A Renaissance for U.S. Civil Defense?

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, or the U.S. Navy.

Commander Michael Dobbs, U.S. Navy

July 2001

CDR Michael Dobbs, USNCommander Michael Dobbs is a policy planner on the Joint Staff. He is a submarine officer and has served on both attack and ballistic missile submarines. Commander Dobbs completed a master’s degree in political science/international relations as an Olmsted Scholar at the Grenoble Institute of Political Studies (France) and holds an MPA from Troy State University. He has earned two diplomas from the U.S. Naval War College, including one in international law.

Introduction

A consensus has formed, as evidenced in speeches, capstone strategic documents, and security forums such as this journal, that threats to the U.S. homeland are real and growing more ominous. The recent chartering of a Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment for Homeland Security should help remove any remaining doubts as to the validity of homeland security as an important national security topic. Even before this consensus was reached, programs had begun, such as the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1996, to develop local, state, and national capabilities to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These initiatives have included the establishment of the Joint Task Force–Civil Support and the WMD Civil Support Teams. Although the work is not yet complete, America has taken great strides toward developing a fairly comprehensive consequence management[1] architecture based on training programs, emergency response capabilities, and the stockpiling of drugs. Although these initiatives have resulted in improvements in consequence management capabilities, the homeland security debate has largely ignored other important elements of civil defense[2] that directly protect citizens from being injured by chemical and biological agents or by radiation and blast effects. This article will provide a summary of American civil defense history and discuss the current shortfalls in civil defense, explore possible reasons why these deficiencies exist, and address whether elements are in place to support widespread resurgence in civil defense in the United States.[3]

A Brief History of Civil Defense

Efforts to provide for civil defense go back to ancient times, when fortified city-states came under siege, including crude biological attacks. However, civil defense became a major issue during World War I as the conduct of war between nation-states expanded pitilessly to include attacks on cities, factories, and civilians that were essential to war in the industrial age. During that conflict, German dirigibles inflicted nearly 5,000 casualties on England and reduced that nation’s production of munitions by one-sixth.[4] Civil defense became even more important during World War II, and the United States, as early as May 1941, established an Office of Civilian Defense within the Executive Office of the President, headed by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York City.[5]

The explosion of the Soviet Union’s first atomic, and then hydrogen, bombs signaled the fact that civil defense would remain a permanent fixture of the Cold War. At first, many believed that measures that had proven effective for conventional air raids could be adapted to atomic attack, no matter the catastrophic scale. However, it soon became apparent that additional programs would be required as the unprecedented destructive force of nuclear weapons was revealed.

During the 1950s, American civil defense was characterized by a city-evacuation system. Because long-range bombers were the only means available to deliver nuclear devices, it was assumed that several hours of warning would precede an attack. Both Germany and Britain had used evacuation, or crisis relocation, with mixed results, during World War II. The American city-evacuation plan called for citizens in highly populated areas to put distance between themselves and the explosive effects and fallout of a nuclear attack. During this period, basic principles of civil defense were also developed, and many of these principles remain seemingly immutable elements of homeland security:

Shortcomings associated with the decentralized federal nature of America’s civil defense program, built on the World War II model, were emphasized as early as 1946. The Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians (Study 3B-1) found that a major weakness of civil defense was the “absence of a unified command and authority to enforce responsibilities allotted to it.…”[7] America’s current civil defense programs draw similar criticism. The “space race” and the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles undercut the assumption that several hours of warning would be available before a nuclear exchange.

Programs to build fallout shelters characterized civil defense efforts in the 1960s. These family and public shelters were designed to help people survive the initial nuclear blast and remain protected for several days as the radiological energy from nuclear fallout decayed to nonlethal levels. The shelters were mostly located in urban settings and were stocked with food, water, medical equipment, and radiation-monitoring devices.[8]

Civil defense during the 1970s retained a focus on shelters. However, as the yield and number of nuclear weapons grew, there was, as Jennifer Shaw noted, a “dawning realization that fallout shelters would fail to protect in the blast environment near target locations.”[9] Predictions of massive nuclear exchanges and “nuclear winter,” along with dramatic portrayals of the post-apocalyptic world, also convinced many that long-term survival following an atomic war was neither possible nor particularly desirable. This realization engendered resignation, and shelter stocks were allowed to dwindle or, in many cases, were destroyed.

The advent of satellite reconnaissance during the 1980s provided hope that as many as three days of warning would again be available before an attack as the Soviet Union moved its strategic forces into launch posture. This assumption made evacuation an option, as it had been during the 1950s, to protect America’s civilian population from the horrors of nuclear war. The discovery that an effective shelter program would cost $60 billion (30 times the price tag for implementing a “crisis relocation” strategy in large cities) made evacuation the only fiscally feasible option.[10] By 1982, plans of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for crisis relocation envisioned evacuation of 150 million Americans from 400 “high risk” areas.[11]

The State of Civil Defense

Much to-do has been made about the shock and indignation of many Americans when they learn that their nation has no defense against ballistic and cruise missiles. However, a more glaring, and infinitely less technically complex, deficiency is that all but a few Americans lack even the most basic personal protective equipment and live, work, and study in environments that afford little shelter against chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents. Even most readers of this journal, all interested and probably knowledgeable in consequence management, would have difficulty explaining what they would do to protect themselves and their families if they were informed that a cloud of anthrax had been released over their city. Since the end of the Cold War, America’s programs (except those designed to protect key government leaders) to provide shelter, food, and water in the case of a nuclear exchange have essentially disappeared. Although an Office of Civil Defense existed within FEMA to coordinate these programs, the office was quietly closed during the mid-1990s. Questions regarding public and private shelters as well as personal protective equipment (gas masks, chemical suits, etc.) must now be referred to state emergency preparedness offices.

This shortfall is particularly disturbing and should be addressed if we are to develop a comprehensive and effective national program to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to the employment and effects of CBRN weapons. The deficiency is unfortunate and potentially tragic because even extremely effective consequence-management efforts taken after a CBRN incident has already occurred can do little more than mitigate the suffering of those afflicted and, in the case of a biological agent, perhaps limit the contagion of other victims. Additionally, local consequence-management capabilities will, it is widely assumed, be overwhelmed in the event of a catastrophic CBRN incident.[12] Although help can be expected from the states and the federal government, this response time will be measured in hours or perhaps in days. As in any disaster, self-help will largely be the rule for many citizens during the initial hours of a large-scale CBRN incident.

Even rudimentary devices such as gas masks or chemical suits provide considerable protection against WMD effects, since many chemical and biological weapons employ airborne agents that must be taken into the respiratory tract or come in contact with the skin to cause harm.[13] Although costs vary, these items can normally be purchased for a few hundred dollars. Israel has recognized the importance of providing equipment and information to help its citizens protect themselves in the event of a CBRN attack. The Israeli Defense Forces Home Front Command, established in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, is responsible for the defense of Israel’s civilian population.[14] Largely a reserve organization, the Home Front Command is divided into six districts. The organization coordinates the distribution of gas masks to Israelis, helps ensure that all new homes are equipped with a personal protective space to provide shelter from a CBRN attack, and has an important operational role to play in the event of a CBRN attack.

America’s current civil defense program also provides extremely little education to the public regarding preparedness and response for a CBRN incident. Despite the billions spent on CBRN preparedness programs, “not one penny is being spent on taxpayers’ involvement or enlightenment,” according to the Cato Institute’s Eric Taylor.[15] Without this education, the public will be poorly prepared to recognize a possible CBRN attack, to resist the urge to panic, to take appropriate immediate actions, or to cooperate effectively with first responders. Although FEMA offers courses and materials to first responders and government leaders, the lack of an official source of information on CBRN incidents has left the average citizen much less prepared, both intellectually and emotionally, than the “lowest private in the U.S. Army,” said Taylor.[16]

Historical Obstacles to Civil Defense Efforts

Various factors have historically limited initiatives to provide personal protection against WMD. Civil defense programs have never achieved widespread and consistent support from the U.S. civilian population, government leadership, or the military since World War II. Despite periodic attempts by political and military leaders to highlight the dangers of nuclear war, most Americans took few actions to protect themselves even during the most chilling moments of the Cold War. As part of a 1953 Gallup poll, Americans were asked whether they were likely to build an air raid shelter (estimated cost: $200) within the next year. Fewer than 3 percent answered in the affirmative.[17] Ten years later, fewer than one in fifty Americans had built even the “crudest kind of fallout shelter” despite direct exhortations from President Kennedy to do so after the terrifying days of the Cuban Missile Crisis.[18] Several researchers have studied the psychology of civil defense during the Cold War, and public apathy toward preparing for the unthinkable has been attributed to the following factors:

Civil defense programs have never enjoyed consistent budgetary and political support from the federal government. Despite periodic breast beating in Congress, annual appropriations for U.S. civil defense programs never totaled much more than $1 billion (1962) and, from 1952 to 1986, mostly varied between $200 million and $400 million (in constant FY 1986 dollars).[20] In 1984, in the middle of the Reagan era, per capita federal expenditures were 75 cents for civil defense, compared with $6 for ballistic missile defense and $1,350 for the Department of Defense. In interesting contrast, 81 cents were spent per capita to fund the Smithsonian Institution in the same year.[21]

America’s political leadership has also run hot and cold on civil defense. Presidents have often used their bully pulpit to raise the awareness of the threat and to encourage Americans to support their initiatives. However, inconsistencies and even contradictions in the political dialogue on civil defense have often confused Americans and reversed momentum on this issue. This inconsistent leadership has been particularly evident at the presidential level:

What Can Be Done?

Whether America is ready for a renaissance in civil defense is largely a function of psychology. The figure below is modified from a flow model for an emergency decision-making process. The decision to take action to protect oneself from CBRN threats involves answers to a series of questions.

Does the threat really exist?
Yes
Is there personal risk?
  • Certainty of impact
  • Proximity of impact
  • Severity of impact
Yes
Is protection possible?
Yes
Can protective action be taken?
Yes
Will actions reduce consequences?
 

As described above, Americans have historically not taken measures to protect themselves, even at the urging of their political leaders and in the face of an undeniable threat, because they answered no to many of these questions. For example, many Americans opted not to build shelters because they believed that protection during a massive nuclear exchange simply was not possible or that survival in the post-apocalyptic world was worse than dying in a nuclear blast.

History indicates that civil defense, on both a personal and a national level, will be supported only to the degree that we can convince ourselves, or be convinced, to answer yes to these key questions. In the post–Cold War era, many changes have occurred that should result in more support for civil defense. To begin with, most Americans now believe that the threat of a CBRN attack is a real and pressing concern. In a 1999 Millennium Survey, conducted by the Pew Research Center, 64 percent of those polled stated that they think that a “major terrorist attack on the U.S. involving biological or chemical weapons” would happen sometime over the next half century.[23] This is a dramatic change from 1996, when the same research organization characterized the public as “apathetic” about nuclear terrorism.[24] This change in attitude is probably attributable to movies, documentaries, real-world terrorist events, and speeches by leaders such as former Defense Secretary William S. Cohen.

Americans should also be more likely than during the Cold War era to believe that protection against WMD attack is possible. During the Cold War, the threat scenario presented to the American public was one of a large-scale nuclear exchange that would effectively end society as it was known. Although the modern threat from CBRN weapons is portrayed as significant, attacks from terrorists or a rogue nation would be limited in scope and duration, and most of America would not be affected. As opposed to being futile, taking precautions for a WMD incident should now be viewed as prudent.

It is more difficult to address the question of whether the public believes that protective action can be undertaken. Most Americans probably have little knowledge about CBRN agents, their somatic effects, and the ways in which these effects can be neutralized. Until they are provided with the appropriate knowledge, it is unlikely that the U.S. population will believe that they can take effective precautions and actions to protect themselves. The current debate on CBRN threats, which has been characterized as containing as much hype as fact, may actually prevent the public from supporting civil defense programs and pursuing measures to protect themselves and their families. As opposed to being super weapons, many CBRN agents, beyond being extremely difficult to weaponize, are fragile, and their lethality often decays quickly with time and with agent dispersion.[25]

Reasonable Measures to Protect the Public

If the threat of a CBRN incident is as imminent, disruptive, and destructive as many experts now propose, reasonable measures should be taken to protect Americans in case threat reduction, deterrence, and our defenses fail to prevent an attack. Although local, state, and federal responders will be able to help save lives and limit suffering after an attack has occurred, their efforts will do little to protect the public from the germs, chemicals, and radioactive energy released by a WMD device, especially in a large city with millions of inhabitants. The following programs, most of which have been components of past U.S. civil defense programs, would help Americans protect themselves from CBRN weapons and make the job of responders more manageable.

  • Public relations: Political leaders at the federal, state, and local levels should articulate to their constituents the facts regarding CBRN agents and encourage people to shoulder some responsibility for protecting themselves and their families against attack. A useful model for this effort would be FEMA’s Project Impact public-service announcement campaign that strives to get “Americans to take action to make their communities disaster resistant.” This is part of a larger project to help individuals and communities protect themselves from the effects of natural disasters by taking actions to reduce their risk before disaster strikes.[26] The Project Impact experiment was implemented based on a commonsense approach that private-sector and individual participation are vital to minimizing the economic and human costs of natural disasters. In keeping with its important role in domestic terrorism response, FEMA should undertake a similar experiment targeting improved preparedness of families, businesses, and schools for a CBRN incident.
  • Education: We are spending billions to train first responders and local leaders, but very little to train the general public. Governments should provide a basic education to the public regarding the nature of CBRN agents, measures that individuals can take to protect themselves, what citizens should do in case of an incident, and how local, state, and federal responders plan to manage the consequences of an attack.[27] The education and training would save lives, reduce the disruption and panic from a CBRN incident, and facilitate the actions that responders will take to mitigate effects of the incident. This program should be incorporated into every high school curriculum and could borrow heavily from the variety of courses already available to responders from organizations such as FEMA and the Center for Domestic Preparedness.
  • Prophylactics: The public should be offered voluntary appropriate immunizations and antidotes against the most likely biological pathogens (such as anthrax) and chemical agents. The stockpiling of vaccines and antidotes is a positive step in this direction, but may be of limited utility for those who have been exposed to a chemical or biological weapon and may have to wait days after an incident until the medicines can be distributed.

  • Indications and warning systems: Major cities should be equipped with indications and warning systems that would continuously monitor for the most likely airborne chemical and biological agents and alert local authorities and the public to their presence. An effective indications and warning system would increase the responsiveness of local responders and allow citizens to seek, or remain in, available shelter.

  • Passive defenses: Public facilities should be equipped with passive defenses against CBRN; the defenses should include high-efficiency particle arrestor filtration of air supplies for buildings and for underground mass transportation systems.

  • Protective equipment and home shelters: The public should be encouraged to equip their homes and cars with personal protective devices such as gas masks and chemical suits. Tax incentives should be offered to Americans who install a sheltered space in their home. An organization, such as FEMA, should be made responsible for providing citizens with information on how to protect themselves and their families from attack just as the Home Front Command does in Israel.

Conclusion

Recent measures to interdict the employment of CBRN weapons and cope with the effects of a successful attack are steps in the right direction. However, America should revive the still-dormant elements of civil defense and arm its citizens with the knowledge, motivation, and equipment required to help themselves during the crucial period between a CBRN attack and the time that first and follow-on responders can react and lend assistance. The first line of defense after a WMD incident is not first responders, but individual and collective measures to shield Americans from the effects of germs, chemicals, and radiation. As advanced by many, homeland security can be achieved only by a concerted effort from all levels of our federal system of government. This concept needs to be taken a step further to assert that individual Americans must shoulder some of the responsibility for their protection against what is no longer the unthinkable, but the inevitable. The nature of conflict and the American psyche at the dawn of a new millennium may be more conducive to moving U.S. citizens to action than were these determinants during the Cold War. However, this action must be encouraged by vocal and consistent political leadership and supported by increased funding for civil defense programs. Some will oppose spurring the American public to action for fear that they will be overly disturbed by the nature of the threat. The counter-argument is simple: either the threat of CBRN attack is real and requires a nationwide effort, or it is not and is already consuming too much attention and resources. If one thing is clear from the history of U.S. civil defense, it is that recent progress can be sustained only through a combination of factors, not the least of which is the public’s support and cooperation to help protect themselves from 21st-century threats to the homeland.

Click on an endnote number to return to the article.

[1] Consequence management, as defined in the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (January 2001, p. 7), is “measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences” of a CBRN incident.

[2] As defined in Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, “civil defense” is “all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: a. minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an enemy attack on the United States; b. deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack; and c. effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack.”

[3] Although this article focuses on civil defenses against limited asymmetric attacks on the United States, a few authors have also proposed that civil defense, along with missile defenses, will become a vital element of deterrent strategy as the United States reduces its nuclear forces and shifts its mindset away from "mutual vulnerability toward protection and assurance.” See John Cappello and Gwendolyn M. Hall, “Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic Force Posture” in James Smith, ed., Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations (Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 22-23.

[4] Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 10.

[5] Ibid., p. 16.

[6] The views expressed by General Nathan Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in 1956 typify the military’s historical opinion on civil defense: “The military services have been guided by the basic philosophy that responsibility for maintaining internal security and relieving the effects of enemy action rests primarily on the civilian agencies”—quoted in B. Wayne Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945–1975 (Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Virginia, 1980), p. 197.

[7] Kerr, p. 20.

[8] Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Nuclear Attack: Civil Defense—Aspects of Civil Defense in the Nuclear Age, Jennifer Shaw, editor (Oxford, UK: Brassey’s Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 198.

[9] Ibid., p. 199.

[10] Ibid., p. 200.

[11] John Hassard, “Maintaining Perceptions: Crisis Relocation in the Planning of Nuclear War,” in John Dowling, ed., Civil Defense: A Choice of Disasters (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1987), p. 88.

[12] It is not practical for any but perhaps the largest cities to organize, equip, and train emergency response personnel to cope with a CBRN incident that results in thousands of casualties and tens of thousands of the “worried well.” Local response will also likely be muted by the incapacitation (contamination, panic, injuries, etc.) of many first responders and by defections from firemen, paramedics, and police officers who choose to return home to protect their families from the spreading effects of a CBRN attack.

[13] See Augustin Prentiss, Civil Defense in Modern War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) for an extremely comprehensive, but dated, description of individual and collective measures to protect citizens against chemical, biological, and atomic weapons.

[14] Additional information on the Israeli Defense Forces Home Front Command is available at www.idf.il/newsite/english/main.asp.

[15] Eric R. Taylor, “Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction? Government’s Half Measures,” Policy Analysis No. 387 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2000), p. 15.

[16] Ibid., p. 1.

[17] Kerr, p. 59.

[18] Jonathan Weart, “History of American Attitudes to Civil Defense,” in Dowling, p. 25.

[19] Blanchard, p. 492.

[20] Ibid., p. 35.

[21] Dowling, p. 169.

[22] Blanchard, p. 492.

[23] 1999 Millennium Survey 2 (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press).

[24] 1996 Terrorism Survey (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press).

[25] “NDPO Chat With William C. Patrick, III,” The Beacon: National Domestic Preparedness Office Newsletter, Vol. 32, No. 2, November 2000, p. 4.

[26] Remarks of Kay Goss, FEMA Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises, before the Virginia Emergency Preparedness Forum, Richmond, VA, 26 June 2000.

[27] During the early 1950s, an “Alert America” campaign was used to inform the public of the dangers of nuclear war and the need for civil defense. This program included convoys of mobile exhibits, the distribution of millions of informational pamphlets, and speeches from President Truman to civic groups. See Blanchard, p. 68.