Yildirim Uryan, M.A., a major in the Turkish National Police, is a doctoral student in the Department of Public Affairs at the University of Central Florida. His research interests include aviation security, public administration, and policing. Email: yuryan@mail.ucf.edu.

Gerald-Mark Breen, M.A., is a doctoral student and graduate research associate in the Department of Public Affairs at the University of Central Florida. His research interests include public policy and analysis, communication, and service improvement. Email: gbreen@mail.ucf.edu.

Jonathan Matusitz, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in the Nicholson School of Communication at the University of Central Florida. His academic interests are organizational communication, communication and technology, and health communication.

Please address correspondence to Jonathan Matusitz at 600 Colonial Center Parkway, Lake Marr, FL 32746, (407) 531-5459. Email: matusitz@gmail.com.

Introduction

The phenomena of modernization and rapid technological development have created tremendous change in terms of human travel via aviationservices.^{1, 2} Many people are now demanding to travel to distant regions in the least time possible while seeking maximum comfort. Consequently, aviation services have become one of the largest, most lucrative, and popular industries around the globe. Because these services economically carry of millions of people—as well as countless quantities and shipments of cargo—across long, wide distances, substantive and fundamental transformation has occurred in the lives of many world travelers. Yet, despite the benefits that such widespread travel allows for the stability of the global economy and transportation of the ordinary citizen, these traveling liberties have also led to the emergence of numerous security dilemmas. Although aviation is a vital service to the general public and the welfare of the global economy, commercial airlines also present vulnerabilities and threats to society in myriad ways.

Terrorist organizations and malicious criminals have already considered—and clearly exploited and secured—airliners as viable, lethal weapons that can produce monumental damage and destruction to edifices, infrastructures, and society in general. For example, instances of bombing attacks and hijackings have paralyzed the U.S. airline industry several times (as in the September 11, 2001, attacks and the 1994 FedEx Flight 705 hijacking by a disgruntled employee who intended to use the aircraft as a missile against FedEx headquarters). In addition, a fully fueled aircraft can, if properly aimed and flown, destroy anything in its path, even the largest landmarks.

If a country or the government that protects it cannot defend its aviation security, homeland security will likewise suffer and succumb to aviation terrorists. Thus, developing efficient aviation security policies, strategies, and tactics has been one primary objective of not only government organizations, but also security departments, airports, airport management services, and the airlines themselves. While the U.S. aviation security approach has developed largely in reaction to past incidents (such as hijacking, Pan Am Flight 103, and 9/11), a more desirable approach is to view aviation security as system and to be active in pursuing policies and programs that achieve a better (or more harmonious) balance between the aviation security systems’ parts and aviation’s operating environment.

Background

U.S. aviation security policy has applied a kind of reactive perspective and approach. After every devastating incident in the aviation industry (especially over the past decade), aviation security policy has been radically modified and reformed. Yet such new security policies and their implementation usually have related and responded to only the specific incident(s) that incited the immediate policy change. Upgraded policies and reorganized rules have engaged only specific and limited parts of aviation security systems, contributing to only partial success in aviation security efforts.³

Seminal literature provides several examples of such policy modifications. For example, beginning at the Cuban Revolution and continuing into the early 1970s, the incidence of hijackings began to increase. In response, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) developed the Sky Marshal program and started to employ security personnel on the airplanes to prevent and/or react to such incidents.⁴ On December 21, 1988, terrorists caused the explosion and plunge of Pan Am Flight 103, which was flying over Scotland at the time. Small amounts of a plastic explosive, concealed in checked baggage, were documented as the cause of the blast. All airplane passengers on that flight, as well as a few individuals on the ground who were crushed or scathed by falling debris, suffered fatal wounds.⁵ According to the Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (1990),⁶ this terrorist attack could have been prevented if all passenger baggage had been properly screened at the airport. The report also determined that Pan Am showed lax security procedures and inspection and that the FAA failed to enforce its security regulations. Subsequently, the FAA decided to install and implement improved explosive-detection equipment in commercial airports, yet little progress was seen even five months later. One rationale pointed to the fact that many other important components of aviation security, and their systems, were absent or not considered in the agenda.

On September 11, 2001, not only did government organizations become aware of the pernicious capabilities of terrorists with respect to airline hijacking, but ordinary people throughout the world were terrorized and traumatized by what terrorists could do in such situations and how the security systems in the aviation sector were deficient, vulnerable, unreliable, and dangerous. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported a lack of control in the U.S. airline industry, with continued poor performance by airport security screeners.⁷

As an attempt to reach a solution, the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) was designed to supplant or supplement the previous system (CAPPS), which applied, or assessed, myriad indicators to determine a passenger’s inspection level, be it normal, a more thorough preflight security inspection, or denial of boarding. This newest policy enables airline systems to inspect and evaluate passengers’ most private information (credit history, banking history, criminal record, public records, property ownership, automobile registration, voter registration, etc.) as a sort of risk assessment. Still, even after the implementation of this newer system, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States⁸ and the media reported numerous criticisms of it, including excessively high rates of false alarms, delays with passengers and baggage, inability to identify concealed and fake weapons, and a general security staff deficiency, consisting of many uneducated and unqualified screening personnel and defective X-ray devices for identifying suspicious objects.

Moreover, aviation security policy reform efforts have been unpropitious with regard to their limited effects on overall security systems. Following every disaster, many precautionary and mitigating actions are taken; as a whole, however, aviation security systems lack comprehensive and reactive management, responsiveness, or renewed enhancement measures. One primary issue pertains to the limited reorganization of the many pieces that make up the whole security system. As a matter of historical importance, according to Paul Stephen Dempsey, writing in 2003,⁹ despite renewed regulations that were implemented in 2001 and 2002, 35 airport terminal violations occurred from October 2001 to February 2002. Interestingly, after every major terrorist attack targeting the aviation industry, authorities have shown a tendency to immediately increase the level of airport security.¹⁰ Then, as the general population and the media shift their focus from the issue, conditions revert to their former situations. Consequently, it can be deduced that reactive policy changes, according to events and public and media interests, lead to inefficient, ineffective, day-by-day aviation security policy implementations.

In line with these contentions, it is important to mention the role of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the U.S. aviation industry. The TSA is a U.S. government agency created as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush in 2001.¹¹ The TSA has become a key element of the Department of Homeland Security. Within the TSA, there is the Federal Air Marshal Service, responsible for detecting, deterring, and toppling terrorist or other criminal activities targeting American aircraft, airports, passengers, pilots, and staff and, if need be, protecting other means of transportation in the United States.¹² Before the TSA was created, security screening at airports was exclusively conducted by private companies that had contracts with airlines, terminal companies, and airport operators.¹³

U.S. Aviation Security: Critical Focal Points

Aviation security—for the purposes of this analysis, and as commonly defined—is the prevention of both the entry of unauthorized persons (access control) and the introduction of potential weapons or other prohibited dangerous objects (the active screening and identification of what has already been preliminarily screened) into airports and aircraft.^{14, 15, 16} All passenger screening systems are provided by the airlines or are contracted out to private security companies by the airlines. Given these conditions, security levels and mentalities are generally controlled, restricted, and/or steered by the economic interests of the private contractors. After each incident or failure of the security system, policy makers develop new arrangements, guidelines, and rules. These responses typically render auspicious solutions with respect to the given incident. Yet the overall system may still suffer, as other components may remain defective or could be overlooked. Aviation systems must have, and should be forced to have, the highest security measures at every level of the system; the obstacle that arises, however, is that the system itself is structured according to the responsibilities and desires of private airline companies, many of which aim to keep costs to a minimum. This financially motivated behavior can be observed when an aviation-related accident or attack occurs and there is a noticeable failure on the part of the security system to prevent or reduce the damage created by the accident or attack.¹⁷ Waiting for new accidents and disasters, then taking measures to improve aviation security policies, represents a reactive tactic, a sort of strategic plan that implies that security systems are lagging in the race against actors and acts of terrorism. Taking all necessary, anticipated, or possible actions to seal loopholes that terrorists might enter suggests an active process of policy making. To ensure the active prevention of attacks, it is essential and fundamental to regard aviation security as a system and to define all individuals, parts, and connections within the system itself. Potential security deficits and threats in each area of the system should be assessed to determine whether existing security measures and safeguards are adequate or need improvement. Realistically, to eliminate all threats may not be possible; but to decrease threats to a minimum, acceptable level, a successful aviation security system design needs to be invented and appropriately and strategically implemented.¹⁸

An overall system is only as strong as its weakest points; hence, any breach or weaknesses within the aviation security policy itself could lead to tragic and fatal aviation events.^{19, 20} If a terrorist manages to surreptitiously mislead security guards and enter an airport, enabling the penetration or infiltration of a geographical area or country, a catastrophe might befall that region. An armed, passionate terrorist who slips through the cracks and steps onto an airplane is not only a threat for a particular region or country, but also a danger to any other populations and territories in the pathway. Even if all airport security systems are believed to be impervious and perfectly implemented within a country, a mere single breach in one area could cause absolute security failure: devastation. Even though the aviation industry as an entity can be regarded as a freely functioning market, and although this market may operate absent government intervention, aviation security problems are more than just part of the reason for the market’s failure. If any problems are found to be related to the market failure, then the government could intervene to correct this imbalance. One major role of government is to establish important preconditions and to provide public services, such as national security, rules of law, and property rights. Nevertheless, almost all aviation disasters have occurred as a result of institutional failures involving poor communication, a lack of coordination among government departments, and an uneven and unprepared response system.^{21, 22} A critical function of government is to seek maximized efficiency, to protect the public interest, and to minimize the presumable consequences of such system failures. Additionally, governments play a key role in setting market conditions. They do so by enforcing contracts, consumer rights, rules of law, and the provision of services that cannot be met by other institutions—for example, the military, law enforcement, and other public security services.

Ordinary members of society are interested in aviation security policy because they demand transportation that is undeniably safe and secure. Hence, the general population expects that governments are able to develop maximally efficient and effective policies. According to Chris Berry,²³ most people are highly sensitive to fatal aviation disasters, more so than many other forms of death. Dying in an airplane crash at the hands of terrorists, and recognizing that there is no chance to control one’s own fate, is, irrefutably, a nightmare for most people to even imagine. The National Transportation Safety Board indicated that in 2005 alone, only 22 fatalities occurred on scheduled aircraft carriers; yet in that same year, automobile or road accidents accounted for approximately 43,443 fatalities.²⁴ Since the government’s role is to ensure the public interest and common good, governments are on the alert—as inspectors or observers—to the failure(s) of aviation security systems.

Research Questions

An efficient aviation security policy requires in-depth analysis of research questions. The following research questions serve as the guiding mechanisms for this investigative analysis:

• What are the possible deficits and weaknesses of U.S. aviation security policy(ies)?
• How can aviation security policy be designed according to the needs of and against presumptive threats?
• To what extent does U.S. aviation security policy require changes from the perspective of an open-systems theory?

Theoretical Framework

According to open-systems theory,²⁵ all systems consist of individual or subparts. Connections among subsystems are loose. Systems are principally affected by their environment(s), and they also strive to simultaneously morph and adapt to their surrounding environment(s). Indeed, aviation security policy has many subparts, and, likewise, each subpart interacts with another. Specifically, some main and representative subparts of such aviation systems are airports, airlines, private aircraft, air traffic system(s) and control centers, air-ground traffic systems, cargo systems, passenger boarding systems, perimeter security systems, airport security systems, hangars, aviation office buildings, and gas stations for aircraft. All systems and their individual components are interconnected and, by the same token, Charles Perrow asserted in 1984²⁶ that it is inherently impossible to predict all potential or likely failure scenarios or those that render accidents. Such systems emerge or are culminated from an aggregated combination of parts, and their relations to one another make them interdependent to various degrees. The interactions between these parts—that is, within the system—create complexity and variability. It is necessary to monitor the entire system, piece by piece, and distinguish the pieces into analyzable parts, requiring examination of each part and its relationships to others. However, one complication lies in the fact that each airline company has different standards and separated (sub-)systems within the overall, over-arching system. An exigent issue, and one of the critical problems confronted here, is that such a scattered and fragmented structure contributes to intrinsic and extrinsic difficulty in monitoring and controlling the system.

Systems theory posits that environmental surroundings and the resultant permeation of this milieu into the organizational structure render significant effects on the organizational behavior within the system.²⁷ To wit, aviation security policies are often influenced by environmental conditions and situations as well as the macro system. Every social and economic variation within the environment affects aviation security to some extent. Aviation security policies are pressured and impacted by the external environment. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103, the FAA installed and implemented more enhanced forms of explosives-detection equipment. Similarly, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, CAPPS II—a more developed and detailed investigation program—launched, as opposed to the former version of the program. In aviation security systems in general, primary attention is on the interdependence of their environmental parts, in line with postulations put forth by systems theory. Any environmental change precipitates a different set of demands and conditions. Therefore, systems need to match their internal features to the demands of the environments, a means to achieve optimal and maximum adaptation. Plus, environmental adaptation depends—to a significant degree—upon a harmonious balance between environmental demands and the system’s internal features; still, each private airline company has different adaptation skills and resources.

W. Richard Scott in 1998 also stressed the challenges facing system designers.²⁸ Creating structures that overcome limitations and, at the same time, exploit the strengths of each system component (particularly the individual participants) has often been an impediment.²⁹ Even if the system designer creates a so-called perfect design, individuals’ contributions cannot be easily predicted, especially since they may have low channel capacity(ies), insufficient reliability, and poor computational abilities. Over 40 years ago, C. J. Haberstroh noted that, with respect to individuals as contributors to the system(s), estimating outcomes presents a nearly impossible challenge.³⁰ For example, according to a 1999 Department of Transportation report, security employers often did not meet their responsibilities for satisfactory airport security.³¹ This report showed that 283 of the 392 employees (72%) failed to challenge testers for unauthorized access, and 116 of the 625 employees (19%) in secure areas did not display any identification at all. Furthermore, every system has individuals, and they have both negative and positive characteristics, creating constant domino and snowball effects, decreasing the ability to estimate system outcomes.

Two main systems theorists, Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, noted in 1978 that an “organization is a coalition of groups and interests, each attempting to obtain something from the collectivity by interacting with others, and each with its own preferences and objectives.”³² Airport exterior security is assigned to airport management, whereas boarding and screening belong to the airline companies. In light of diverse (and sometimes counterproductive) economical preferences, airline companies sometimes recruit substandard personnel with inadequate training and pay them low wages. Although security must be of primary concern, private companies sometimes prefer to act with economic interests as a top priority. In 2001 congressional testimony, Gerald Dillingham of the General Accounting Office emphasized security personnel quality.³³ He noted that screeners were typically paid less than fast-food restaurant airport employees. These interests of private airline companies affect the efficiency levels and standards of aviation security systems as a whole. Each and every subpart has preferences and objectives, and each brings various effects to the overall system. From a systems theory perspective, U.S. aviation security policy should be structured as a system in which subparts and individual effects must be considered. These systems can be constituted under a government authority, just as many countries are in the European Union. In this way, systems can be better monitored for flaws and defects, and presumable attacks can be more effectively prevented.³⁴

Practical Implications: Policy Options and Solutions

Developing efficient policy options requires the ability to comprehend threats and whatever the policy’s defects are. Clearly, the aviation industry has become a preferred target for terrorists and malicious criminals.³⁵ Of the numerous reasons for the susceptibility and vulnerability of the aviation industry to attackers, one key issue has to do with the system itself being penetrable and misused as a destructive weapon. Bombing airports and airplanes, acts of hijacking and sabotage, and bomb threats are major challenges facing this fragile yet critically important industry. Too, insufficient security systems in the aviation industry and the sensitivity of aircraft to hijacking and methods of attack represent important factors that give aviation its status as an easy target. According to 1999 work by Paul Wilkinson and Brian M. Jenkins,³⁶ terrorists were successful 85% of the time when they tried to hijack an airplane in the 90s, 80s, and 70s. Similarly, according to the past decade’s statistical reports, bona fide terrorists have achieved their goals at a rate of roughly 76% when they attacked airplanes and airports. Finally, because attacks on aircraft may result in many fatalities and likewise draw global media attention, the agendas and motivations for terrorists and malicious criminals to target these sectors may involve their interests in loudly expressing their religious or fundamental ideologies to the world.

Centralized Aviation Security Policy: A Systems Theory Perspective

Systems theory views organizations as comprehensive systems with a cornucopia of subparts and subsystems, all of which are loosely coupled or connected to one another.³⁷ Both airports and the entire surrounding, interactive system(s) have subparts, and centralized aviation security policy provides a rather loose connection between airports and their subparts. From this vantage point, an airline company is part of a larger system. Nevertheless, there is no clear connection between private aviation companies (subparts of a system) and some other subparts of the system (such as airports). Moreover, inherent in the tenets of open-systems theory is the notion that organizations strive to change and adapt to their environment(s). Especially after September 11, 2001, many departments reported that the system(s) being used contained many defects and that transformation would be inevitable. The Homeland Security Department has indicated that centralization for security systems is necessary. Since organizations adapt their internal features to their environmental demands, centralization provides a sort of harmonious balance between aviation security systems and their environments.

Systems theory also emphasizes individual effects on an entire system due to such issues as low channels, an absence of reliability, and poor computational abilities. To underscore the flaws of the current policy to show how the newer system may prove more effective, centralized aviation security policy should enable improved quality across security personnel and education. Relatively higher salaries and the same level of, or more frequent use in, inspections should reduce the negative influences of individuals against the entire system.

Another important contribution to recent failures in aviation security is a generalized, low-level security mentality across airline companies. Since these organizations represent coalitions of groups and interests, every subpart has preferences and objectives that render effects on the overall system. Moreover, private companies usually have a cost-benefit point of view that seeks to reduce the strengths of security points, an approach that may clearly affect the entire system.³⁸ On the other hand, centralized security systems can provide a sort of consensual collectivity of interests in which security agencies may develop the tendency to act in order to fortify security lines.

Evaluations

Since the principal problems of contemporary policy emerge from low-level security approaches (and, likewise, mentalities) of airline companies, new policy options must possess higher-level security approaches. Alternative policies may not be original or innovative and may merely be derived or diffused from ideas and constructs from other international policy options. According to Elizabeth E. Bailey, writing in 2002,³⁹ the European Union’s “system of government operation” is superior to that of the United States. The bottom line, generally, is to maintain both enhanced security and affordable air travel. For example, most countries in the European Union have more comprehensive, stricter, or tighter aviation policies (rules and regulations) than the United States does. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, one particular government agency is responsible for the overall scope of aviation security, screening, and airport operations. While security screeners in the United States are required to complete 12 hours of aviation security training, France requires 60 hours, and Belgium requires 40 hours for basic training in addition to 16 to 24 hours for each other section of specific training. In Turkey, both screeners and airport security agents are primarily assigned to the Turkish National Police, and these jobs are performed principally by well-trained, more lucratively paid officers. Most countries in the European Union allow only ticketed passengers through the screening checkpoints; hence, screeners can dedicate less elaborate attention to checking fewer people.⁴⁰

A brief comparison of the European Union and the United States in reference to their aviation security systems. Performance indicators are aggregated from reports presented to Congress.

The European Union public system had higher scores on indicators such as screener performance, checkpoints, screener training, screener pay and benefits, acuity with rules, and screener turnover. The overall score of the European Union public system was almost three times higher than that of the U.S. private system. Given the aviation security policies in European Union countries, it appears that the United States has a low-level security system overall.

Private airline companies carry a sort of security mentality that has not satisfied public interest concerning aviation security. A federalized and centralized law enforcement agency responsible for securing all modes of air transportation—including airports—can solve, or largely resolve, the aforementioned problems. The agency designed and assigned to operate the country’s entire aviation security system can increase efficiency of aviation security by standardizing airport systems, employing better-qualified security personnel, training them more professionally, and monitoring flaws and defects more efficiently. Being under the same security agency, innovative security tactics such as bomb-sniffing dogs, Federal Air Marshals, and strengthened airport perimeters can be easily implemented. Agency inspectors can frequently test security personnel in specific time intervals, and managers can award or reward officers who catch any prohibited objects or devices. This will lift the limited benefits and repetitive, tedious, and oftentimes monotonous nature of security personnel work.

Transforming current policy and implementing new policies will certainly create additional expenses in an agency’s budget—hiring more highly paid and trained employees is a costly enterprise. However, security expenditures from one airline company can be transferred to another company. Passengers can be charged additional taxes if they so choose or vote to upgrade the security level(s) of their public transportation. Additional expenditures by airline companies and passengers may be lower than the indirect costs related to the inconvenience to passengers and any loss of business to airlines when an aviation disaster presumably strikes.

Limitations

The aviation security sector in the United States is a massive system in which more than 475 commercial airports are used for 40% of all flights in the world. More than 2 million passengers daily travel on 30,000 flights, and 450 trillion tons of cargo are transported via airplanes each year in the world.^{41, 42} Therefore, it is difficult to develop and change aviation security policy(ies) when making a comparison to other public policies.

Another difficulty concerns restrictions on transparency. Especially after 9/11, inspectors reported that the transparency of aviation security policies made terrorist attacks on aircrafts and airports easier. Therefore, new policies have been developed to attain a higher level of security. Neither the structure of security systems nor data about efficiency have been made available for public access and researchers. Thus, empirical studies related to aviation security, as well as evidence-based approaches, are becoming increasingly difficult.

On the other hand, given our free-market orientation, the aviation sector may be affected by various governmental interventions. Many relevant stakeholders assert that the government should not intrude too invasively into the aviation market; even here, the issue of concern is security.⁴³ The 9/11 disaster has invariably converted the route of government in terms of intervention into the free market of aviation. For over 20 years, the European Union and its aviation security systems have typically lacked the degree of responsiveness to U.S. problems and may do more harm than good.⁴⁴

Discussion

As a conclusive statement, the main concerns regarding aviation security policy must be to obtain both enhanced security and affordability in air travel. The biggest challenge to this approach lies in developing security systems that are efficient, with minimal intrusion from the government, to maintain aviation as a free market and part of public-private life. Contemporary conditions in the United States, with respect to aviation security systems, cannot respond to public interests and sector concerns. The commonsense reason for the importance of aviation security simply points to the nation’s overall security. Government groups must develop more efficient policies, whether to federalize aviation security or improve airlines’ security levels. Yet the bottom line remains: the aviation security system must be managed and operated as a whole system, as overall security is as strong as the weakest point in the system. The European Union public system has higher scores on multiple indicators (screener performance, checkpoints, screener training, screener pay and benefits, acuity with rules, and screener turnover) than the U.S. private system overall. In fact, it is almost three times higher. Given the aviation security policies in European Union countries, it appears that the United States has a low-level security system overall.

For all these reasons, we are suggesting the need for a fundamentally different U.S. approach, one that measures up to the European Union public system. This is not to say that the U.S. private system should copy the European Union model. However, the U.S. system needs to take necessary steps to ensure the aviation safety measures that the European model possesses. It would prove useful for the FAA, for instance, to merge with the TSA. The FAA, by joining forces with the TSA, a separate and culturally different U.S. entity, would improve its current airline safety levels by increasing the protection of U.S. transportation systems and thereby increase the guarantee of freedom of movement for people and commerce. Another policy is the achievement of full federalization of the U.S. aviation system. In a similar vein, it would be practical to have U.S. government planners take more of a systems-level view of security requirements.

References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1. Andrew R. Thomas, Aviation Insecurity (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003).

2. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

3. Andrew R. Thomas, Aviation Security Management.

4. Frank J. Costello, “Post-9-11 Challenges for Aviation Security,” in William C. Nicholson, ed., Homeland Security Law and Policy (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 2005), pp. 234-248.

5. Bruce Maxwell, ed., Homeland Security (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004).

6. Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 1990.

7. Gerald L. Dillingham, General Accounting Office, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues, “Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security,” testimony before the Subcommittees on Transportation, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, Sep. 20, 2001.

8. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004).

9. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 41, 2003, pp. 649-670.

10. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

11. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York: Routledge, 2009).

12. Ryan Fries, Mashrur Chowdhury, and Jeffrey Brummond, Transportation Infrastructure Security Utilizing Intelligent Transportation Systems (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009).

13. Anne Graham, Managing Airports: An International Perspective (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001).

14. Chris Berry, “Policy Change in Aviation Security: Canada and the United States, 1985-2005,” master’s thesis, University of Calgary, Alberta, 2007.

15. Bruce Maxwell, ed., Homeland Security.

16. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

17. Bruce Maxwell, ed., Homeland Security.

18. Chris Berry, “Policy Change in Aviation Security: Canada and the United States, 1985-2005.”

19. Gerald L. Dillingham, “Aviation Security.”

20. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

21. The 9/11 Commission Report.

22. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

23. Chris Berry, “Policy Change in Aviation Security.”

24. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2006.

25. W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998).

26. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

27. W. Richard Scott, Organizations.

28. W. Richard Scott, Organizations.

29. W. Richard Scott, Organizations.

30. C. J. Haberstroh, in Handbook of Organizations, James G. March, ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

31. “Airport Access Control,” U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Nov. 18, 1999.

32. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 76.

33. Gerald L. Dillingham, “Aviation Security.”

34. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

35. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

36. Paul Wilkinson and Brian M. Jenkins, eds., Aviation Terrorism and Security (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).

37. W. Richard Scott, Organizations.

38. Michael L. Pinedo, Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems (New York: Springer, 2008).

39. Elizabeth E. Bailey, “Aviation Policy: Past and Present,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 69, no. 1, 2002, pp. 12-20.

40. General Accounting Office, congressional testimony on airport screeners, 2000.

41. Andrew R. Thomas, Aviation Insecurity.

42. Andrew R. Thomas, ed., Aviation Security Management.

43. Elizabeth E. Bailey, “Aviation Policy: Past and Present.”

44. Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).