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A Model for Engaging the Faith Community in Advance Preparation for Disaster
January 2009

Sharon Canclini and Judy Shannon
Texas Christian University

Kay Dillard
Volunteer Center of North Texas

Introduction

Natural disasters happen, and man-made disasters are a byproduct of the modern world. As population density increases, the financial and human impact of disaster events multiplies; so does the need for appropriate, prepared, and coordinated response. As a result of Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 storm in 2005, 1,300 people were killed, 770,000 people were displaced, and 300,000 homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.1 Compounding the relief efforts was Category 5 Hurricane Rita, which occurred two weeks later along the Texas Gulf Coast. As a result of these two storms, more than 31,000 individuals sought hurricane relief in Tarrant County, but only 9,201 of those were sheltered through government-sponsored facilities.2 Katrina and Rita graphically demonstrated the inadequacy of existing disaster response systems. However, they also provided insight into untapped resources that have the potential to play a significant role in improving future response efforts.

Nationally, 83% of the U.S. population claims some form of religious affiliation.3 Faith-based organizations filled the gap that other public and private organizations could not. “Faith-based organizations also provided extraordinary services,” wrote Frances Fragos Townsend. “… Many smaller, faith-based organizations … brought comfort and offered shelter to the survivors.… Local churches independently established hundreds of ‘pop-up’ shelters to house storm victims.”4

The Problem

Communities of faith, by their nature, have a strong desire to serve others and also have the advantage of geographic presence in virtually every community in the nation. However, these resources go largely untapped because most government agencies tasked as first responders have not developed ways to connect with and engage their local faith communities. Issues of separation of church and state create a hesitation by the faith communities to partner with government agencies for fear they will be required to stifle the very beliefs that are calling them to serve. With no central contact point to reach the faith community and with many faith leaders reluctant to participate in events that are sponsored or supported by government agencies or by other faith traditions, it has been a challenge to reach this group of willing volunteers.

The Governor’s Division of Emergency Management in 2007 predicted that with a Category 1 hurricane as many as 40,775 evacuees would come to the Fort Worth–Dallas area from the Texas coast and that with a Category 5 hurricane that number could increase to 111,315.5 Kenny Shaw, director of the Dallas Office of Emergency Management, estimated that Dallas could house approximately 6,000 special-needs evacuees and Fort Worth could house 3,000, with another 15,000 sheltered by the American Red Cross. “Beyond that, the community would depend on churches and nonprofits to help,” said the reporters.6

During the Katrina and Rita crisis, many communities of faith experienced frustration as their members expressed a strong desire to help and then realized that they did not know how to engage their volunteers, services, and resources in effective ways. “Today there is a national consensus that we must be better prepared to respond to events like Hurricane Katrina,” wrote Townsend.7 “The storm [Katrina] demonstrated the need for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts.”8 And “faith-based and non-governmental groups were not adequately integrated into the response effort. These groups often encountered difficulties coordinating their efforts with Federal, State and local governments.”9 As a result, nonprofit response organizations were inundated with unnecessary donated items, unknowing parishioners were taken advantage of by unscrupulous “victims,” and some faith communities were at a standstill looking for places to fit into the system. For example:

  • One congregation in south Arlington, Texas, drove goods and services across town to an identified shelter not knowing that a mosque in their neighborhood could have used those goods and services to care for an influx of Muslim evacuees.10
  • Phone calls offering assistance remained unanswered because both nonprofit and governmental agencies could not keep up with the volume of calls. The Volunteer Center of North Texas, headquartered in Dallas, operated eight phone lines to assist volunteers. The heavy volume of calls caused a catastrophic failure of the phone system twice in the first few days of the evacuation relief. Ultimately the center recorded more than 15,000 volunteer referrals during the initial days of the evacuation and sheltering for the surrounding 12-county region.11
  • Agencies that distribute clothing were overwhelmed with donations of used clothes and household linens that presented storage problems and took months to sort. Reunion Arena was a primary shelter in Dallas County. A nearby parking lot was besieged by a mountain of donations people simply dropped off when they couldn’t find any agency to accept the items.12
  • Congregations and individuals were defrauded by thieves posing as hurricane evacuees.13
  • Members of the faith community put their families at risk by inviting evacuees into their homes with no information about their background or character.14
  • Financial resources were spent to duplicate goods and services due to lack of communication and coordination of needs. A shelter in central Arlington ran out of storage space for donations of new items for babies and children but did not have adequate resources to provide shoes and clothing for the adults they were sheltering.15
  • Resources went unused because the “right” people didn’t know they were available.16

Method

In “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Recommendation 100b is “Pre-determined roles and responsibilities for volunteer organizations, which identify their mission, capabilities, training, and certification.”17 Representatives from two departments at Texas Christian University met with individual leaders from the Tarrant Area Community of Churches and the Volunteer Center of North Texas in the spring of 2007 (Appendix F). Each had expressed the concern that something needed to be done. Research at that time identified no effective initiatives to engage members of the faith community in advance preparation for disaster response.

Resolved to take action, this group established a mission statement: To help prepare the Tarrant County faith community to mobilize volunteers and resources efficiently in response to disasters.

Rather than create a new organization or system, the group’s key strategy was to provide information, education, and networking resources so members of the faith community could coordinate their volunteers and resources to support existing local first responders. Building networks within neighborhoods became a primary tactic to help both large and small congregations respond better to local emergencies and to efficiently integrate their resources.

The convening group evolved into a planning committee and drafted a set of assumptions regarding disaster response from the faith community:

  • Faith communities have a reservoir of volunteers who are willing and eager to help in response to disasters but may require additional training to fully understand appropriate roles and boundaries for volunteers in disaster response.
  • Some faith communities have insufficient knowledge of the structure and mechanics of disaster response so that, while well-intentioned, they may actually impede first responders, needlessly duplicate resources, and even put themselves or the victims in harm’s way. For example, a faith-based organization responded to 2007 flooding in Haltom City, Texas, with volunteers and cleaning supplies. This congested the work area for first responders and clogged the roads, preventing victims from evacuating in a timely manner.
  • Coordinated efforts can help keep volunteers, disaster victims, and first responders safe and position volunteers and resources where they are most needed.
  • With knowledge of processes and effective lines of communication, faith communities can be better stewards of their gifts and resources and provide invaluable service to others in disaster.
  • It is not necessary to create new organizations or systems. The existing disaster response system is effective, provided that people understand how it works and how they can work with the established agencies.
  • For a more efficient and timely response, it is helpful to coordinate services and resources within geographic neighborhoods.

Following agreement on these basic assumptions, the planning committee determined that its initial step to address these concerns was to stage an event for clergy and lay leaders that, while respecting their spirituality, helped them better understand the structure of disaster response. Additionally the group would encourage these leaders to begin geographic networking to aid in coordinating neighborhood disaster response initiatives. It was also imperative to engage first-responding governmental and nonprofit agencies to help educate faith leaders and conduct training classes on how to volunteer in a disaster for members of the faith community. Finally, it was apparent that training to personally respond to and survive a disaster for members of the faith community was also important. The committee named the event “Calming the Storm: Effective Response in Times of Disaster.”

Strategies

The planning committee established procedures that could be replicated in this and other communities. To appeal to a broad spectrum of the faith community, the planning committee considered the needs of local denominations and religious affiliations in order to include all religious groups in this collaborative effort. To that end, they identified the following action steps:

  • Extend invitations to the broad interfaith community by working through a local interfaith association.
  • Encourage broad participation by holding meetings on “neutral ground” rather than at a religious or government site.
  • Entice participation by providing a free meal, being sensitive to dietary restrictions of participants from varied faith traditions.
  • Obtain commitments by requiring pre-registration, which also aids in planning for meals and handouts.
  • Provide a format that shares key information about the structure of disaster response and honors the spiritual call to serve. This format also allows time for individual congregations to begin identifying their response role and identify and network with others in their neighborhood (Appendix A).
  • Facilitate neighborhood networking by asking participants to sit by geographic location.
  • Engage the support of first responders by conducting a pre-event meeting to inform and invite participation.
  • Invite first responders to share more detailed or specific information with participants by setting up information tables at the event (Appendix B).
  • Help individual congregations identify the resources and roles they are best prepared to provide in times of disaster by designing a simple checklist to use with their faith community (Appendix C).
  • Encourage engagement by providing time for participants to work and plan with others in their geographic neighborhood.
  • Identify those who wanted additional information from specific first responder agencies and related nonprofit agencies by incorporating referral requests into the evaluation process (Appendix D).
  • Seek sponsorship to underwrite expenses for the event.

Outcomes

Participation in the initial event, held October 23, 2007, on the Texas Christian University campus, included 96 individuals representing 46 distinct congregations and 11 denominations. The response was overwhelmingly positive to both the format and the content of the meeting. According to the completed evaluations, 79% rated the event excellent. As a result of the information provided, 92 referrals were made to 8 emergency preparedness agencies and organizations.

Local first responders and corporate sponsors came forward to request a second, identical event in a neighboring geographic area. At the March 4, 2008, event, held in a suburban community center, 100 participants enrolled, representing 44 distinct congregations and 15 denominations, and an additional 109 referrals were made to 8 emergency preparedness agencies and organizations. According to the completed evaluations, 92% ranked the event excellent. First responders again provided information exhibits with more targeted information, which participants enthusiastically received.

Representatives from the State of Texas and officials from three Texas counties came to see how this model might be duplicated in other communities. The Offices of Emergency Management in Santa Rosa County, Florida, and in Collin County and Fort Worth, Texas, have consulted with the planning team about engaging their local faith community in advance preparation for disaster.

In April 2008, one month after the second event, organizers conducted an online survey for all Calming the Storm participants. At that time, more than 72% of respondents reported having taken some follow-up action with their community of faith, and five churches reported taking steps to become certified shelters.

Discussion

One lesson learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that faith communities must be better informed and prepared to respond efficiently, effectively, and safely in times of disaster. The faith community has reservoirs of volunteers and resources and is willing and eager to help in response to disasters but may not know how to best engage. Nonprofit and governmental agencies are looking for efficient ways to engage the faith community. Organizations such as a local university can provide a valuable service in convening these groups and providing meeting space to bring everyone to the table on neutral ground.

Most communities of faith are willing to work together across doctrinal lines to achieve the mutual goal of helping those in need. The follow-up survey indicated that 20% of respondents had contacted other neighborhood congregations to develop collaborative efforts, and no one reported any lack of interest by those they contacted. Eboo Patel wrote:

[Reverend Dr. Martin Luther] King once said: “The Hindu-Muslim-Christian-Jewish-Buddhist understanding of ultimate reality… is that love is the unifying principle of life.”

King understood that love is not just something you say, it’s something you do.

All across America, people from different faiths, and no faith at all, are putting their love into action by serving others.… we use this shared value of our diverse faiths—the call of putting love in action by serving others—as the common ground where we can come together to build bridges.18

Conclusion

Although many faith organizations have developed disaster response plans and programs at their national levels, these programs tend to be frequently directed at financial assistance. While these are certainly significant contributions, often the national plans do not address the individual and collective call for immediate, hands-on response at the community level, which the local congregations seek to provide. The follow-up survey for Calming the Storm indicated that 89% of congregations considered it important or highly important for their local congregation to respond to others in times of disaster. It is practical and reasonable to expect first responders to target the faith communities as logical recipients of much needed training.

A 2006 study by the Homeland Security Institute stated that the faith communities were efficient and effective for three primary reasons:19

  1. Faith-based volunteers felt a “higher calling” to serve (often at great personal, physical, emotional, and financial cost). This “higher calling” bridged many social and cultural gaps as disparate faith groups worked together to serve those in need.
  2. Faith communities were immediately effective because they are fully integrated into the local community. Unlike guest volunteers, local faith-based organizations have insider knowledge about their communities. The study identified many faith-based organizations using nontraditional resources and nontraditional techniques (such as word-of-mouth communication) to get needs met under trying circumstances.
  3. Finally, the faith community serves as an inside contact that can be easily tapped into in times of crisis by supportive faith-based organizations outside the crisis zone.

The faith community proved to be a valuable resource during the Katrina and Rita hurricane relief efforts and in many other smaller local disasters. To increase the engagement and improve the effectiveness of community disaster response, governmental first responders, nonprofit agencies, and faith-based organizations must build relationships, provide information, identify resources, provide training, and facilitate neighborhood networking in the calm before the storm.


References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1. Frances Fragos Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006.

2. Juan Ortiz, “Comprehensive Local Emergency Planning,” presented at Tulane University, New Orleans, June 1, 2006.

3. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Beliefs and Practices: Diverse and Politically Relevant, June 2008.

4. Frances Fragos Townsend, p. 63.

5. Governor’s Division of Emergency Management, Hurricane Evacuee Estimates and Destinations, 2007.

6. Polly Ross Hughes and Janet Elliott, “Hurricane Readiness: ‘Big D’ Offers Little Help,” Houston Chronicle, May 31, 2006.

7. Frances Fragos Townsend, p. 66.

8. Frances Fragos Townsend, p. 50.

9. Frances Fragos Townsend, p. 49.

10. Sharon Canclini, personal communication, 2007.

11. Celeste Sauls-Marks, personal communication, April, 2008.

12. Celeste Sauls-Marks, personal communication, June 2007.

13. Dick Lord, personal communication, October 2005.

14. Dick Lord, personal communication, October 2005.

15. Judy Shannon, personal communication, July 2007.

16. Melinda Veatch, personal communication, July 2007.

17. Frances Fragos Townsend, p. 115.

18. Eboo Patel, “Obama Should Be Bolder,” On Faith, July 6, 2008.

19. Hearlding Unheard Voices: The Role of Faith-Based and Nongovernmental Organizations During Disaster (Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute), 2006.

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