Institute Analysis 009 - September 2002

Understanding the New
National Security Strategy of the United States

Dr. David McIntyre - Deputy Director, ANSER Institute

 

Since 1986, federal law has required a public declaration of each Administration's national security strategy so the Congress and the people may understand its intents and priorities in defending and advancing the interests of the United States. And each President since 1986 has declared similar general goals for the nation's future: peace, prosperity, and influence in a world stable but steadily improving economically, politically, and in the physical well being of its citizens. Despite occasional charges by political opponents, no modern President has proposed withdrawing behind America's ocean borders and hiding from the world's problems. So the primary difference between Presidential visions for our national security is not so much what is to be achieved, as how America is to go about it.

The last Administration saw American security as a byproduct of global security, which was best produced by promoting free markets and human rights, themselves best ensured by multilateral action taken through formal international structures, like the UN, treaties, and collective security operations.

This Administration seeks a similar goal - a "world not just safer but better" -- but through a dramatically different approach. The new strategy is more pragmatic, and sees American security as the direct result of US efforts to continually manage problems, rather than expecting those problems to right themselves once the proper global environment is created. It depends more on bilateral relations than multilateral structures, looks to assist those with promise rather than just those in need, and ultimately relies on force to support international standards, rather than international standards to contain hostile force. It is a strategy for American leadership by action, rather than leadership through cooperation. It is a strategy for a nation at war.

Clearly, a new player is at bat. This one does not aim for a hit so perfect that the other side gives up the game -- just a winning balance of plans and plays. Although less than half the size of its predecessors, the new strategy (to borrow a baseball metaphor) has power, lift and distance. Unfortunately, it ultimately falls outside the boundaries of the field, well struck, but not playable in the day-to-day game of international relations. But this flaw can be mended; a little adjustment to the basic stance might make this one a winner.

A New Context

Comparing this document to national strategies previously published is difficult because the context is so different. Those released in the last decade had to deal with potential threats - nuclear proliferation, ethnic conflicts, the reversal of democratic trends - but not living enemies. The only survival threats of the 1990's were posed to our values. The argument was for engagement and enlargement of free markets and democratic governments, lest a world develop hostile to our vision of freedom. The strategy called for involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping issues lest we cease to be the nation we want to be.

The Strategy of 2002, by contrast, notes from its opening page that we are directly threatened "by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few" - engaged in "a war against terrorists of global reach," where the enemy is not so much a person or a people as a type of behavior: "The enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." This gives the Strategy both a focus and an air of practicality that carries throughout the document. The top priority of the nation is clear: "to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership." Every other aspect of the nation's international relations is ordered against, or influenced by, this priority. As a result, the call for action to shape a world of justice and respect for human dignity is less altruistic than in previous years, and more driven by the requirement for measurable results.

The goal is practical: reducing the reservoir of anger that might engender attacks on the United States. In dealings with non-hostile nations, this is intended to play out in measurable support and responsible behavior by friends, allies, and those who seek our help. In dealings with those hostile to our existence, it will play out in "proactive counter proliferation" to prevent them from striking first.

A Call for New Action by Others

For example, while this new Strategy continues the emphasis on expanding free markets and free trade that has served as America's bridge to the future for a decade, it includes a new description of what this should look like in practice. The Administration expects to see:

The tone suggests a new, hard line in demanding that the benefits of a free economy be shared with all, and not just the elite that has too often emerged in newly open economies to siphon off the wealth of those new to the concept of private ownership. Similarly, the emphasis on property rights and unfair labor and trade practices suggests impatience with promises, and insistence on results, in turning opportunities for trade into development for people. All indications are that the US plans to be bold in using its economic leverage to demand certain behavior of its trading partners, large and small.

That leverage will be used both to defuse regional conflicts and to promote global trade. Despite charges that the Administration is too quick to "go it alone" in international relations, the Strategy lists many locations (Israel and Palestine, India and Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia, parts of Latin America, and many places in Africa) where its preferred approach is to use international relationships and institutions to manage regional crises. Additionally, the statement that "The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves" sounds a warning that the US plans to be judicious in such situations, not easily manipulated by claims of victimhood or helplessness. And beyond that, the Strategy envisions maintaining momentum on free trade issues by continuing to press for new agreements at the global, regional and bilateral levels. But the emphasis is on measurable results, not just consultation or agreement.

A similar willingness to use leverage to press underdeveloped nations (and hence potential trouble spots) into sound development policies is reflected in the discussion of economic assistance. Refusing to measure aid in terms of dollars spent but insisting on evidence of increased productivity instead, the Strategy demonstrates a preference to assist nations that have "met the challenge of national reform," over simple claims of need. Again, the focus is on results - on measurable actions in fighting corruption, improving respect for law and human rights, and investing in education, agriculture, and health care. And the promise is that such progress will be met with grants instead of loans, decreasing the problem of future debt and of future resentment against the US at the same time. Clearly, the emphasis is on action and accountability by those who look to the US for economic and political assistance.

An Announcement of New Action by the US

This call for results-based action extends to US use of force as well, and it is here that the ball drifts outside the lines when it comes to the critical new issue of preemption.

No doubt those who crafted this Strategy were focused on the current crisis with Iraq as they laid out the rational for "Prevent[ing]Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction." But the quick dismissal of deterrence as a Cold War concept, and the rush to embrace "proactive counter proliferation" (preemption) as a replacement, seems a bit one-dimensional when considering the range of global challenges we are likely to face in the future.

The justification for a new doctrine of preemption is three fold:

1. The inability to deter a potential attacker.
2. The immediacy of today's threats.
3. The magnitude of potential harm.

"The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action," the Strategy argues, and if current international law poses an obstacle to action, then it must "adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."

The problem is that this position is simply asserted and not demonstrated logically. Hence, despite the disclaimer that "The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats," (nor should others), the new doctrine sets no bounds. No standard is offered to judge when the US would consider the threat dangerous enough to preempt and when it would not - hence there is no answer to others (India? Pakistan? Israel? China?) who might adopt preemption themselves. In future situations, might the US again choose preemption even though deterrence would this time be appropriate? And knowing this, might others be more likely to strike even earlier - requiring the US to improve its first strike capabilities in return? The logic of offense and defense could make a world of unbounded preemption very ugly indeed.

Curiously, a strong argument for preemption does exist in the case of Iraq inning Strategy for a wartime nation. But we must not confuse the strategy for a single game, no matter how important, with a strategy for the long haul.