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The following editorial published in
the Washington Times on 16 September, 2001, explains
how the strategic functions of Homeland Security interact
in a logical cycle, using as an example the terrorist attack
on 11 September 2001, and the anticipated US response.
All
wars progress according to a logic, a pattern of cause and
effect. Because of high emotions, that logic is not always
clear at the time. But the victor is the one who understands
the logic and uses it. For this war, the goal should be ending
the use of terror against America. Winning the war -- getting
the logic right -- will require patience, perseverance, planning
. . . and a steely resolve.
Security
of our homeland flows from a strategic cycle of events. Our
preference is deterrence, but this takes time.
Enemies are deterred when they believe that their efforts
will fail at a price too high to pay. But this mind-set is
the cumulative result of all our actions over time. Once we
have failed to instill fear of failure and punishment, we
will have to work through the entire cycle before restoring
it. There are no short cuts. We can restore deterrence, but
we will have to be patient and persevere.
When
deterrence fails we turn to prevention. This
is the sum of all the actions, small and large, that prevent
or mitigate an attack. Our nation is huge and complex. A suicide
attack will always find some vulnerability, but preventative
efforts - from airports checks to arms control agreements
to active defense systems - can minimize the damage. Prevention
failed in Boston and Newark and Dulles. The cost of improving
it nationwide will be high, and the system will never be perfect.
But we can improve it, if we work the problem at every level
from local to national. Again, we will have to show patience
and perseverance.
If
our intelligence is good enough and if we are convinced that
attack is imminent, we can preempt. But this
is dangerous stuff. Preemption is hard. Some missions will
fail. Some soldiers will die. Some counter strikes against
us will be planned. Some in the court of world opinion will
disapprove. Preemption can be effective, but it will be expensive
and it will take time to equip and improve our forces. And
it will cause a hue and cry abroad. The ability to preempt
with confidence is not achieved overnight. We must persevere.
Because
our previous actions fell short in these three areas, deterring
or preventing another attack will depend upon what we do next.
We
are almost done with step four, crisis management.
This began the moment we received a credible threat of attack,
and will continue until we are sure this wave of destruction
is over. Division of labor is important: local agencies address
local problems, while federal agencies focus on national threats.
Considering the unprecedented scale of the attacks, we actually
did pretty well. Buildings were evacuated, traffic was no
worse than in a major snowstorm, emergency services responded
well, elected officials at national, state and local level
remained in control. But we should not be complacent; the
attacks might not be over. We don't know, for example, if
a biological attack took place at the same time as the air
attacks - and we won't know for weeks. We must persevere in
our determination to work through this crisis.
The
same is true of consequence management. This
will be really hard. It will take days to evacuate the dead
and wounded, weeks to clean up the sites, and years to rebuild
the damage to our facilities, our economy and our psyche.
Again, state and local agencies will take the local lead,
while federal agencies deal with national issues like restoring
the economic and transportation systems. Opening the cities
and restoring "almost-normal" life are essential
to show attackers that they failed. We are not as ready for
this as we should be. New organizations, training and doctrine
are required. But given what we had to work with this time,
so far, so good -- although perseverance through the hardest
part is still to come.
The
next step, attribution, is the key to direct
action against the murdering criminals who attacked us. Every
resource of our intelligence and criminal justice systems
and all we can borrow from our friends and allies needs to
be dedicated to the search. The case does not have to be perfect,
but it must be good enough for a conviction in the court of
public opinion. To win this war, we must win the moral battle,
and that means gathering evidence and making it public. Fortunately,
this type of investigation is exactly what the FBI does best.
The situation could be worse. With biological, or radiological,
or cyber attacks it would be. But this time, we can succeed
at attribution if we persevere.
Which
brings us to the President's toughest decision: retaliation.
Getting this right in order to deter and prevent future attacks
will require careful planning and a steely resolve. We must
resist the passionate calls for wide spread revenge or a declaration
of war, which would give our enemies a moral and a legal standing
they do not deserve. And we must resist weak pleas for understanding
and negotiation. We must not be partisan or chase personalities
- this must not degenerate into Bush vs. Bin Laden. Instead
we must focus relentlessly on exactly what we want to achieve
- destroying the terrorist network that attacked us and deterring
terrorism itself. The President (with Congress in agreement)
will have to decide whether this means "bringing the
individuals to justice" - with its time consuming legal
mechanisms and danger of further attacks during trial and
imprisonment -- or the more satisfying but less accepted approach
of treating them as military targets. Either way, planning
will have to be detailed and precise, and the nation resolute
in pressing home the attack. We must get retribution right
to revive deterrence, or we will never be secure again.
There
is no shortcut through this cycle. If we want peace in the
future, then we must work our way through the logic of homeland
security to get there. This devastating attack on defenseless
men and women may seem an act of madness, but it was not.
It was logical and calculating. If we are to win this shadowy
war and secure our homeland in the future, then our response
must be logical as well.
-Dave
McIntyre, a retired military officer and former Dean of the
National War College, is the Deputy Director for Research
of the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security.
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