plan or strategy for dealing with suicide attacks. There are vague, often contradictory, and certainly ineffective policy documents and directions, but nothing from which a coherent plan or response can be built or derived.

One area that must be considered is the possibility of applying nontraditional deterrence. There are a variety of rationalizations used to convince and encourage suicide attackers. In the specific case of Islamic extremists, enormous effort has been expended to present their missions in such a way that they can be justified by their own religious faiths when in fact these same faiths directly forbid such behavior. Herein lies a key area that could be exploited: detailed analysis of these arguments and equally (or hopefully more so) effective arguments to the contrary. For example, one rationalization is that the martyrs will go to paradise and reap its benefits. Could we instead convince them that this is not the case? In our favor is the general predisposition that most people have against their own death. However, there may be other arguments and approaches, such as peer pressure against suicide attacks and terrorism—their own communities can be pressured to not look at them with adulation, but instead with disgust and contempt. Consider how our society views child molesters (we still have them, but they are ostracized and held in disgust and contempt by most portions of society).

We also need to address the wider-ranging issues of how this new turn of events, this new method of attack, will impact national security. The issue has been raised as to whether guards and police officers in Israel should have the authority to “shoot on suspicion” suspected suicide bombers. (There are procedures that must be followed, such as providing warning, but there is no requirement that a weapon be positively identified, only that a reasonable threat be believed to exist.) The answer was that guards and police officers indeed have that authority; however, if in retrospect they were correct in shooting, then they will be rewarded, but if they were wrong, then they will be charged with a crime. This may sound somewhat flippant, but it illustrates one of the key issues that must be addressed in dealing with this problem: Are we prepared to accept the collateral damage associated with eliminating or injuring our fellow citizens on suspicion because someone behaves oddly or fits a particular profile? Further, no matter what solution we apply, will it be sufficiently effective? We had examples of collateral civilian injuries in the 2003 Iraq war. U.S. soldiers fired on a van carrying 13 women and children when the driver failed to stop at a military checkpoint; seven of the passengers were killed.³

There is another, much more insidious—yet also potentially much more dangerous—issue that must be dealt with. So far, most of the Israeli public’s exposure to this threat involves someone strapping explosives to his body, walking into a high-value target with many civilians, and setting off the explosives. (As we have recently seen, not just Israel but nations as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Kenya have experienced these attacks.) What about someone who instead chooses an act of sabotage? Consider a nuclear power plant worker, a petrochemical worker, or even a truck driver who decides to kill himself for a cause. Physical signature or profile is replaced by only an intent. The issue of intent will then take overriding precedence in trying to detect and deter or prevent such attacks. How will we be able to detect intent so as to prevent an attack?

One approach is to determine whether there are any unique signatures associated with intent. Are there behavioral cues, or maybe actions in preparation for such an event? Some work has been done^{4, 5} to study this, but much more remains to be done, even at the level of basic problem definition.

However, it must be recognized that, after an incident, in many cases we may never know what the actual intent was. Could the Union Carbide Bhopal industrial disaster in 1984 have been intentional? The Arkansas River bridge collapse in 2002? West Nile Virus? SARS in 2003? If the perpetrators died in those events, it is possible that we will never know.

We have entered a new age where decision making under conditions of uncertainty (for example, the anthrax releases in the fall of 2001) will play an ever-increasing role—we must accept this situation and adapt to it. This is the true, insidious nature of this evil. Pandora’s box is open; we may close it again, but we will never get everything back inside.

What Is the Problem?

The issue of suicide attackers has been generally lumped into a single question: What do we do about them? Even more specifically, what do we do about suicide bombers as a subgenre, disregarding for the moment discussion regarding forms of attack. Further, much of the focus has been on technological solutions (such as better detection and nonlethal methods of subduing the bomber). But the problem is much more complex.

There are basically four separate and almost completely independent areas of focus in interdicting a suicide attack:

1. Prevention and mitigation (How do you keep it from happening?)
2. Detection (Who is a suicide bomber?)
3. Neutralization (How do you stop the attack in progress?)
4. Response (What do you do about the aftermath of the explosion?)

These are four almost completely separate, albeit related, aspects of countering the problem of suicide bombers. The technologies and techniques employed to address these areas of focus are completely different, yet there must nonetheless be an effective and reasonable interface between them. The problem must be treated as a management system, and whatever the ultimate solution is, it must address the connection of these four facets.

Prevention and Mitigation

In effect we are looking at both extremes of the spectrum here: on the one end, the elimination or reduction of intent and motivation; on the other, how to reduce the impact of the event.

Prevention is, in general, more of a politico-social issue focused on changing societies, customs, and cultural interactions. The specific issues are legion, and the complexity rivals that of stochasm found in biological systems, but discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this article.

Mitigation is considerably easier to address. It involves everything from passive measures (properly designed entryways, physical structures, basic security measures) and properly trained and effective response organizations (the classic first responders). Both of these efforts have significant payoff in day-to-day operations of society and are in no way useful only in countering suicide bombings; they apply to almost all hazards. However, detailed discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this article.

Detection

Much of the discussion by security experts centers on the need to detect the potential perpetrator, possibly at a point in the attack process. To use the example of a suicide bomber, the following are the stages in the attack process at which detection could take place:

1. Motivation and intent (why, what, and who?)
2. Preparation of an organization and infrastructure to support the mission (training, manufacturing, recruiting, etc.)
3. Target selection
4. Manufacturing of the weapon
5. Deployment of the weapon to the final staging area
6. Movement of the system—attacker and weapon—to the target
7. Activation of the weapon

Each step can be detected with a variety of means, some more conventional than others, but in general, current technologies and methods can be used, with evolution and improvement, to intervene at any one step.

Besides detecting the perpetrator, we need to determine exactly what the threat is. Is it (as we have experienced) an explosive? Or perhaps a canteen filled with some caustic or toxic chemical agent? Is it someone driving a fuel truck at high speed? Or flying an airplane? And if it is an explosive, how large is the weapon? What type of weapon is it? Are there additional hazards (shrapnel, chemical agents, etc.)? How will the explosion be initiated (cell phone, direct control, anti-tamper device)? This information will be vital in determining not only the countermeasure used, but also the optimal way of tracking and assessing the threat.

Considerations for Intervention

Motivation and intent (why, what, and who?). The first and most crucial question is why? This issue has been downplayed because the greatest focus has been on response, with less emphasis on prevention. The issue of suicide attacks, at least in the United States, has been generally relegated to one of two modes of thought: either “it is not a problem here because we prevent them all through effective intelligence and police work” or “it is primarily an Israeli issue, and since it has not occurred here it probably will not.” The rationale and shortsightedness of these two attitudes can be debated, but the fact that prevention must be the primary goal cannot.

It is often erroneously assumed that the goal of the terrorist, or a suicide attacker, is simply to take life. Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, in their book An Expected Surprise: The September 11th Attacks in the USA and Their Ramifications,⁶ list some of the general characteristics of suicide attacks worldwide. According to the authors, suicide bombing is a central element of a terror organization’s campaign of psychological warfare. The primary goal is to terrify a larger group of people—religious, secular, or both—than those immediately present at the explosion. The motives for suicide attacks include acting in the name of God, a nationality, a leader, or the organization; peer pressure; and revenge and deterrence. Preparation for a suicide attack always involves more than one person, and both men and women may take part. Also, suicide terror activities are usually spread over a wide geographical area. The key point that Schweitzer and Shay make is that there is no single profile of a suicide terrorist.

All of the following steps in the process will follow from the key question “What is the goal of the attack?” The goal will then determine the target, the method of attack, who will carry it out, and the rest of the subsequent stages. Also, knowing the goal will allow for the increased probability of interdicting or preventing the attack—the ultimate payoff.

Preparation of an organization and infrastructure to support the mission (training, manufacturing, recruiting, etc.). This step includes everything from a method of identifying and recruiting likely volunteers or terrorists to having a place to plan and prepare for an operation. The resources required may be an array of organizations, physical structures, and an advanced communication infrastructure, or they may be nothing more than an individual with no organizational affiliation who has both the will and skill to carry out an operation—for example, the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski; while not a suicide bomber, he is a good example of a lone operator. So far, the majority of incidents worldwide have been related to groups with strong religious and religio-political beliefs. But there is no inherent necessity to affiliate with a certain group or organization to plan and execute a suicide attack. For the current situation in the Middle East, however, these issues provide some good insight as to where countermeasures could be focused.

The purpose of this article is not to address the details of the “signature,” or profile, that we should look for, but merely to point out that it exists. A variety of available technologies already provide the ability to correlate and sift a diverse set of information in this area.

Of note, several assumptions can be made about any attack on American soil. Most of them flow from a single principal assumption, based on observed phenomena: that it will not be Americans who will carry out the attack. Given this, several potential sequelae present themselves:

1. The perpetrator will be unfamiliar with American culture and will need to seek advice and assistance.
2. Given the terminal nature of the attack, very few experienced terrorists will be available. Hence, the perpetrators must identify laypersons who can help them but also must be provided with everything that they will need (training, equipment, etc.).
3. Given the illicit nature of the attack, the terrorists will be able to discuss their plans with only a very few people who may be able to assist them in the United States.
4. Logically, the perpetrators would develop a “cover story” related to crime and seek to hire criminals, probably petty ones, to provide validity to their actions.

Criminals would be a potential source of information for those trying to prevent these attacks. Many times, it is the criminals themselves who provide keys or clues to potential crime. Local law enforcement, having generally developed an effective human intelligence system among criminal elements, could also be a source of information or indications that a crime may occur—if they know what to look for. A report from the Drug Enforcement Administration estimated that 90% of the information on potential terrorist threats is being collected from law enforcement, with the remainder coming from intelligence agencies.⁷ In addition, there is a lesson to be learned from New York City’s crime-fighting program under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani:⁸ when the police cracked down on even minor crime, statistics demonstrated a decrease of 40.7% in overall crime between 1993 and 1998 and a 69.3% reduction in murder rates across the same time period.⁹ Criminologists feel that this is a result of disrupting the criminal activity process at an early stage. It is possible that the same lesson could be applied to deterring suicide terrorism or, in the context of this article, providing guidance as to which signatures to look for.

Given the above line of reasoning, it should be possible to make much better use of existing police and local (not just federal) law enforcement resources to seek out and identify potential early warning signs and indicators of suicide attacks. The attackers are not likely to be professionals and can be expected to make errors associated with inexperience, so there are clues to look for. The key, however, will be to identify the proper indicators or clues that suggest that such an attack might occur.

Target selection. Based on the goal or intent of the attacker, one or more targets will be selected. This target will be determined, at least in the mind of the attacker, to be the most effective and optimal choice, taking into account all of the attacker’s considerations. These may include ease of attack, susceptibility, publicity, number of potential injuries, and political impact. In any event, the choice of target will be based on the attacker’s intent and his means. The target will also determine the mode of attack and the devices or weapons used.

Manufacturing the weapon. Opportunities for detection can be enhanced by an array of sensors that may be able to detect, identify, and locate caches of explosives, explosion initiators, and other unique items associated with a portable explosive weapon.

It should be noted, however, that this applies only to explosive weapons and may not apply, depending on the type of destruction desired. For example, should a chemical agent be the intended method of attack, a different set of unique clues would be present. The same would be true for biological agents. However, should sabotage be the goal, this phase would not exist, and these unique characteristics or clues would not appear.

Deployment of the weapon to the final staging area. In many cases, weapons (if there are any) are moved to a final staging area, possibly in single or multiple stages, and of varying proximity to the target, where they are put on or loaded, armed, and checked out before the bomber is deployed to the final target area. This final staging area could be any place where final details can be worked out while minimizing the potential for system failure or discovery.

All of the above approaches apply to detection, but here the interdiction methods begin to diverge from conventional responses. For the first time we have a “live” weapon, so to speak, and interdiction can result in its inadvertent activation.

Movement of the system—attacker and weapon—to the target. The weapon (man and machine, as opposed to sabotage) is now fully functional and can be immediately activated. The two problems are now (1) how to detect the suicide perpetrator and (2) how to interdict him. Detection is not easy and will depend on the interdiction method. The more drastic (that is, damaging) the interdiction method used, the more accurate the sensing or detection method must be to prevent accidental detonation of the device or unintended collateral damage (such as killing of an innocent bystander).

For example, if the authorities intend only to identify and follow the potential terrorist, a higher number of false alarms can be allowed. If the intent is to kill the terrorist (using, for example, a sniper), no false alarms can be tolerated. But it may be sufficient to divert the perpetrator from the intended target or, depending on the scenario, limit the damage inflicted. Options will depend on the point in the attack at which the act is detected and how much information can be gathered via previous intelligence.

Activation of the weapon. In the final stage of the attack, it is vital to not only detect and identify the perpetrator, but also clearly know what the target is. This is not as clear cut as it may sound. In the case of a suicide bomber, a number of targets can be in proximity to each other—for example, a bus stop, restaurant, and shopping mall can all be within meters of each other. It will also be vital to determine the exact type of device or system used so that the damaging effects may be mitigated if not prevented. There is the very real possibility of multiple devices, initiated in any of a variety of ways. A secondary device or attack is always possible, and any plan or response must consider this possibility.

Neutralization

This is basically a technological problem, though there are certainly many societal issues to be dealt with as well. Neutralization can range from a sniper shooting the attacker to remote detonation of the weapon under relatively controlled conditions and in a safe manner. In many cases, however, the best that can be hoped for is to reduce the impact and devastation caused by the weapon (for example, an explosion outside rather than inside a crowded mall or packed bus, reducing injuries). Many technological programs are under way to address these issues, as well as much discussion of doctrine, methods, and techniques. However, detailed discussion of these efforts is beyond the scope of this article.

Response

A key component of an effective response is to know the exact nature of what we are responding to. This entails recognizing that not all suicide attacks will be by suicide bombers wearing bombs or driving trucks laden with explosives, but may use other means or agents of attack (for example, using an infected terrorist to spread deadly diseases, sabotaging a chemical plant, crashing an airplane, or releasing a chemical agent). To determine the proper response, the nature of the problem (that is, both the killing mechanism and how much collateral damage the authorities are willing to accept) must be known and defined in advance.

Explosives. So far, explosives have been the principal threat. However, there are numerous cases where shrapnel such as nails, bolts, and metal balls has been used in explosive weapons. The high-velocity shrapnel can cause severe internal injuries, which can be more deadly than the blast itself.^{10, 11} In addition, the inclusion of shrapnel in the bomb establishes a wider impact zone, injuring victims standing beyond the immediate vicinity of the bomb.

In determining the best response, the effects of the blast and/or shrapnel must be considered. For example, if there is little shrapnel and a limited amount of explosives, the hazard of a bomb detonating even in an urban environment is greatly reduced. However, if there is incendiary material, shrapnel, or a very large quantity of explosive (contained in a car or truck bomb, for example), or if it is detonated near a flammable container or an industrial facility (such as a natural gas main or chlorine tank), it is no longer sufficient to simply interrupt or divert the bombers—the authorities must absolutely prevent them from reaching their target. Even when the attackers have been diverted, there is the question of what to do with what amounts to a live, smart bomb, still with explosives and still functional.

Subduing a suicide bomber is not easy. While there are technologies available (for example, nonlethal gas to stop the perpetrators or render them unconscious), some have significant drawbacks and are limited in their scope and effectiveness.¹² Ultimately, there are a limited number of response options:

• Divert the bomber until he can be apprehended or subdued in some way
• Blow up or activate the weapon in a place as safe as possible (for example, an open road or field, as opposed to inside a shopping mall)
• Render the weapon no longer dangerous (for example, disable the weapon, or convince the bomber to give up)
• Disable the bomber before he can activate the weapon

With the exception of the third option, rendering the weapon safe, the interventions are fraught with significant hazard to both authorities and bystanders. The choice that is made will depend highly on the situation.

In May 2002 in Israel, two attempts to use trucks in terrorist plots were reported. The first involved an unsuccessful hijacking of a fuel truck. In the second incident, an explosive was successfully planted on a diesel tanker. This was later detonated by remote control while the driver was filling up the tank at the country’s largest fuel depot, although it caused no injuries. These were both rather crude and unsophisticated attempts, though somewhat more creative than those that have historically occurred.¹³

Immediately after 11 September 2001, it was suggested by a large number of people that the coordination and implementation of those attacks had been extremely sophisticated and had required extensive resources, rigorous training, and a truly substantial infrastructure. It has since been confirmed that in fact these efforts, though expertly planned and meticulously organized, required only very basic technology and readily learnable skills. This should in no way detract from the devastation that was caused, but instead be cause for alarm at the ease and lack of sophistication with which a major incident can be perpetrated. These events also serve as a warning for what could occur in the future and provide some indication of just how devastating an attack could be if there actually were effective planning and coordination.

To list here potential forms of attack would be pointless; the number of possible scenarios is simply too large and too varied to be of any real value and would detract from the necessary focus on responding to generic problems and overall preparedness versus preparing for the threat du jour. Suffice it to say that our adversaries can occasionally be clever and very creative. They have certainly demonstrated ruthlessness. We must be equally clever in dealing with them.

Conclusions

It is clear that, in spite of arguments to the contrary, suicide bombing attacks will occur. There is no surefire way to stop them completely. The obvious solution is to pursue a robust defense in depth (for example, appropriate deterrent and response resources and efforts at various stages and levels of the suicide attack) combined with the acceptance that some damage will occur. Our goal is to minimize and control the impact, death, and destruction to the greatest extent possible.

The first step is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the motivations, goals, and intents of the terrorists using suicide attack tactics. Second, we must have knowledge of the personalities and philosophies of our enemies. From this we can begin to create and implement plans to mitigate and prevent these kinds of attacks. Until we start with a thorough understanding of the process and problem, however—a step that has heretofore been ignored—no amount of feel-good actions will have any appreciable effect, and in the end we will be no safer tomorrow than we were before 11 September.

Further Reading

Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks in Israel,” in Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference, Herzliya, Israel, February 20–23, 2000, International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1. Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, volume 299, number 5612, 7 March 2003, pp. 1534–1539.

2. Tovah Lazaroff, “Experts: Suicide Bombers not Crazy,” Jerusalem Post, 27 May 2002.

3. “U.S. Soldiers Fire on Van Carrying Women and Children,” CNN, 31 March 2003.

4. Michael Hopmeier, “Discussion of Potential Warning Signs and Indicators Associated With Preparation for and Execution of a Suicide Attack,” International Society for Optical Engineering AeroSense conference, Orlando, FL, April 2003.

5. Rick DeMeis, “DARPA Leverages Technology for Homeland Defense,” Design News, 4 April 2002.

6. Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, An Expected Surprise—The September 11th Attacks in the USA and Their Ramifications (Herzliya, Israel: Mifalot, IDC & ICT Publications, 2002).

7. J. Torobin, “Local Police Stopping Most Terror Attacks, DEA Says,” Congressional Quarterly, 20 March 2003.

8. Based on the “broken window” theory developed by Harvard academics James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling (“Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly, March 1982). Wilson and Kelling argued persuasively that neighborhoods that neglected minor things like broken windows and graffiti created an environment that encouraged more serious crime. New York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani adopted the “broken windows” theory into his crime policy and implemented a community-policing strategy focused on maintaining order. Efforts included washing graffiti nightly off subway cars, arresting subway turnstile jumpers, and collecting trash.

9. FBI reports found that overall crime fell by 48.8% and that murders decreased by 70% from 1993 to 1997 in New York City (archives of the Mayor’s Press Office).

10. Kobi Peleg, “Gunshot and Explosion Injuries Caused by Terrorist Attacks in Israel Between October 2000 and June 2002: Characteristics, Outcomes and Implications for Care” (under review).

11. Gidon Almogy, Arnon Makori, Oded Zamir, Alon J. Pikarsky, and Avraham I. Rivkind, “Rectal Penetrating Injuries From Blast Trauma,” Israeli Medical Association Journal, vol. 4, July 2002, pp. 557–558.

12. Johanna McGeary, “Bloody Drama,” Time, vol. 160, issue 19, 4 November 2002.

13. Jean-Luc Renaudie, “Suicide Bombing Foiled in Israel, Troops Make Incursion into Gaza,” Middle East Times, 24 May 2002.